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Hostility to copyright has a long and honorable history. In the nine-
teenth century, for example, Lord Macaulay argued that while copy-
right might be necessary to ensure a "supply of good books," the 
monopoly that it imposed was at best a necessary evil. 
For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought 
not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing 
the good. 1 
A number of studies critical of intellectual property followed in our 
century.2 The most well known is probably the economically oriented 
1970 study by Stephen Breyer (then a professor, now a federal appel-
latejudge) who argued that the "case for copyright protection is weak," 
particularly as applied to certain classes of works. 3 The trend has con-
tinued. In 1988 William Fisher published a lengthy article recom-
mending that the "fair use" doctrine4 be reformulated to deny 
enforcement of copyright claims that conflict with particular economic 
I. THOMAS MACAULAY, Speech Before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in 8 THE 
WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 195, 199 (Lady Trevelyan ed. 1866) (opposing a bill which would 
have extended the duration of copyright protection). 
2. See the sources in collected note 25 infra. 
3. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, 
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 350 (1970) [hereinafter Breyer, The Uneasy Case]; 
see also id. at 283-84; Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972). 
4. The "fair use" doctrine privileges acts that would otherwise constitute copyright in-
fringement. Congress recognized this judicially created and protean doctrine in the Copy-
right Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (permitting "the fair use ofa copyrighted work ... 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research"). 
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or utopian goals.5 Even more recently, Tom Palmer has attacked all 
intellectual property as illegitimate for giving rights beyond what would 
be available under the common law of tangible property and contract. 6 
Most of the critics of intellectual property have not challenged the 
concept of private property in other contexts. This pattern is the re-
verse of what might be expected, since many of the most common criti-
cisms addressed to the institution of private property are less applicable 
to authors' claims over their works. For example, private property has 
been strenuously criticized on the ground that it impedes full human 
development by allowing workers to be separated from the fruits of 
their labor. 7 Patent and copyright, by contrast, extend the power of 
creative persons to control what they have made.8 Nevertheless, in 
some quarters intellectual property has been hard put to hold its own. 
The special burdens scholars place on copyright may have their ori-
gins in public perception.9 There is often a distrust of copyright when 
its compulsions conflict with the usual expectations people have of the 
freedoms they should be entitled to exercise over their physical posses-
5. See generally William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 
1659 (1988). I discuss Fisher's position further at text accompanying notes 407-409 & 440-
442 infra. 
6. Tom Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAM-
LINE L. REV. 261 (1989). I discuss Palmer's position further at text accompanying notes 313-
318 & 344-388 infra. 
7. See, e.g., ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND PoLmCAL THEORY 160-66 (1984) (examining 
Marx's view that systems of production in which "property as capital ... is in control" frus-
trate humankind's need for creative work. Id. at 163-64). 
8. The primary protection that intellectual property law gives creators is a legal right 
against those who would use or copy the work without permission. That right can be em-
ployed as a tool of creative control. However, it is also a form of wealth. Subject to some 
limitations, notably the inalienable power to terminate copyright grants, see note 143 infra and 
accompanying text, creators can sell this wealth. Since intellectual property law can amelio-
rate but not eliminate underlying disparities in bargaining power, economic need might in-
duce an impecunious author or inventor to part with control over her work, and even to give 
up the liberty to use it, perhaps in return for fairly small rewards. Thus, although intellectual 
property improves the creative person's position, it can guarantee neither adequacy of com-
pensation nor continuation of control. 
The issues raised by the transferability and employer ownership of copyright are outside 
the scope of this article. By and large, I treat the creative person as the copyright holder, and 
do not focus on the special issues that might be raised when the copyright holder is an em-
ployer or assignee. This should not significantly distort my arguments since neither the nor-
mative issue most directly implicated by these distinctions (namely, the "personality" interests 
served by copyright) nor empiri_cal issues are the focus here. All that is necessary for the 
instant analysis is that creative persons receive some increased potential for control and reward 
from copyright, which they certainly do. I have therefore thought it beneficial so to simplify 
the discussion and reserve the questions raised for another time. 
For further discussion of the varying roles of creators and others under copyright, see, 
e.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 6-9 (1967) (suggesting that pub-
lishers rather than authors were the intended beneficiaries of England's first copyright stat-
ute); id. at 74-75 (suggesting that copyright also "serve[s] the material expectations and 
psychological cravings of the individual creative worker"). 
9. For a general discussion of the role that lay perceptions have played or should play in 
the development of property law, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CON-
STITUTION 88-167 (1977). 
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sions. 10 In everyday experience, when people who buy records, video 
cassettes, and computer programs are told not to use their own home 
machines to make copies of them, or when radio listeners are told it 
might be unlawful for them to tape music off the air, 11 there is often a 
feeling of unfair restriction. Another source for popular unease re-
garding intellectual property is that one need climb no fences to make 
copies of intellectual products. The restraints are obviously artificial, 
making the state's hand visible in a way a physical barrier does not. 
One knows one is doing something wrong when one tries to sneak into 
a neighbor's house or pick the lock of another's automobile; it may not 
seem so obviously wrong to tape a musical recording or duplicate a 
computer program that is already in hand. In addition, an act of copy-
ing seems to harm no one. 12 There is no perceptible loss, no shattered 
lock or broken fencepost, no blood, not even a psychological sensation 
of trespass. As a result of all these factors, ordinary citizens may per-
ceive a copyright owner's intangible interest as imposing an "extra" 
restriction, limiting their liberty in a way that ordinary property does 
not. 
Legal scholars show a parallel unease. Although lawyers and theo-
rists have long recognized that property is not a matter of touchable 
"things" but rather a set of rules governing human relations in regard 
to resources, 13 some commentators are concerned that certain objects 
of intellectual property law are not sufficiently "thinglike" to be the 
subject of "ownership." 14 Thus, doubts about copyright often have a 
10. As one commentator observed, "By the time the Supreme Court rendered its deci-
sion [Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (the Betamax case)], 
much of the population seem[ed] to have concluded that it was perfectly appropriate behavior 
[to use VCRs] to record copyrighted programs broadcast over the public airwaves." Fisher, 
supra note 5, at 1732. 
11. Although the Supreme Court has ruled that certain off-the-air home videotaping of 
television broadcasts is fair use, Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417, it is not yet clear whether home 
audio taping, with its arguably greater potential for harm to the copyright owner, is entitled to 
the same treatment, see 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 13.05(F)(5)(b)(ii) (1988). 
12. On the role of "harm" and "benefit" in copyright, see text accompanying notes 190-
202 infra. 
13. The Supreme Court has thus held that intangible interests can be "property." Ruck-
elshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (trade secrets are "property" subject to the 
protection of the fifth amendment takings clause). The Court wrote: 
It is conceivable that [the term 'property' in the takings clause] was used in its vulgar 
and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises 
rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in a more 
accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the 
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the 
construction given the phrase has been the latter. 
Id. at 1003 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)); see 
also Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q 8, 12 (1928). 
14. Timothy Terrell and Jane Smith present a sophisticated variant of such an approach; 
they usefully concentrate not on physicality but on specificity. They have suggested that the 
right of publicity so lacks boundaries and specificity that it should not be treated as an inherit-
able property right, but that other intellectual property rights might not manifest this defi-
ciency. Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publidty, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A 
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remarkably spatial dimension. For example, Justice Holmes opined: 
[Copyright] restrains the spontaneity of men where but for it there 
would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is 
a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the 
party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand miles from the 
owner and without his ever becoming aware of the wrong. 15 
Running through much of the commentary seems to be the perception, 
whether spoken or unspoken, that intellectual property is somehow a 
"sport," a statutory exception to the common law pattern, imposing 
unique restraints on liberty. 16 Some critics seem to think that, as a 
moral matter, consent by the individuals affected is the only sufficient 
ground for imposing legal restraints on copying. 17 As with the lay per-
ception, at bottom there seems to be a feeling that having intellectual 
property rights is less natural than having tangible property rights, and 
that somehow the compulsions inherent in copyright require special 
justification. 
One can further speculate about the reasons for such an attitude. 
History may fuel it. In England and on the Continent, governments 
sometimes did grant "exclusive rights" over printing and manufacture 
for unsavory ends, such as censorship. 18 In my view, the origins of in-
tellectual property raise questions quite separable from the issue of its 
Co11ceptual a11d Eco11omic A11a{l'Sis of the I11heritability Issue, 34 EMORY LJ. I, 28-54 ( 1985) (present-
ing and applying a concept of" 'thingness' as specificity"); see also text accompanying notes 
167-190 mfra (discussing the function of boundaries). 
For a discussion of the rnle demarcation plays in reducing the harm that intellectual 
property rights can impose, see Wendy J. Gordon, Owning the Fruits of Creative Labor: 
Boundaries and Limits in Intellectual Property (Aug. 16, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Stanford Law Review) [hereinafter W. Gordon, Creative Labor]. For a discussion of 
the role that demarcation plays in encouraging the formation of markets in intellectual prop-
erty, see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1605-14 (1982) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use). 
15. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes,]., 
concurring). Justice Holmes argued further that because of this intangibility, copyright 
"could not be recognized or endured for more than a limited time" and is therefore uniquely 
a "product of statute." Id. 
16. "Copyright law is usually treated as an offshoot of patent law-as one of the two 
queer bra11d1es of our jurisprodmce in which, by a11 exception depending on statute, intangible ideas 
are protected." Kenneth Umbreit, A Comideratio11 of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 932, 932 
(1939) (emphasis added). 
17. See, e.g .. 2 MURRAY ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES 652-60 (1962). Rothbard favored rights against copying, apparently on the 
ground that creators could bargain with potential copyists as a condition of physical access 
and obtain consensual no-copy agreements from them. Id. at 653-55. In his view, the copy-
right notice reflected such an agreement between authors and purchasers of copies. Id. at 
654. He opposed rights against independent recreation, such as appear in patent law, be-
cause an independent inventor does not need to bargain with the original inventor and thus 
would have no reason to bargain away his freedom of invention. Tom Palmer takes such a 
view one step further. Palmer, supra note 6. Palmer opposes both copyright and patent, and 
he argues for limiting creative persons to the rights that they could extract through contract 
from the law of tangible property. I discuss these consent-oriented positions at text accompa-
nying notes 313-388 iefra. 
18. See, e.g., B. KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 3-9 (origins of copyright in England). 
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present functioning; but the circumstances under which the doctrines 
first appeared may leave a residue of doubt. 19 Also, it is conceivable 
that a preference for physical over intangible claims reflects unchange-
able aspects of human psychology.20 Or the attitude may simply be a 
habit of mind left over from a simpler age, when reprographic technol-
ogy, and laws to control it, were not part of everyday life. 
Whatever its sources, the unease with intellectual property has con-
ceptual components that this article will analyze. For example: Are the 
compulsions of intellectual property really different from what appears 
in other areas of the law? What importance should tangibility have? 
Has the perception that intellectual property is "different" pushed 
scholars to judge the institution by inappropriate or unduly demanding 
criteria? 
The question of appropriate criteria is raised in particular by the 
economic commentary on intellectual property, where a search for spe-
cial justification is discernible. That economics should be a focus of 
attention is unsurprising, since both copyright and patent law are seen 
as serving primarily economic incentive functions.21 What may be sur-
19. Thus, Tom Palmer argues that "[m]onopoly privilege and censorship lie at the his-
torical root of patent and copyright." Palmer, supra note 6, at 264 (footnote omitted). 
20. See, e.g., ROBERT ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE: A PERSONAL INQ.UIRY INTO 
THE ANIMAL ORIGINS OF PROPERTY AND NATIONS ( 1966) (suggesting that humankind is a "terri-
torial species" for which physical space has a unique importance). 
21. The constitutional clause is usually taken to indicate that the primary goal of copy-
right and patent law is to provide incentives: Congress is authorized to give authors and 
inventors rights of limited duration "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Justice Stevens wrote that the Constitution authorizes Congress 
to convey limited "monopoly privileges" "to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products 
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
For discussions of intellectual property's incentive effects, see, e.g., Martin Adelman, The 
Supreme Court, .\l/arket Structure, and Innovation, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457 (1982); Kenneth Arrow, 
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF IN-
VENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962); Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1605-14, and sources cited 
therein; William Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 17 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 325 (1989); Barry Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published 
Books, IS UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971); see also Richard Adelstein & Steven Peretz, The Competi-
tion of Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L 
REV. L. & EcoN. 209 (1985) (presenting an evolutionary approach to the development of 
intellectual property markets). For an interesting attempt to systematize the kinds of empiri-
cal comparisons necessary to analyze fully copyright's incentive effects, see SJ. Liebowitz, 
Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, in RESEARCH IN LAw AND EcoNOMics: THE 
ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 181, 183-88 (J. Palmer & R. Zerbe eds. 1986) [here-
inafter THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS], and SJ. Liebowitz, Copyright and Indirect 
Appropriability: Photocopying of journals, 93 J. PoL. ECON. 945 (1985). 
Several foundational works provide the background economists draw upon when analyz-
ing intellectual property questions. In one of these, Harold Demsetz presents the "internal-
ization of externalities" as the key function of property. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 347, 348 (May 1967) (papers & proceedings). Note that 
copyright allows authors to capture ("internalize") the payoff from benefits their works gener-
ate. In addition, intellectual products have what are known as "public goods" characteristics: 
They can be shared over a fairly broad range of use without diminishing any one user's enjoy-
ment, and it can be difficult to exclude nonpayors from sharing them. See Gordon, Fair L'se, 
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prising is that economic critics have spent relatively little time examin-
ing how copyright facilitates the evolution of economic markets,22 as 
compared with the attention they have devoted to examining flaws in 
the markets that have evolved. In particular, academic critics have ex-
pressed strong concern that intellectual property's incentive effects for 
encouraging new works might be too weak to outweigh its so-called 
"monopoly" effects on resource allocation. 23 Despite inconclusive em-
supra note 14, at 1610-12 & nn.65-73. Private markets do not reliably provide optimum sup-
plies of "public goods," and it is often argued that this failure justifies some kind of govern-
mental intervention either to provide the goods directly (e.g., in the case of roads or national 
defense) or to restructure legal rights to create the excludability on which private markets 
depend (e.g., copyright). See Otto Davis & Andrew Whinston, On the Distinction Between Public 
a11d Primte Goods, 57 All!. EcoN. REV. 360 (May 1967) (papers & proceedings) (general discus-
sion of public goods); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. EcoN. & 
STATISTICS 387 (1954) (foundational analysis of public goods). 
Providing incentives for the creation of new works is not the only economic role intellec-
tual property plays. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
EcoN. 265 (1977) (suggesting that patents are also important in order to organize efficiently 
the development and exploitation of existing inventions); Robert Denicola, Institutional Public-
ity Rights: An A11alysis of the Merchandisi11g of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C.L. REV. 603, 637-41 
(1984) (applying a similar analysis to trademarks). 
Note that although the Supreme Court's analyses continue to treat the provision of eco-
nomic incentives to produce new works as important, an "authors' rights" or fairness-based 
strain of analysis has also emerged. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 546 (1985); notes 449-450 infra and accompanying text. 
22. Some economic treatments sympathetic to copyright do exist, however. See, e.g., 
Landes & Posner, supra note 21. 
23. Intellectual property law gives creators whose works have no perfect substitutes the 
power to increase their revenues by restricting their production of copies and charging for 
each a price in excess of marginal cost. At the extreme, this can amount to monopoly power. 
Economists discussing monopoly usually consider the decrease in quantity as the evil to be 
avoided. As a result of monopoly pricing, fewer consumers will purchase copies than would 
under conditions of perfect competition. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICA· 
TIONS 238-44 (3d ed. 1984); Fisher, supra note 5 at 1700-04; Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 
1605-14. 
Perfect price discrimination would make it possible to induce the creator to produce both 
the work and the optimal number of copies. Of course, this would also enable the producer to 
capture all the consumer surplus. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 
j.L. & ECON. 293 (1970). 
The possibilities of price discrimination aside, intellectual property's ability to generate 
incentives does bring with it some quantity reduction. The notion of copyright's causing a 
decrease in the number of copies purchased may seem odd, however, since the creator may 
not have fashioned the particular intellectual product at all had she not been able to look 
fonvard to the economic returns made possible by copyright. In other words, sometimes the 
alternative to copyright may be zero copies rather than more copies. For a model of quantita-
tive analysis that takes this potential paradox into account, see Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photo-
copJillg, and Price Discrimination, supra note 21, at 186-88. Copyright supporters tend to argue 
that any short-run consumer loss that results from monopoly effects is more than compen-
sated for by copyright's ability in the long-run to cause new works to be created. Copyright 
critics tend to make the opposite empirical claim. 
The balance between incentive and restriction is not always the same. For example, any 
particular book, movie, or invention is likely to face competition from other books, movies, or 
inventions which are near but not perfect substitutes. The extent to which monopoly power is 
present in any particular case is an empirical question. See Edmund Kitch, Patents: ,\1011opolies 
or Property Rights?, in THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, supra note 21, at 31. 
In addition to the quantity issue, the matter of price has normative implications. In eve-
ryday life, one commonjudgment of unfairness is that something costs more than it "should." 
Macaulay suggested there is a moral aspect to the shift in consumer buying patterns that can 
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pirical evidence,24 a fairly wide range of encouragement-oriented com-
mentary centers on the possibility that the institution of intellectual 
property is not carrying its economic weight.25 
This article will address three issues inherent in intellectual prop-
erty criticism: (1) the descriptive question of whether the structure and 
function of intellectual property is essentially different from, or consis-
tent with, the patterns found in other areas of the law; (2) the normative 
question of whether copyright should be condemned because it im-
poses state-enforced restraints on potential copiers; and (3) the norma-
tive question of the proper role that economic analysis should play in 
occur as books become more expensive: Copyright "is a tax on readers for the purpose of 
giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one of the most 
innocent and most salutary of human pleasures; and never let us forget, that a tax on innocent 
pleasures is a premium on vicious pleasures." T. MACAULAY, supra note 1, at 20 I. Of course, 
as book prices go down, there is no guarantee that the consumers will spend the cost savings 
in ways that would please Macaulay or anyone else; there are many variant noneconomic con-
ceptions of what is socially desirable. 
24. Part of the difficulty is methodological. See George Priest, What Economists Can Tell 
Lawyers About Intellectual Property, in THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, supra note 
21, at 19 ("[l]n the current state of knowledge, economists know almost nothing about the 
effect on social welfare of the patent system or of other systems of intellectual property." Id. 
at 21.). 
25. See notes 396-401 infra and accompanying text. Judge Breyer's work represents the 
leading modern analysis suggesting that copyright might not be economically justifiable. See 
Breyer, The c.:neasy Case, supra note 3 (arguing that in several areas copyright is so unnecessary 
to securing remuneration that portions of the proposed statutory revisions then under consid-
eration that would grant additional protections to authors would be inadvisable); see also 
Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, supra note 3. For an earlier analysis reflecting similar judgments 
about the economics of copyright, see Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects ef Copyright in Books, 1 
EcoNOMICA (n.s.) 167 (1934) (arguing that publishers have ample means other than copyright 
to obtain remuneration and suggesting that instead of a long copyright term, a compulsory 
license arrangement should be imposed five years after publication so that "the public would 
no longer have to wait more than five years for cheap copies of the books they wish to buy." 
Id. at 196); see also Robert Hurt & Robert Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 
AM. EcoN. REV. 421 (May 1966) (papers & proceedings) (stating what came to be the standard 
economic analysis-weighing incentive effects against restrictions on access-and concluding 
that the welfare effects of copyright required more empirical investigation). 
In addition, there is some concern that any extra profits accrued by virtue of the intellec-
tual property monopoly may not aid incentives toward creation but rather may be "dissipated 
through competition for the monopoly." SJ. Liebowitz, The Betamax Case 30 n.4 (Aug. 16, 
1984) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Law Review). 
The efficiency aspects of intellectual property continue to be an active concern among 
economists and economically oriented lawyers. See, e.g. THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND 
COPYRIGHTS, supra note 21; William R.Johnson, The Economics ef Copying, 93 J. PoL. EcoN. 158 
(1985); Ian Novos & Michael Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection, 92 J. PoL. 
ECON. 236 (1984). 
Much of the debate concerning the economic aspects of copyright surfaces within the 
context of fair use law. For varying uses of economics in that context, see Fisher, supra note 5, 
at 1698-1744 (analyzing how a court might restructure the law of infringement and fair use if 
its goal were solely to maximize economic value); Gordon, Fair L'se, supra note 14 (suggesting 
that efficiency gains can justify fair use where, because of market failure, enforcing the copy-
right would not yield the copyright holder substantial revenues); Liebowitz, Copyright Law, 
Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, supra note 21 (suggesting that copyright protection may 
be undesirable and "fair use" preferable where "the benefits of increased consumption ap-
pear to outweigh the harm from reduced production." Id. at 188); see also Adelstein & Peretz, 
supra note 21 (evolutionary approach). 
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justifying copyright. On the first issue, I will show that the perception 
of difference is largely erroneous and that copyright is actually more 
consistent with the common law pattern than a lack of copyright would 
be. On the second issue, regarding the evils of compulsion, I will argue 
that consent cannot stand alone as a criterion of moral adequacy. On 
the third issue, economics, I will show that the special economic tests to 
which most critics subject copyright are premised on questionable 
foundations. In my view economics provides an important descriptive 
tool for understanding the operation of copyright law, and certain eco-
nomic criteria can even provide useful guidance in interpreting some 
areas of ambiguity or "open texture" in the current statute. But I argue 
that "wealth maximization," as an aggregative criterion that disregards 
the possibility of independently derived individual rights, cannot serve 
as an acceptable foundation for the initial assignment of entitlements. 
The article concludes that inquiries based on consistency, consent, and 
economics do not impair, and often offer affirmative support to, the 
legitimacy of intellectual property. 
There are other important issues, notably the possibility that intel-
lectual property rights may inhibit freedom of speech. 26 Plaintiffs in 
several recent copyright infringement suits appear to have been moti-
vated at least in part by the copyright owner's desire to silence person-
ally objectionable views, 27 to forestall discussion of a subject the 
copyright owner wanted kept out of the public eye,28 or to control pub-
26. For example, Lord Macaulay argued that copyright might result in works being "to-
tally suppressed or grievously mutilated." T. MACAULAY, supra note 1, at 204. He was con-
cerned particularly with suppression that might occur when the copyright had passed to heirs 
unsympathetic to the author's works. See id. at 204-08. For commentary concerned with sup-
pression issues in the copyright area, see, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: 
Co11Stitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Gold-
stein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 CoLUlll. L. REV. 983, 988-90 (1970); Pamela Samuel-
son, Rn1iw1g Zacchini· Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 
57 TuL. L. REv. 836 (1983). 
27. The sons of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg sued Louis Nizer for copyright infringement 
for using many quotations from the Rosenbergs' letters in his book about the Rosenberg 
executions. Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding fair use as a 
matter of law), rev'd and remanded, 520 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 
(1978). Nizer's book was viewed by some as being "sensationalized and partly inaccurate." 
See, e.g., WILLAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR UsE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAw 78 (1985). The trial 
court was concerned that the plaintiffs "really desired a trial of the accuracy and fairness of 
defendants' book" rather than on its use of copyrighted letters . .lleeropol, 417 F. Supp. at 
1208; see also New Era Publications Int'!, ApS, v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (critical biography of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard found to have 
infringed certain of Hubbard's writings; injunction denied), ajf'd on other grounds, Nos. 88-
7707, 88-7795 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 1989). In .Yew Era Publicatio11S, the trial court noted that 
"(t]he record contains substantial indication that plaintiff's primary interest is to destroy a 
book that is hostile to the Hubbard image," 695 F. Supp. at 1528 n.14, though the court did 
not rely on that fact in refusing plaintiff an injunction, id. 
28. A corporation controlled by Howard Hughes purchased the copyrights to several 
articles that had been written about him and then used them to attack an "unauthorized" 
biography with a copyright infringement suit. W. PATRY, supra note 27, at 73; see also id. at 72 
(discussing "allegations that Hughes was attempting to suppress perceived unfavorable com-
ments about him"). Hughes may also have been motivated by his ironically well-publicized 
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lie perception of the copyrighted work.29 Copyright law currently con-
tains doctrinal protections for the free speech of copyright defendants, 
such as the "fair use" doctrine,30 and it would be worthwhile to discuss 
whether additional limitations are mandated by the public's first 
amendment entitlements. This article, however, pays little attention to 
the first amendment question. Though it is my belief that the public 
interest in free speech should indeed "trump" conflicting intellectual 
property rights in appropriate cases,31 the quest for a determinate set 
of criteria capable of identifying all such cases of conflict would take us 
too far afield from my inquiry into copyright's general legitimacy. 
Thus, this article concerns itself with a limited set of questions, such 
as: whether it is appropriate to place on intellectual property a special 
burden of justification not imposed on other forms of property; 
whether the burden most often placed upon intellectual property, that 
it prove itself economically, is itself justifiable as applied by those com-
mentators whom this article dubs the "encouragement theorists"; and 
whether the alternative proposed by intellectual property opponents 
has any clear claim to superiority. Even so limited, the field of inquiry 
is broad. To keep the discussion within manageable bounds, the dis-
cussion will focus on copyright law and will refer to other intellectual 
property doctrines (such as patent and trademark) only for comparison. 
The article is divided into three parts. Part I is primarily descriptive. 
Responding to the perception of some critics that copyright and its kin-
dred doctrines are out of kilter with the common law, Part I draws many 
structural and functional parallels between copyright and the common 
law of tangible property and torts. Among other things, I suggest that 
the set of boundaries provided by copyright serves largely the same 
functions as the physical boundaries of tangible property. Part I also 
gives persons previously unfamiliar with intellectual property law an 
overview of the area. Overall, Part I addresses the question of copy-
right's consistency with common law patterns. 
Part II briefly surveys several alternative legal structures for han-
dling intellectual property questions. Opponents of intellectual prop-
desire for privacy. When the Second Circuit vacated the plaintiff's preliminary injunction, at 
least two of the judges were explicitly concerned with the first amendment issue. Rosemont 
Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311-13 (2d Cir. 1966) (Lumbard, CJ., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). 
29. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (Disney suit against 
counter-cultural comic books that, among other things, portrayed Mickey Mouse in compro-
mising positions), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). 
30. The courts have been generally reluctant to embrace a distinct first amendment priv-
ilege, relying instead on the "idea-expression dichotomy" and the fair use doctrine to protect 
defendants' free speech interests. See .Yew Era Publications, slip op. 2863, 2882. 
31. Even from an economic point of view, the utility of copyright enforcement is ques-
tionable when first amendment issues are involved. See Gordon, Fair C:se, supra note 14, at 
1630-32 (allocation of nonmonetizable interests such as free speech should not be tied to 
market-based intellectual property system); id. at 1632-35 (courts should tend to find fair use 
where authors seek to use copyright law to censor persons who wish to comment negatively 
on the author's work or to investigate or report on the author). 
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erty typically argue that members of the public should be privileged to 
copy any work freely as long as they violate no independent law (such 
as restraints arising out of tangible personalty law, privacy law, or con-
tract) when they obtain and make copies. Part II compares this option, 
which I denominate "copy-privilege," with other structural alternatives 
and shows why it is the one most often favored by intellectual property 
opponents. 
Part III, the heart of the piece, presents a primarily normative com-
parison between copyright and copy-privilege, its most likely competi-
tor. The first two sections of Part III deal with consent theory. The 
part begins by showing how the nature and sources of authors' power 
over their works would differ in a world with copyright and in a hypo-
thetical world where the only restraints on copying were those contrac-
tually agreed upon. I then advance the following propositions: The 
noncontractual restraints imposed by copyright are of the same nature 
as those imposed by other areas of the law; the central role played by 
the user's consent in copy-privilege does not make that regime morally 
superior to copyright; and the state's imposition of noncontractual re-
straints on resource use does not per se necessitate more justification 
than does the state's refusal to intervene. 
Part III then turns to the economic arguments. Rather than attempt 
to redebate the inconclusive empirical evidence, the discussion outlines 
the logic underlying most efficiency arguments against copyright. I ar-
gue that the normative base of the "encouragement" theory is not dic-
tated by the foundational premises of welfare economics, and that it 
lacks any principle of distributional justice sensitive to individuals' 
claims as individuals. Further, I show that the distributional principle 
which, if normatively acceptable, would come closest to justifying "en-
couragement" theory's results is itself at odds with the common law-
including the doctrine in restitution law that volunteers and intermed-
dlers should ordinarily have no right to compel payment for their ef-
forts. I also suggest that the "encouragement" critics take a position 
that is fundamentally at odds with moral notions of desert. Finally, I 
show that copy-privilege is inherently arbitrary, making the relations 
between authors and users depend largely on serendipitous physical cir-
cumstance, while copyright pays due respect to the intangible domain. 
Through the route I have described, I seek to demonstrate intellec-
tual property's legitimacy. I aim not to show that all forms and exten-
sions of authorial rights are good or desirable,32 but that the decision 
to give creators some legal rights to control or be paid for33 certain 
32. For an extended discussion of the limitations I believe should curtail intellectual 
property rights, see W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14 (arguing against recent judicial 
extensions of intellectual property rights and for reserving to the public a significant range of 
privileges to use others' creations). 
33. Since this article analyzes whether authors should have any legal rights in their in-
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uses of their creations embodies the same kind of structural, functional, 
and normative choices that are sewn into the legal fabric elsewhere. 
I. ENTITLEMENT STRUCTURES: STRUCTURAL AND 
FUNCTIONAL CONSISTENCY 
To begin the exploration of intellectual property's relation to the 
common law of tangible property and torts, this part reviews the set of 
entitlements that, taken together, ordinarily constitute property in tan-
gible resources. It then reviews the set of entitlements that make up a 
federal copyright and compares the ways in which the entitlements that 
constitute intellectual property resemble, and differ from, those in the 
common law. Part I concludes that the commonalities in structure 
predominate over the differences. Part I then analyzes the distinct eco-
nomic functions played by each component of the entitlement package 
and argues that intellectual and tangible property serve similar eco-
nomic roles. 
A. Entitlement Structures: Rights, Privileges, and Powers 
1. Entitlement structures in tangible property and torts. 
When the courts and laypersons speak of some tangible thing as 
being someone's "property," they usually mean that the person desig-
nated as the "owner" has rights to exclude other people from the re-
source and to obtain relief if they cause intentional or negligent 
damage to it, 34 exclusive powers to transfer the property to others, and 
privileges to use the property to suit her purposes.35 Justice Holmes de-
scribed the package of rights and privileges this way: 
Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is allowed to exercise 
his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered with, and is 
more or less protected in excluding other people from such interfer-
ence. The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no 
one.36 
tangibles, whether rights of control or payment, I make no distinctions here between these 
two sorts of rights or between injunctive and monetary remedies. 
34. Property also gives owners a "privilege" to exclude. That is, one can not only sue 
trespassers, but one can also build fences to keep them out. See text accompanying notes 246-
254 infra (distinguishing rights and privileges). 
35. For a brief but relatively formal review of some of the entitlements that constitute 
typical fee simple ownership of realty under the common law, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE LJ. 710, 746-47 (1917). 
Varying and much more complex definitions of property have been suggested, see, e.g., 
Timothy P. Terrell, "'Property, '' "'Due Process, " and the Distinction Betwem Definition and Theory in 
Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. LJ. 861, 865-74 (1982), but these three basic entitlements (rights of 
exclusion, powers of transfer, and privileges of use) capture the essence of property for our 
purposes. 
36. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES,jR., THE COMMON LAw 246 (1881). The Holmes view is 
revisited in notes 347-351 infra and accompanying text. Frank Michelman writes ofa "pure" 
ownership model: 
To be 'full owner' of something is to have complete and exclusive rights and privileges 
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Bruce Ackerman's description of the ordinary concept of property is 
little different: 
A particular thing is Layman s thing when: (a) Layman may, without 
negative social sanction, use the thing in lots more ways than others 
can; and (b) others need a specially compelling reason if they hope to 
escape the negative social sanctions that are normally visited upon 
those who use another's things without receiving his permission.37 
As the following discussion makes clear, copyright exhibits the same 
pattern: A copyright proprietor is privileged to use her 38 work in many 
ways others are not and has the right to forbid certain uses of the work 
by others. In addition, a copyright owner, like any other owner, has 
certain powers to transfer her entitlements to others.39 
Using the terms right, duty, privilege, and power in the precise senses 
employed by Wesley Hohfeld illustrates the property ownership pat-
tern most clearly.40 This section defines the Hohfeldian categories and 
then uses them to examine the pattern of jural relations that together 
constitute "property." This survey is followed by a parallel analysis of 
copyright. Hohfeld's terminology, which illuminates the fact that all 
rights limit liberty, will help us focus on the question of whether the 
limitations on liberty imposed by copyright differ from those imposed 
by other forms of property rights.41 
The rights of tangible property ownership. In the Hohfeldian lexicon, a 
right is an entitlement42 to have the government interfere on one's be-
half. For these purposes, right has no connotation of transcendency, 
natural law, or constitutionality. It is a nonnormative, positive term 
that simply represents that courts and other government agents will 
take action. 
Where one party has a right, those against whom the right operates 
over it-the 'rights' meaning that others arc legally required to leave the object alone 
save as the owner may permit, and the 'privileges' meaning that the owner is legally 
free to do with the object as he or she wills. 
Frank Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Proper!)~ 24 No~ws 3, 5 (J. Pennock & J. 
Chapman eds. 1982). 
37. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 99-100 (footnote omitted). 
38. This gender choice was made simply as a matter of convenience. In this article both 
masculine and feminine pronouns will be used when no particular person is being discussed. 
39. Ackerman omits explicit mention of "rights of transfer" from his list because he 
views powers of alienation as a subset of the right to use the property. See B. ACKERMAN, supra 
note 9, at 100 n. l l. 
40. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (W. Cook ed. 1923); Hohfeld, supra note 35; 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in judicial Reasoning. 23 
YALE LJ. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions]. When the Hohfeldian 
terms can be confused with the common ones, I emphasize the Hohfeldian terms with quota-
tion marks or italics. 
41. For a discussion of Hohfeld's influence in helping the legal profession understand 
the inevitable costs of entitlements, see Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and 
Contract E.ffinmt?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 751-58 (1980); Joseph William Singer, The Legal 
Rights Debate 111 Ana(i·ticaljurisprudmcefrom Bentham lo Ho!ifeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975. 
42. "Entitlement" as used in this section is simply a catch-all term for legal relations. 
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have a duty to respect it.43 That means that rights and duties are correla-
tives, two faces of the same legal relation; for a right to be meaningful, 
someone somewhere must have a duty not to infringe it.44 Tort law, 
with its focus on duties, thus teaches a great deal about property, for 
often a property right may be best understood by tracing the duty it 
creates.45 For example, if negligence law specifies that persons have a 
duty to use reasonable care toward each other's property, then one of 
an owner's entitlements is the right to be compensated for negligent 
damage to the property. 
This logical relationship between rights and duties makes clear that, 
while an owner's set of rights may increase his security, and thus his 
own personal sense of liberty, the duties so created necessarily restrict 
the freedom of others. Every question about private property is there-
fore also a question about public restraint. 
Property owners have at least three potential categories of rights 
worth mention: rights of exclusion, rights against harm or interference, 
and rights over the benefits their property yields. The right to exclude 
is generally agreed to be the most important of the owner's entitle-
ments.46 The right to exclude entitles the owner to call upon the police 
to eject or arrest trespassers or to call upon the courts for injunctive 
relief or damages against intrusions on the property. The public's cor-
responding duty is to refrain from entry. 
The right to exclude is broad. Any intentional intrusion onto the 
physical thing owned is ordinarily a sufficient basis for suit. Thus, a 
plaintiff charging trespass need not prove that the intruder has caused 
damage or d,one something socially undesirable on the land in order to 
maintain a cause of action.47 Further, the trespasser will be liable for 
43. Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 40, at 30-32. 
44. See id. at 32. Hohfeld writes: "[I]f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the 
former's land, the correlative {and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the 
place." Id. Similarly, if X has a right that others use a particular standard of care when deal-
ing with his property or a right to hold his property free from intentional injury, then others 
have a duty to use that care in regard to X or to avoid inflicting such injury. 
45. Torts like trespass, conversion, and negligent infliction of damage to property are 
the litigative reflection of property rights; and in tort litigation those rights are concretized. 
In a trademark opinion, Justice Holmes evocatively wrote of this linkage between torts and 
property: "[I]n a qualified sense the mark is property, protected and alienable, although as 
with other property its outline is shown only by the law of torts, of which the right is a pro-
phetic summary." Beech-nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1927). 
46. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 13, at 12 {the "essence" of property "is always the right to 
exclude others"); see alm Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987) ("exclusivity is 
an important aspect of confidential business information and most private property for that 
matter"); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987) ("the right to 
exclude [is] 'one of the essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized 
as property'") {quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
47. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 13, at 70 {5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. 
At one point unintentional as well as intentional intrusions onto land also gave rise to virtually 
automatic liablility. But in most jurisdictions today, realty owners only have rights against 
those accidental intrusions or interferences that cause harm and satisfy generally applicable 
criteria for liability, such as negligence. See RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965) 
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intentionally setting foot on the owned land even if the boundary cross-
ing occurred through a reasonable mistake.48 
A landowner's rights against intentional but nonintrusive harm are 
somewhat more limited. Where no entry has interfered with posses-
sion, for example, intentional interference with an owner's ability to 
use and enjoy property will give rise to an actionable private nuisance 
"only if the interference proves to be substantial and unreasonable."49 
Also, the type of interference with the owners' expectations can make a 
difference; thus, economic harm is not easily recoverable when it stands 
alone and is most reliably recoverable when it is parasitic on physical 
damage.50 
Rights to exclude and against interference also find protection 
under the fifth amendment takings clause, which in part functions as a 
sort of public tort law governing the redress available to owners whose 
interests in land have been subject to certain harms at the government's 
hands. This protection is particularly strong for intrusions. When a 
wire is physically placed on an apartment building, a court might order 
compensation for the intrusion even if it caused virtually no harm to the 
building's value.51 "Takings" law places a somewhat lesser emphasis 
on the importance of rights against noninvasive harm. For example, a 
local government's prohibition against mining gravel might eliminate 
virtually all of the economic value in a previously operating gravel pit, 
yet the courts might rule that this nonintrusive governmental act does 
not constitute a "taking" requiring compensation.52 
In addition to rights against intrusion and harm, owners also have 
some rights to derive benefits from their property. But these are rela-
tively weak and generally parasitic on the intrusion right. Thus, when 
someone receives a benefit from another's property without harming it, 
the owner ordinarily cannot recover53 unless the benefited party has 
also physically interfered with the property either by entry (for land) or 
(harmful intrusions caused by recklessness, negligence, or ultrahazardous activity); id. § 821 
(1979) (harm); id§ 822(b) (1979) (unintentional nuisance). 
48. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 47, at 74-75. 
49. Id. at 70. 
50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C comment b (1979) ("parasitic" 
compensatory damages may be recoverable where pure economic harm would not be). For a 
general discussion of this issue, see Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for .\'egligent(}' biflicted Eco-
nomic Loss, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985). 
51. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) 
(treating minor physical intrusion as a taking); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 
107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987) (treating easement as a physically invasive taking). See generally 
John M. Payne, From the Courts, 16 REAL EsT. LJ. 258, 263 (1988) (interpreting .\'ollan in light 
of Teleprompter). 
52. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
53. See John W. Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV. 
1183 (1966) (persons who voluntarily improve their own property cannot ordinarily require 
payment from neighbors who incidentally receive benefits as by-product). 
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touching (for personalty).54 Generally, strangers who draw benefits 
from land can be sued successfully only where the owner can prove a 
boundary crossing.55 If that can be proven, intruders who cause no 
harm can be required to pay not only- nominal damages but potentially 
substantial sums in restitution56 if they have either profited57 or saved 
money58 by using the other's land. When there is no intrusion, a stran-
ger's mere benefit from ("use of") another's property does not ordina-
rily give rise to a right of action. 
For example, many motels and restaurants may deliberately locate 
near a tourist attraction in order to take advantage of its popularity 
without giving the benefit-generating landowner any right to extract 
payment from them for such use.59 By contrast, as previously men-
tioned, a plaintiff landowner may be entitled to a significant recovery 
from a defendant who has used and entered the land.60 Thus, the law 
of physical property tends to use entry to distinguish between those 
benefits which the property owner has a right to control and those over 
which the owner has no legal right of recapture. 
Powers of transfer. In addition to having rights to state protection, 
owners generally have powers to transfer their rights, powers, and privi-
leges over the resource to others. The Hohfeldian term power denotes 
an ability to alter legal relations. Ordinarily, only owners have powers 
54. See Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946) (personalty), 
discussed at note 167 infra; notes 56-58 infra. 
55. See generally Wendy Gordon, Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse 
(Aug. 16, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) [hereinafter 
W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse]. For a suggestion that all appropriations of property 
interests should bring restitutionary remedies, see Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Ob-
tained Through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 504 
(1980). 
Drawing benefits from another's tangible property in a way that does not harm or physi-
cally touch the property may sometimes generate a cause of action when some independent 
factor is involved (such as violation of fiduciary duty), but in the absence of additional factors 
most forms of such use are privileged. See Nat'! Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 
435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977) (surveying the many ways that persons in an interde-
pendent society give each other benefits for which the law will not require recompense). 
56. Even with regard to tangible property, the law is somewhat uneven. See DAN B. 
DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 372-75 (1973) (restitutionary remedies for trespass to land); id. at 
416-19 (tangible personalty). Most commentators seem to agree "that a defendant who tres-
passes on the plaintiff's land should be liable to make restitution to the plaintiff in respect of 
both profits which he has earned and expense which he has saved thereby." ROBERT GOFF & 
GARETHjONES, THE LAw OF RESTITUTION 16 (1966); see also id. at 431-33. 
57. See Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936) (plaintiff held enti-
tled to a share of the proceeds where defendant charged fees for tours ofa cave that extended 
under plaintiff's land). 
58. See Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231 (1946) (plaintiffheld 
entitled to compensation despite the absence of harm when defendant transported more coal 
over plaintiff's land than their existing arrangement allowed). 
59. Under current law the owners of tourist attractions are not helpless. Those who 
wish to capture the "full" value of their enterprises try to purchase nearby land and build 
hotels and restaurants to receive the profits that the tourists bring. This is a form of "inter-
nalization by contract"; to the extent such internalization occurs, separate property rights 
over the benefits themselves are economically less necessary. 
60. See notes 56-58 supra. 
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to affect the legal status of a resource.61 
A power, too, is an entitlement. While we often take the ability to 
make legally enforceable contracts for granted, as if it were the inevita-
ble concomitant of the human propensity to make agreements, it is a 
powerful thing indeed to be able to enlist the state's might to enforce 
the allocations which two or more people make among themselves. 
Similarly, making a gift may seem the most natural thing in the world, 
as if the power of gift-giving flowed inevitably from the desire to be 
generous. But absent governmentally granted powers, sellers or donors 
could do no more than forbear from asserting their own claims on the 
thing transferred. 
Privileges of use. The last important category of entitlement to dis-
cuss is privileges. A privilege is an entitlement to be free of governmen-
tal interference or compulsion. For example, in the law of intentional 
torts, a person who uses a gun in self-defense is privileged to do so, 
meaning that the courts will not provide a cause of action against that 
person for harm so caused. 
Although this category is most familiar from intentional tort law, the 
Hohfeldian term "privilege" is applicable whenever someone's actions 
would not violate existing rights. Thus, where negligence law governs, 
any unintentional and nonnegligent act is privileged, for an injured 
plaintiff has no right to use such an act as the premise of a successful 
damage suit. Furthermore, the policies underlying various privileges 
are often consistent with each other. Many privileges are based on the 
substantive desirability of the privileged act. For example, compare the 
absence of negligence, which will defeat a negligence suit, with the 
presence of a privilege such as "self-defense," which will defeat an in-
tentional tort claim. Though each has different procedural implica-
tions, 62 the two share a conceptual unity. A nonnegligent act is often 
described as not wrongful, as socially desirable, or, in economic terms, 
as yielding more benefits than costs.63 Most privileges in intentional 
tort law similarly involve actions, such as violence committed while de-
fending oneself against unprovoked attack, or remaining on another's 
61. In Hohfeld's scheme, where there is no power, there is a disability. Ordinarily, non-
owners of an owned resource are disabled from affecting its legal status. They can physically 
destroy it; but ordinarily the law will not recognize their efforts to sell it, encumber it, or give 
it away. When others are disabled from affecting someone's legal relations, Hohfeld describes 
that person as having an immunity. Both physical and intellectual property ownership give an 
owner a large degree of immunity from nonowner powers. I do not list immunities separately 
as property entitlements since they are not particularly important for our purposes. Rather, 
the article generally employs the term "exclusive powers" to indicate that no one but the 
owner has powers over the resource. 
62. The intentional tort defendant ordinarily has the burden of proving facts entitling 
her to the privilege, while in the negligence suit the jury will find the defendant nonnegligent 
unless the plaintiff proves otherwise. 
63. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Richard A. 
Posner, .. 1 Theo1y of .\"egligmce, I J. LEGAL Sroo. 29, 32-33 (1972); Henry T. Terry, .\"egligence, 29 
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915). 
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land in cases of emergency, that are judged morally, economically, or 
othenvise desirable.64 Both tort doctrines "privilege" desirable behav-
ior. Another type of "privilege" is based not on the substantive desira-
bility of the privileged act, but on the policy judgment that certain 
spheres of behavior are best left unregulated by government. This is 
the basis of many of the privileges in the Bill of Rights.65 
Privileges also exist in property law. A landowner may have a privi-
lege to build a house, reservoir, or factory on his land, for example, or a 
privilege to mine it. If he has such privileges, then others have no legal 
right to call on the state to prevent him from exercising them. As a 
definitional matter, persons negatively affected by the owner's exercise 
of a complete privilege will have no righ.t to an injunction or damages; 
if the owner's privilege is "incomplete," those negatively affected can-
not stop the contested activity but can obtain a damage remedy.66 
Generally speaking, property owners have broad privileges to use 
and enjoy their property, or to let it go to waste, as they see fit.67 De-
fenders of private property tend to argue both that owners will use 
their privileges in ways that are socially desirable and that governmen-
tal noninterference with property management is itself a positive 
good.68 
But a property owner's privileges are not unlimited;69 on some oc-
64. One measure of desirability might be the pursuit of distributional or "other justice" 
goals. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1098-1105 (1972). 
65. Thus, for example, the first amendment privilege to speak and publish is theoreti-
cally based not on the positive desirability of every statement that might be uttered under its 
protection, but rather on the belief that government should not be choosing between desira-
ble and undesirable utterances. 
66. Privileges that function as defenses to tort suits are sometimes distinguished as 
"complete" or "incomplete." See Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional In-
vasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1925). For example, the 
privilege of necessity in tort law is "incomplete"-the person with the privilege may use an-
other's property, but she must pay for any damage intentionally caused in the process. See 
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). The holder of the 
"incomplete" privilege is subject to the opposing entitlement-holder's "incomplete" right to 
payment. Note that in Calabresi and Melamed's terminology, a similar distinction is captured 
by focusing on the mode by which entitlements are protected: They compare a "liability rule" 
that gives a remedy of monetary recovery with a "property rule" that gives a veto or injunctive 
remedy. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64. 
One can describe compulsory licenses as granting incomplete privileges and persons 
owning property subject to compulsory licenses as possessing incomplete rights. Copyright 
law frequently requires compulsory licenses. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 1977 & Supp. 
1989) (compulsory license for cable retransmission of copyrighted material); see also note 135 
and text accompanying notes 135-136 infra. 
67. But see text accompanying notes 69-90 infra (discussing limitations on use and non-
use of property in general); text accompanying notes 14 7-166 infra (discussing limitations on 
use and nonuse of intellectual property). 
68. See, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1605-10 (discussing the legacy of Adam 
Smith and its role in contemporary economic defenses of private property); see also the 
sources cited in id. nn.35 & 59 (certain political and economic arguments in favor of property 
owners' independent decisionmaking). 
69. See text accompanying notes 79-90 infra. 
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casions the courts will indeed inquire into the use made of land. Thus, 
owners have some duties to the public. 70 If a neighbor has a right that 
the owner not build a polluting factory, for example, or a right that the 
owner prevent any reservoir on his land from flooding the neighbor's 
mine shafts,71 then the owner has a duty to comply and no privilege to 
pollute or to allow his reservoir to leak. If strangers in emergencies 
have rights to enter the land, owners will not have the privilege to eject 
them.72 
2. Common law limits on ownership entitlements. 
Property owners' rights to exclude, powers of transfer, and privi-
leges of use are not unlimited. 73 First, the privileges of others limit the 
rights that attach to ownership of land or tangible personalty. For ex-
ample, though owners may have many rights against intentional and 
intrusive harm, most jurisdictions give the public privileges to act rea-
sonably even when reasonable acts accidentally cause intrusive harm to 
land. As a result, owners have no right to keep their real property se-
cure from the unintentional and nonnegligent harms that others might 
inflict on it. 74 
A property owner may not even have a right of redress against in-
tentional entry to the land if the entrant acted pursuant to some recog-
nized excuse or justification, such as the preservation of life or public 
necessity. Further, as mentioned above, when a stranger needs entry to 
someone's property greatly enough, the owner may not lose only a 
right of exclusion; the owner may also have a duty to refrain from inter-
fering with the imperiled person's use of the land.75 Federal or state 
constitutional liberties may similarly limit property rights. 76 
An owner's powers of transfer have their limitations as well. For 
70. Definitionally, someone's duties arise where his privileges terminate and others' 
rights begin. Duties are the opposite of privileges. 
71. See Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (H.L. 
1868). 
72. While a defendant who enters another's land out of necessity may be required to pay 
for any damage done, as in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 
(1910), the entrant may be able to sue the landowner if the landowner tries to throw her off 
the land during the emergency. See, e.g., Ploofv. Putnam, 81Vt.471, 71 A. 188 (1908) (land-
owner's demurrer overturned where his servant cut loose a boater's craft moored for safety 
from a storm). 
73. Recall for example that justice Holmes prefaced his description of property entitle-
ments with the clause, "[w]ithin the limits prescribed by policy." See text accompanying note 
36 supra. 
74. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1971) (store owner not entitled to compensation where driver's negligence did not 
cause out-of-control vehicle's crash into storefront); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 166 
(1965). 
75. Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 474, 71 A. 188, 189 (1908) (reversing demurrer for 
landowner whose servant had cast off plaintiff's boat into the water during a storm, even 
though the boat had moored without permission). 
76. Thus, state constitutional law may give rights or privileges of entry to persons who 
wish to bring petitions into shopping malls. The mall owners may have no federal constitu-
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example, the law will invalidate an owner's attempt to control future 
disposition of his property that violates the rule against perpetuities; 
and some contracts regarding real and personal property are void as 
against public policy.77 Furthermore, the owner's powers to affect the 
property are not fully exclusive. As the doctrine of adverse possession 
exemplifies, strangers may occasionally have powers to affect owner-
ship. 78 In addition, the government has several powers in regard to 
privately owned property, the most notable being the power of eminent 
domain and the power to require the owner to pay taxes on penalty of 
losing ownership. 
Privileges are also limited. As already noted, owners have duties 
that limit their privileges of action;79 and their privileges of inaction are 
also limited. For example, ·a landowner who neglects to make his land 
reasonably safe may be liable to an invitee who is injured; and owners 
who do not eject trespassers may eventually find that adverse posses-
sion has made their title unenforceable against the squatters.80 
As between private parties, the overall rule under the common law 
is that one is not privileged to act in ways that intentionally invade 
others' legally protected boundaries,81 or that do harm to others' inter-
ests.82 Although there are of course exceptions to this general ap-
proach,83 the roost noteworthy arising in the area of unintentionally 
caused harm, some theorists attempting to unify the various tort law 
tional right to be compensated for this gap in their entitlement to exclude trespassers. See 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
77. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (enforcement ofrestrictive deed cove-
nant barred by fourteenth amendment); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) (unconscionability provision). 
78. The Hohfeldian term "power" refers not only to an ability to form a binding con-
tract but also to an ability to effect an alteration in legal entitlements. Thus, adverse posses-
sion is an exercise of"power," for it results in loss of title. 7 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK]. 
ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY§ 1017 (1989). Since adverse possession requires some 
behavior by the "open and notorious" possessor, that possessor has some conditional power 
over the property; and the property owner's immunity from the powers of others is corre-
spondingly limited. 
79. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra. 
80. See 7 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 78, at 110-17 (adverse possession results in 
loss of title). 
81. Harmless but intentional violations of boundaries have increasingly come to be 
treated as not only actionable, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 47, at 75-77 (trespass to 
land), but also as giving rise to potentially significant restitutionary recoveries, see, e.g., notes 
54-58 supra and accompanying text; note 170 infra and accompanying text. 
82. Regarding intentional harms, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice and 
In/en/, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1894) (general rule for intentional harms). As to unintentional 
harms, see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2]. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (urging 
strict liability for all harms directly caused, subject to excuses and justifications); George P. 
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972) (urging liability for all 
harms resulting from nonreciprocal risk, subject to excuses and justifications); see also A.M. 
Honore, Ownership, in PROPERTY: CASES, CONCEPTS, CRITIQ.UES 78, 85 (L.C. Becker & K. Kipnis 
eds. 1984) (property owners not entitled to use their property harmfully);Joseph L. Sax, Tak-
ings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149, 161-63 (1971) (suggesting that no 
compensation be owed for governmental restraints on previously privileged uses of land if 
those uses cause negative effects on other properly). 
83. See Singer, supra note 41 (discussing various privileges to do harm). 
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doctrines come close to recommending that the law of unintentional 
harms be seen as expressing a general principle of "pay for any harm 
you cause,"84 and several decades' growth in strict liability and other 
pro-plaintiff tort developments have reduced the lacunae of noncom-
pensation. 85 The dividing line between an owner's privileges and du-
ties is more often drawn where the owner's use of the property causes 
invasions or harm than elsewhere. 
Note that the description here largely assimilates property owners' 
duties with the duties persons generally owe. Although landowners 
once had a number of special duties and privileges peculiar to their 
status and to the status of the entrant in relation to the owned land, in 
many jurisdictions those duties and privileges today follow more gen-
eral patterns, with landowners' duties to trespassers, licensees, and in-
vitees being judged by a unitary standard, for example.86 Admittedly, 
owners do have some limited privileges to do harm in defense of prop-
erty; rights of exclusion in tangible property may be accompanied not 
only by privileges to build walls and lock gates, but also by privileges to 
use reasonable force against an intruder in certain circumstances. But 
nonowners' privileges to defend their persons parallel landowners' 
privileges to defend their property. Further, as demonstrated by the 
generality of Learned Hand's negligence formula,87 the common law 
grants a privilege to do unintentional, cost-justified harm that does not 
at all depend on the privilege-holder being a land owner.88 Thus, while 
some differences exist, the limits the law places on an owner's privi-
leges generally parallel those affecting nonowners. 
Although boundary invasion and harm provide the most obvious di-
viding line between privilege (to act) and duty (to refrain from acting), 
an owner's liberties are sometimes limited even when their exercise 
would not invade or injure anything. Zoning is perhaps the most strik-
ing example of legal regulation that limits owners' freedom to use land 
absent threatened harm or invasion, yet it is considered consistent with 
84. See Epstein, supra note 82 (presumptive liability for all harms directly caused); 
Fletcher, supra note 82 (presumptive liability for all harms except where risks are reciprocally 
imposed). 
85. The twentieth century has seen a sharp and accelerating trend toward favoring the 
victims of unintentional harms, particularly through expanding strict liability for hazardous 
activities and for products. Other pro-plaintiff developments include contraction in the ability 
of government, charity, or family-member defendants to claim immunities; growth in the non-
delegable duty doctrine; increases in the kinds of duties that courts are willing to impose; and 
relaxation of causation requirements. 
86. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 442 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) 
(adopting unitary standard of care). Similarly, unintentional trespasses are now largely gov-
erned by the same principles that govern liability for other unintentional acts. See note 47 
supra and accompanying text. 
87. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (1947). 
88. The privileges afforded by the negligence principle have been narrowed in recent 
years by some forms of strict liability that apply with special force to landowners (such as for 
ultrahazardous activities), but other equally significant forms of strict liability (such as for 
products) are not particularly linked with land ownership. 
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property ownership. Another example is the eminent domain area, 
where many important cases have focused on whether a particular legis-
lative limitation on previously existing privileges should amount to a 
"taking" of "property" for which compensation should be paid;89 it is 
far from clear that only "harmful" or "invasive" privileges can be re-
strained without paying compensation.90 
* * * 
We should not allow the limitations to obscure the basic property 
model-rights of exclusion, privileges of nonharmful use, and exclusive 
powers of transfer. However variable the Supreme Court's treatment 
of threatened rights, powers, or privileges,91 for example, no one can 
doubt that a "taking" of "property" has occurred where the govern-
ment cancels all of an owner's rights, powers, and privileges, particu-
larly if the government simultaneously transfers those entitlements to 
itself. In a sense, then, we define "property" using a proportionality 
inquiry:92 The more complete the package of rights, powers, and privi-
leges, the more comfortable most Americans feel in using the term 
"property" to describe the phenomenon to which these characteristics 
attach.93 
To what extent does the entitlement structure within copyright law 
mimic the patterns of the common law allocation of property entitle-
ments? Clearly there must be differences. For example, since intellec-
tual property has no physical boundaries that can be crossed, it must 
perforce use something other than entry to distinguish between those 
89. Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (re-
quirement that certain coal be left unmined held not to constitute a "taking") and Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (city safety ordinance prohibiting excavations be-
low the water table held not to constitute a taking of plaintiff's gravel business though the 
excavations essentially destroyed the business) with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393 (1922) (prohibition of mining under dwelling houses held to constitute a "taking" of 
defendant's mining privilege). For an interesting exploration of the disparity between the 
Court's treatment of the privileges in Pennsylvania Coal and Goldblatt, see B. ACKERMAN, supra 
note 9, at 156-65. 
90. See Sax, supra note 82, at 150 n.5;joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE 
LJ. 36, 46-50 (1964) ("[T]he problem is not one of noxiousness or harm-creating activity at 
all; rather it is a problem of inconsistency between perfectly innocent and independently de-
sirable uses." Id. at 49.). 
91. See note 89 supra. 
92. See text accompanying note 37 supra (Bruce Ackerman's definition of property; it is a 
matter of proportion, not "either/or" choices). 
93. The constitutional protections for "property" can be triggered by damage to inter-
ests which would not ordinarily be termed property interests. The Court in Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984), indicated that, for takings clause purposes, a mate-
rialman's lien as well as a valid contract have been held to constitute property. This is even 
more true in the due process context. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82 
(1979) ("Arguably, the cause of action for wrongful death that the State has created is a spe-
cies of "property" protected by the Due Process Clause.") (dicta); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 
U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (certain expectations of continued employment are "property" for due 
process purposes). Nevertheless, ordinary conceptions of property have had an impact on the 
Court's takings law jurisprudence. See genera/(\' B. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 88-189. 
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uses of the property the owner can control and those she cannot.94 Yet 
we will find the parallels to be remarkably close. 
3. Entitlement structures in copyright law. 
Copyright is the body of law that protects works of authorship. 
"Works of authorship" include books, music, sculpture, movies, and 
even computer programs,95 but not ideas, processes, or systems, no 
matter how valuable or creative. 96 Copyright today is largely governed 
by federal statute, the Copyright Act of 1976.97 The following over-
view of federal copyright law will outline how the copyright statute, like 
the law of tangible property and torts, grants to proprietors rights of 
exclusion, privileges of use, and powers of transfer. 
Section 106, the central provision of the 1976 Act, gives authors98 a 
right to prohibit copying and other specified uses of their works of au-
thorship. Section 106 grants to creators "exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize" the reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public perform-
94. See text accompanying notes 170-189 infra. 
95. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (works of authorship include literary, musical, and dramatic 
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works; and sound recordings); see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West 
Supp. 1989) (special provisions regarding computer programs); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (de-
fining "including" as "illustrative and not !imitative"). 
96. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Other areas oflaw, such as patent, protect some subject 
matter not protected by copyright. 
97. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). Until the Copyright Act of 1976 
became effective on January l, 1978, states were free to grant copyrights in unpublished 
works. The new act, however, has largely preempted state copyright law. 
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright ... in works of authorship that are fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright ... , 
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title .... [N]o 
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the 
common law or statutes of any State. 
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Some areas of state activity are preserved, such as causes of action 
accruing prior to the new Act's effective date, id. § 30l(b)(2), and state action regarding "ac-
tivities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright," id. § 301 (b)(3). The statute also emphasizes that pre-
emption does not affect works "not fixed in any tangible medium of expression." Id. 
§ 30l(b)(l). Fixation is a requirement for federal protection. Id. §§ 101-102. State copyright 
in "unfixed" (unrecorded) performances thus remains available. State copyright in perform-
ance is sometimes given the name of the "right of publicity." This misnomer was carried into 
to the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 564 
(1977) (holding that Ohio would not violate the first amendment if it gave "human can-
nonball" Zacchini a right of publicity against news stations which broadcast his act in full, at 
least so long as Zacchini sought revenues from and not an injunction against dissemination of 
his performance). 
98. Unless the article's context indicates othenvise, the terms "author" or "creator" will 
be used to include not only authors, composers, painters, and other creative persons, but also 
employers, assignees, licensees, heirs, and anyone else claiming copyright interest in work 
created by another. Potentially significant differences characterize the normative status and 
empirical effect of copyrights in the hands of original creative persons and copyrights in the 
hands of publishers and other derivative parties. Such issues are outside the scope of this 
article. See note 8 supra. 
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ance, and public display of their works.99 Taken together, I will gener-
ally refer to these as rights over "copying." 
Although section 106 employs only the word "rights," it uses that 
word loosely, as synonymous with "entitlements."100 In fact, section 
106 constitutes a simultaneous award of Hohfeldian rights, privileges, 
and powers over the enumerated uses. Because the section 106 grants 
are "exclusive," the owner has the right to exclude others from the 
physical acts described. 101 Because the section 106 grant includes an 
entitlement "to do" the enumerated physical acts, creators have a privi-
lege to use their creations in the manners specified. Because the grant 
awards an entitlement "to authorize" the various physical acts, creators 
have a power to transfer their entitlements. Because creators hold that 
power "exclusive[ly]," they also have an immunity from other persons' 
efforts to affect the legal status of the copyright. Thus, the intellectual 
property entitlements include, for example, the privilege to make repro-
ductions, the right to forbid strangers to make reproductions, and the 
power to sell others a privilege to make reproductions. 
The right to exclude others from particular modes of enjoyment. As the tort 
cause of action denominated "trespass" vindicates the duty to stay off 
strangers' land, the tort cause of action denominated "infringement" 
vindicates the duty to refrain from copying others' works of authorship. 
Thus, as with tangible property, copyright's core is a set of exclusive 
rights; and violation of those rights gives rise to tort and other reme-
dies. Persons who enjoy a work in the ways reserved to the copyright 
owner's exclusive control-for example, reproducing the work verba-
tim, adapting it for use in new works, or publicly performing it-may be 
liable for injunctions, 102 damages, 103 accounting for profits, 104 criminal 
penalties, 105 and other sanctions.106 
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Not all of the rights apply to all types of works or in all 
contexts. For example, musical groups who record their performances have an exclusive right 
ofreproduction but not of performance. Id. §§ 106(1), (4), 114. Radio play, therefore, earns 
royalties for the composer of the music but not for its performers. 
100. Such a usage is quite common. In fact, Hohfeld offered his definition of entitle-
ments in part to clarify the many ways in which judges and commentators used the term 
"right." See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 40, at 30-31. Hohfeld's 
stipulative definition attaches only one of the common meanings of"rights" to the word, and 
he invented or borrowed other terms to denote the other meanings. 
10 I. Since the grant states that owners have the exclusive privilege of using the work in 
the specified ways, no one else can engage in the listed acts. Since persons other than the 
creator have no privileges to use the work in the listed ways, they have duties not to so use it; 
correlatively, the creator has rights against such persons. 
102. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982); 3M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 11, at§§ 14.06(A) 
(preliminary injunctions), (B) (permanent injunctions). 
103. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 501, 504 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). 
104. Id. § 504. 
105. Id. § 506 (criminal penalties applicable only to infringements undertaken "will-
fully" for "purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain"). 
106. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1982) (impoundment and destruction of infringing cop-
ies}, 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989) (statutory damages); see also 17 U.S.C. 
§ 505 (1982) (attorneys' fees). 
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Rights in tangibles differ from the rights in intangibles largely with 
regard to the kind of control each set of rights gives. The differences 
can be illustrated, for example, by comparing how the law treats partic-
ular intellectual products with how it treats the physical objects embod-
ying the intellectual products. Copyrightable narrative is routinely 
embodied in paper and ink, just as copyrightable artistic design is com-
monly embodied in canvas and paint, and someone who receives letters 
from famous friends owns the pieces of paper and the ink on them. But 
if the recipient includes the text of those letters in her memoirs she may 
be unpleasantly surprised by a copyright infringement suit. 107 This is 
so even though the recipient would have been free to sell the letters to 
an autograph dealer108 or throw them away. Similarly, if a museum 
purchases a copyrighted painting but does not also purchase the artist's 
copyright interest, the museum would infringe the copyright by making 
posters or postcards of the painting for sale in its gift shop without the 
artist's permission. 
Conversely, if a burglar steals the letters from the recipient's desk 
drawer or the painting from the museum, that harm may not be re-
dressed under the copyright law, even though the theft may deny the 
copyright owner effective use of the creative work. As long as the bur-
glar only steals the letters or painting and does not reproduce them or 
otherwise employ them in violation of section I 06, 109 the copyright 
statute gives no redress. The legal avenues to achieve some "remedy" 
for the harm-notably burglary law and the tort law of conversion 110-
107. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (author obtained 
preliminary injunction against publication of a biography which contained quotations from 
some of his letters); see also Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135, 89 N.E.2d 863 (1949) 
(owner of Mark Twain manuscript held not entitled to publish it because physical ownership 
of a manuscript does not necessarily include ownership of its copyright); 17 U.S.C. § 202 
(1976) (transfer of object does not "of itself" carry with it ownership of copyright); id. § 204 
(transfers of copyright ownership are invalid "unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note 
or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed"). 
The existence ofa chattel "embodiment" is essential to federal copyright, which applies 
only to works "fixed," embodied, in "stable," "tangible medi[a] of expression." Id. §§ 101 
(definition of "fixed"), 102(a) (subject matter of copyright). So, for example, until a play-
wright makes a stable record of his play, via pen, video camera, or otherwise, federal copy-
right law does not protect it. And although all objects "embody" the intangible ideas that 
make naming and understanding possible (a chair "embodies" the notion of chaimess, for 
example), the large majority of these ideas fall outside the range of copyrightable subject 
matter. 
108. Although one ofa copyright owner's exclusive rights is the right "to distribute cop-
ies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale," id. § 106(3), lawful owners 
of copies have a privilege to resell or othen\'ise dispose of them; this has been established by 
the "first sale doctrine," now embodied in id. § l09(a). That section "is an extension of the 
principle that ownership of the material object is distinct from ownership of the copyright in 
the material." Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984). 
The doctrine does not apply to commercial record rentals. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b). 
109. Note, however, that the burglar's sale of the painting might violate the copyright 
owner's exclusive right to control sale, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1976), since the privilege of own-
ers of copies to resell them is not available to persons who are not lawful owners. Id. § l 09(a); 
see also § 109(d) (Supp. IV 1986). 
110. Like a landowner, an object's owner has rights to physical dominion over the thing 
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are available to the person who owns the physical object, who often 
does not own the copyright; 111 and even that person's chances of gain-
ing satisfaction are determined by the government's ability to identify 
the thief and enforce burglary law and by the thief's solvency as a tort 
defendant. 
Thus a copyright owner's rights largely operate independently of 
the rules governing physical ownership. Intellectual property is con-
cerned not with entry or physical interference but with forbidding spec-
ified uses of the work that may be quite independent of physical 
touching. Nevertheless, this right, like the right at the core of tangible 
property, can be viewed as a right of exclusion. Thus, in examining the 
"property" status of one type of intellectual property (trade secrets) for 
purposes of fifth amendment takings law, the Supreme Court in fact 
characterized the right at issue as a "right to exclude others."ll2 
Types of use a creator may exclude. The Court referred to the right to 
exclude others from "enjoyment," 113 but that is not a technical term. 
Such phrases generally refer to the various rights an intellectual prop-
erty owner might have to exclude others from benefiting from the in-
tangible at issue. Any mode of drawing benefits from a resource might 
be referred to as "enjoyment" or "use," and intellectual property law 
does not purport to control them all. 
There are many ways one can benefit from a resource, and different 
uses trigger liability under different intellectual property rules. Patent 
law approaches "use" most expansively. A patentee's rights to "make, 
use, or sell" the invention render it unlawful even for one who indepen-
dently replicates-without copying-a patented invention to profit 
from it. 114 In ordinary language, profiting from an independent inven-
tion seems to be an enjoyment of an invention that happens to be the 
same as the patented invention, rather than an enjoyment of the pat-
ented invention itself. Nevertheless, patent policy gives patentees the 
right to control independently created duplicates, at least partly be-
cause we believe that giving independent inventors' privileges to ex-
ploit what they find might interfere with potential inventors' overall 
owned and rights to redress physical harm done to it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 
supra note 74, §§ 216-218, 222 (trespass to chattels); id. §§ 222, 222A (conversion). 
l l l. Ownership of an object containing a work of authorship includes no presumption 
of ownership of its copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 202. This is true whether the object in question 
is an original manuscript or the 10,000th copy from a massive press run. 
112. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 101 l (1984). 
113. Id. 
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. 1984) (it is an infringement to make, use, or sell any pat-
ented invention within the United States during the patent term, and no exception is made for 
independently derived duplicates of the invention); EDMUND w. KITCH & HARVEY s. PERLMAN, 
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 747-48 (3d ed. 1986). Although the statute 
does not exempt even the making of one copy of the invention, there are some judicially 
created exceptions, e.g., "the manufacture and experimental use of a machine ... until the 
machine is put to a commercially valuable use." 2 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAw FUNDA-
MENTALS § 17.02(1), at 17-15 (2d ed. 1988). 
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willingness to invest in research. When several scientists are hot on the 
same trail, a promise of exclusivity to the 'vinner may be the only prize 
meaningful enough to keep the race from flagging. 115 
Rights over use also can be defined quite narrowly. If the patent 
stands near the expansive end of the spectrum of infringement stan-
dards, at the opposite extreme is unfair competition law, 116 including 
trademark and trade secret law. Here the plaintiff must show some-
thing substantially more than a mere unconsented use of the "owned" 
thing to prevail on an infringement claim. For example, in federal 
trademark law, only a mark's uses that the plaintiff can show are likely 
to cause consumer confusion are actionable. 117 Thus, even if the sec-
ond user employs an identical mark, his use is not ordinarily actionable 
unless the plaintiff's and defendant's products are related enough that 
the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause confusion to consum-
ers.118 Similarly, use of a trade secret is usually prohibited only if the 
user has violated some independent legal obligation, such as a fiduciary 
obligation not to disclose secrets revealed during confidential business 
negotiations. As the Seventh Circuit observed: 
The only protection equity affords the possessor of a trade secret is to 
prevent its use by those who obtain the secret information in breach of 
contract or of a fiduciary relationship, and by third parties who know-
ingly participate in such breach. . . . The gravamen of a cause of action 
of this nature is wrongful appropriation. One who obtains secret infor-
mation honestly may use it freely. 119 
115. History holds many examples of apparently simultaneous discoveries, so that the 
law's grant of control to patentees even when others can prove the independent origin of 
their inventions is significant. A purpose of the public record of patent claims is to make the 
scientific community aware of their content. 
116. The overall field of law that governs the control of intangibles is known as "intel-
lectual property" or "unfair competition." It can be helpful to distinguish between the two 
terms. The term "intellectual property" is best used to identify those areas of law, such as 
patent and copyright, where copying or use simpliciter constitutes an infringement. In these 
areas, the form of control can be easily analogized to the ownership of realty, where mere 
intrusion contitutes a trespass. "Unfair competition" is the term best used to identify those 
areas, such as trademark law and trade secret law, where more than mere copying or use is 
necessary to constitute infringement. These doctrines are more like the torts that govern 
interpersonal relations than like property. However, it is common to use the term "intellec-
tual property" to refer to both sets of doctrines, and this article will often use the term in this 
fashion. 
117. See 15 u.s.c. § 1114(1) (1982); 2J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 23:1 (1984 & Supp. 1988). Although some recent cases have cast doubt on 
the continued vitality of the confusion requirement, see, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n 
v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.) (duplication of hockey 
team symbol for sale as a cloth emblem held an infringement of trademark rights because 
consumers would associate symbol with team, regardless of whether consumers would be mis-
led as to the emblems' source), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975), trademark law is still 
predominantly employed in contexts where the mark is used to identify a product, rather than 
where the mark itself is the product being sold. 
118. See 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 117, § 24: 1, at 160-63. 
119. Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 923 (7th Cir. 1953); 
see also 1 ROGER M. l\hLGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §§ 4.03, 5.04(3)-(4)(a) (1988). 
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Thus, one may freely copy another's trade secret if one has discovered 
the secret by reverse engineering or other lawful means. 
The uses prohibited by copyright law occupy a middle position be-
tween patent and unfair competition law on the infringement contin-
uum. To obtain relief, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the 
defendant had access to and borrowed some protectable aspect of the 
copyrighted work. Thus, a defendant can defeat a claim of infringe-
ment, regardless of how similar the plaintiff's and defendant's works 
might be, by proving that she independently created the supposedly 
infringing work. 120 A plaintiff, however, need not show any injury, 121 
confusion, or violation of independent duty in order to prevail. Copy-
ing is per se actionable. 
Copyright's grant of exclusive rights thus most closely parallels 
landowners' "right to exclude,"122 for patent law gives proprietors 
something more than a "right to exclude" 123 and trademark and trade 
secret law give something less. 124 Copyright gives authors only what 
trespass law gives landowners: Authors have the right to exclude 
others from what they own. 
Limitations on the exclusion right. As with the rights against physical 
interference that attach to tangible property, 125 the exclusive rights of 
an intellectual work's creator against unconsented uses of her works are 
limited in various ways. The 1976 Act grants no rights at all for works 
that fall outside the subject matter and uses it designates for protec-
tion.126 Thus, the Act protects only expression and not ideas, 
processes, systems, discoveries, or similar products of mental effort, 127 
and so grants no rights in copyright in these subject matters even when 
120. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). 
121. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-502 (1982) (proof of injury not a prerequisite for infringe-
ment suit); see also id. § 504(b) (entitlement to award of infringer's profits); id. § 504(c) (statu-
tory damages available in lieu of actual damages and profits). 
122. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra (nature of trespass suits). 
123. For example, patent proprietors can stop strangers from using what the strangers 
themselves have created. In real property law, that would be similar to granting landowners a 
right to bring trespass suits against anyone who entered property ''just like" the owners' land. 
124. For example, strangers can use marks or secrets as long as they cause no socially 
undesirable confusion and breach no independent duties. In real property law, that would be 
similar to landowners having no action for trespass without showing that the entrant had 
made some socially undesirable use of the land or was violating some independent obligation 
by entering. 
125. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra. 
126. See note 95 (protectable subject matter) & text accompanying note 99 (enumerated 
rights) supra. 
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (copyright does not "extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery"); see also Baker v. Selden, 
101 U.S. 99 (1879). Ideas are not subject to protection for several reasons, including defer-
ence to the first amendment. See M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 11, § l.IO(B)(2); see also 
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-14 (2d ed. 1988). Other reasons in-
clude practical considerations such as the costs of tracing ownership, see John P. Dawson, The 
Self-Seroillg Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1412 (1974), and the injury that ownership of 
ideas would do to public life and to later creators' ability to make works of their own. See 
notes 172, 518 & 530-531 infra and accompanying texts. 
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they are contained in othenvise protectable works of authorship. 
Where the copyright statute grants proprietors no rights at all, poten-
tial users are privileged to copy. 128 So, for example, anyone is privi-
leged to copy an author's themes or ideas, since copyright does not 
protect these aspects of othenvise copyrightable works. 129 Similarly, 
the Act's list of enumerated "exclusive rights" is limited. For example, 
copyright owners have rights over public but not private performance 
and display of their works; 130 over initial distribution of their works but 
not over a library that lends the books it has purchased; 131 and over 
reproduction 132 but not over enjoyment. 133 
Copyright law imposes a number of additional limits on the rights it 
does grant. The most famous is probably the restricted duration. 134 
Although ordinary property can be owned forever, copyrights expire. 
Another interesting limitation is the set of compulsory licenses 
copyright bestows in areas such as cable retransmission and the pro-
duction of new recordings of existing music. 135 Persons entitled to 
128. However, legal protection other than copyright may be available. For example, 
although the refusal to protect general ideas stems from Congress's affirmative desire to keep 
ideas free of constraint, the refusal to extend copyright protection to utilitarian objects stems 
instead from a recognition that copyright is an inappropriate vehicle for such protection. 
(There may be also a constitutional dimension to copyright's refusal to protect useful objects. 
See KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, The Co11stitutio11al I11tellectual Property Power: Progress of the [ 'seful Arts 
and the Legal Protectio11 of Semiconductor Tech11ology, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 473, 501-02 (1988)). 
Other legal regimes may be available and specifically tailored to the issues presented by the 
various forms of intellectual property. 
Patent law, which is available to the inventors of utilitarian objects, demonstrates such a 
specific adaptation. A right only against copying is of limited value to an inventor. Though a 
right against all replication of an invention would be more valuable, it is more restrictive. 
Patent law has worked out a compromise: A patent gives rights against independent replica-
tion, but utility patents are quite difficult to obtain and have only a 17-year duration. 
129. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (themes not 
protectible), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); see also notes 185-186 infra. 
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5). 
131. See id. §§ 106(3), 109. Lending the books one has purchased is privileged under 
the "first sale doctrine." Id. § l09(a). 
132. Id. § 106(1). 
133. See 1d. § 106 (no mention of a right of enjoyment of copyrighted works). 
134. Except where Congress chooses to enact private bills at the behest of particular 
copyright owners, a copyright can last no longer than the life of the author plus fifty years. Id. 
§§ 302-305. 
135. See, e.g. id. § 111 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (in designated circumstances, owners of 
copyright have no right to prohibit cable operators from retransmitting on-the-air broadcasts 
if statutory formalities are satisfied and governmentally specified fees are paid); id. § 115 
(once a composer authorizes distribution of a nondramatic musical work on phonorecords in 
the U.S., virtually any performer can obtain a compulsory license to make and issue pho-
norecords using the composition); id. § 116 (juke boxes); see also Second Supplementary Re-
port of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of U.S. Copyright Law, ch. 7, at 
18-20 (Oct.-Dec. 1975) (draft) [hereinafter Second Supp. Report) (exemplifying the attrac-
tions of the compulsory license as a mode of legislative compromise for conflicting claims in 
addressing protection for typeface designs). See genera/(\' STAFF OF Susco111111. ON PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE Co111111. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., lsT 
SESS., THE COMPULSORY LICENSE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw (Comm. Print 
1960) (H. Henn) (history of the phonorecord compulsory license). Some changes are in the 
offing for jukebox compulsory licenses. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 
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such licenses have "privileges" to use the copyrighted material, regard-
less of the copyright owner's preferences. The privileges are "incom-
plete" since the copiers must pay at least the governmentally set 
licensing fee. Correlatively, copyright owners have only "incomplete 
rights" of ownership in works subject to compulsory licenses. 136 
The most often litigated copyright limit is the "fair use" doctrine, 
judicially created and now enshrined in the statute.137 Uses of copy-
righted works "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research" 138 are likely to be found "fair" and thus non-
infringing. As currently interpreted, persons entitled to "fair use" have 
complete privileges to use copyrighted works in the sense that they are 
both permitted to use the work and free of any obligation of pay-
ment.139 Much debate surrounds the question of which situations are 
Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 4(a)(4), 102 Stat. 2853, 2855-57 (adding new § l 16A to the Copyright 
Act). 
Compulsory licenses continue to be created. The newest compulsory license permits sat-
ellite carriers to make certain secondary transmissions to "unserved households" with home 
dishes, for private viewing, at a statutory royalty fee. See Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, 
P.L. 10-667, creating a new section, 17 U.S.C. § 119. The Act is a temporary measure. On or 
before the end of 1992, the statutory fee option will no longer be available; and in 1994 the 
Act itself terminates. Id. 
136. See note 66 supra. 
137. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1982). See generally LEONE. SELTZER, Ex.EMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN 
COPYRIGHT (1978); Gordon, Fair C:se, supra note 14. 
138. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1982). 
139. Conceivably "fair use" could be implemented as an incomplete privilege instead. 
Under that approach, which has its own difficulties, a user might be allowed to continue utiliz-
ing the work but be required to pay. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1724-27 (use of a liability 
rule); Gordon, Fair C:se, supra note 14, at 1622-24. The common law contains several incom-
plete privileges, such as the incomplete privilege of"private necessity" in tort law, see Vincent 
v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); other sources cited in note 66 
supra, and the recognition in nuisance law that sometimes a valuable but noxious activity 
should be allowed to continue as long as it pays its own way, see, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (defendant allowed to 
continue polluting as long as it paid damages). 
With fair use cases, as in copyright litigation generally, the courts have so far adhered to 
an all-or-nothing approach, so that a defendant either is found to be an infringer, subject to 
injunction as well as damage liability, or is allowed to continue the contested use for free. In 
New Era Publications Int'!, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), ajf'd 
011 other grounds, Nos. 88-7707, 88-7795 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 1989), Judge Leval attempted to 
depart from this approach. He had before him a critical biography of L. Ron Hubbard which 
used many quotations from Hubbard's published and unpublished works. Finding that most 
but not all of the defendant's quotations were fair use of Hubbard's copyrighted expression, 
Judge Leval concluded that the biography did infringe. 695 F. Supp. at 1524-25. He never-
theless refused to grant an injunction against the book's publication, id. at 1525-28, because it 
"would diminish public knowledge" and would "implicate[] concerns of the First Amend-
ment," id. at 1525. The Second Circuit repudiated that aspect of Judge Leval's opinion and 
affirmed the denial of an injunction solely on the ground oflaches . .Yew Era Publicatio11S, Nos. 
88-7707, 88-7795. There are, however, some signs that the all-or-nothing approach to reme-
dial issues in copyright cases may be eroding. See Abend v. M.C.A., Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 
(9th Cir. 1988) (injunction refused); see also .Yew Era Publicatio11S, slip op. 2863, 2884, 2907-13 
(Oakes, CJ., concurring; vigorously disagreeing with the majority opinion and referring inter 
alia to Boomer and other cases involving real property as analogical support for denying an 
injunction). 
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appropriate for fair use treatment. The most recent example of a use 
found "fair" by the Supreme Court is home videorecording of broad-
cast television shows for the purpose of time-shifting. 140 
Exclusive powers of transfer and their limitations. The copyright statute 
gives copyright owners "powers" both to transfer exclusive rights and 
to grant mere privileges to use the work. 141 Limits temper the exercise 
of these powers. For example, the Act requires certain formalities for 
transfering exclusive rights. 142 More significantly, the statute gives au-
thors an inalienable power to terminate any grant after a specified pe-
riod of time in virtually all but work-made-for-hire contexts, thus 
limiting most creators' present ability to make full transfers of what 
they own. 143 The statute also limits inheritance of this termination 
140. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984). "Time-shift-
ing" refers to viewing videorecorded broadcasts at a more convenient time. 
141. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting "the owner of copyright ... the exclusive rights to do 
and to authorize" reproduction, adaptation, distribution to the public, public performance, and 
public display) (emphasis added); id. § 201 (d) (transferability of rights). 
142. Thus, though grants of privilege (also known as "nonexclusive licenses" or "per-
missions") can be oral, transfers of exclusive rights must be memorialized in a signed writing. 
See id. § 204 (a signed writing required for any transfer of copyright ownership other than 
transfers by operation of law); id. § 101 (the phrase "transfer of copyright ownership" does 
not include nonexclusive licenses). Restrictions of this sort may frustrate owners' desires in 
the short run but tend to work to further the long-term functioning of the transfer system. 
They thus function much like the statute of frauds in contract law or the requirement that 
disinterested witnesses sign wills in the law of estates. 
143. See id. § 203 (applying the termination power to works copyrighted after the effec-
tive date of the 1976 Act); id. § 304(c) (applying the termination power to the renewal rights 
in works copyrighted before the Act's effective date). 
Authors can terminate grants roughly 35 to 40 years after their execution, id. § 203(a)(3), 
or 56 to 61 years after copyright was secured, id. § 304(c)(3). See generally Frank R. Curtis, 
Caveat Emptor in Copyright: A Practical Guide to the Termination-of-Transfers Provisions of the Xew 
Cop_rnght Code, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 19 (1977); Melville B. Nimmer, Termination of Trans-
fers l'11der the Copyright Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1977). 
The new termination power largely replaces the "renewal" provisions of the Copyright 
Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), which also aimed, though with limited effec-
tiveness, at returning to authors control of their works. Whether or not the new limitation 
will prove to be in the authors' long-term interest is a matter of debate. Briefly, the debate is 
between those who see a disability to make transfers as a limitation that impairs authors' 
ability to get the best price for their efforts (as well as an interference with authors' auton-
omy), and those who view it as a way to protect authors' interests in a way the authors them-
selves cannot. 
Congress, of course, intended termination rights to operate in the creators' interest. See 
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 123, 124-28, 139-42 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5738-44, 5755-58 [hereinafter HousE REPORT]. One 
could argue, however, that the new power merely eliminated one of an author's bargaining 
chips: Prior to the new statute, an author could have bargained for inserting a termination 
right into her contracts or could have received a higher license fee or sale price in return for 
forgoing such rights. "A right that cannot be the subject of bargaining is worth less .... " 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Eco11omic Sl'Slem, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 
(1984). Nevertheless, disparities in bargaining power might.ordinarily have prevented au-
thors from obtaining such concessions in the first instance. Also, it is not clear that movie-
makers, publishers, and other grantees are paying authors less today than they otherwise 
would. Given discount rates, the value to a grantee of exclusive rights 35 years later is proba-
bly small, particularly since grantees can continue to use derivative works made prior to termi-
nation of the grants even after termination (e.g., motion picture dramatizations of novels). On 
the operation of the derivative works exception, see Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 
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power to statutory beneficiaries rather than allowing it to descend to 
those whom the author would prefer to designate by will. 144 
Despite these and other minor restrictions on the power of transfer, 
Congress, in the new copyright statute, ratified and even expanded the 
powers of the copyright proprietor. Most notably, declaring its adher-
ence to "the principle of unlimited alienability of copyright,"145 Con-
gress further eased transferability of copyright interests by making 
intellectual property more divisible than it had been under the prior 
law.146 
Privileges of use and their limitations. A "privilege" to use and refrain 
from using one's works is implicit in both the statutory grant of "exclu-
sive rights" to use the work in designated ways147 and in traditional 
Anglo-American law, under which people may use the resources they 
own. In addition, in 1912 the Supreme Court held that the privileges 
of "using ... selling, producing, or performing" a copyrighted work 
are "[f]ederal right[s] specially set up and claimed" under the copyright 
statutes. 148 
When the copyright holder loses the exclusive rights guaranteed by 
section 106 or they expire, the work becomes a part of the public do-
(1985); see also Howard B. Abrams, ll'ho s Sorry .Yow?: Tennination Rights and the Derivatfoe Jlorks 
Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181 (1985). 
The power of termination is a species of "inalienable" entitlement. Inalienability some-
times serves the interests of the party who is deprived of the power of transfer, and sometimes 
serves other interests. See general(l' Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property 
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at I 092-93, 1114. 
The term "inalienable" is often applied to entitlements that can be waived but not sold. 
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64. It is possible for the law to go one step further, and 
prohibit even the waiver of rights. Copyright law does not go so far. The termination power 
is waivable, since no termination will occur unless the holder of the termination power takes 
specific steps to assert it. The holder can also make a binding agreement to waive it, but only 
many years after the initial grant. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982). 
144. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c}(2) (1982). Grants made by will, however, are not 
terminable. Id. §§ 203(a), 304 (c). That is, ifan author died possessed of the right to make a 
motion picture from her novel and bequeathed the right by will, the right so passed would not 
be terminable. A probate court could not enforce, however, a provision in an author's will 
purporting to bequeath her power to terminate a previously made movie contract to persons 
other than the statutory beneficiaries. 
145. HousE REPORT, supra note 143, at 123 ("The principle of unlimited alienability of 
copyright is stated in clause (I) of section 201(d)."). 
146. Id. Prior law considered a copyright indivisible. Copyright's embrace ofa series of 
quite different entitlements that an author might wish to sell separately created a range of 
difficulties. "The indivisibility concept mandated a single owner or proprietor of copyright at 
any one time .... The ramifications of indivisibility reached such questions as notice, owner-
ship, recordation of transfers, standing to sue, and taxes." ALAN LATMAN, ROBERT GORMAN & 
jANE c. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 227 (2d ed. 1985). Under the new law, any 
holder of an exclusive license is an owner of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 101; HousE REPORT, supra 
note 143, at 123. 
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (author has "rights to do" the enumerated activities). 
148. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 431 (1912) (construing the applicable copyright 
statute, U.S. Comp. Stat. tit. 60, § 4952 (1901), and holding that a right to perform one's own 
federally copyrighted play is a right under federal law sufficient to provide a basis for federal 
jurisdiction). The Court used the term "right" in the general sense of "entitlement"; what 
was at issue was clearly a privilege. 
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main. Although the former copyright holder remains privileged to use 
the work, she then shares the privileges with everyone else. This mu-
tual sharing is familiar from the common law, too, where unowned or 
abandoned resources can be used by all, "free as air to common 
use." 149 Unlike the common law pattern relating to unowned 
tangibles, however, intellectual products whose copyrights have ex-
pired or been lost150 cannot be appropriated by later comers. Once a 
work of authorship is in the public domain, it remains there. 151 
Although the copyright statute itself imposes virtually no limits on a 
copyright owner's privileges of use, 152 other branches of the law do. 
Under defamation law, for example, an author might be privileged to 
write a story but have a duty not to utilize the story to malign someone 
falsely. Similarly, the law of fraud might prohibit an author from em-
ploying a talent for fiction in a deceptive enterprise. Antipomography 
laws may also restrain distribution of certain works. Overall, however, 
use limitations are few. This is not surprising since most limits on privi-
leges in our system stem from a policy of preventing harm or inva-
sion, l53 and much of the harm that works of expression can do is 
permitted by the deference given to free speech under first amendment 
doctrine. 154 
Even when a copyright owner lacks a privilege to use the work in a 
particular way, the copyright proprietor may still retain the right to pro-
hibit others' use. Thus, for example, antipornography laws might pe-
nalize the author of an obscene film for publishing or distributing the 
work and thus effectively destroy the author's privileges for that work. 
Yet the author may still possess exclusive rights in the work and thus be 
able to command payment from anyone else who wishes to display it 
149. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) (citing justice Brandeis in Inter-
national News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)) (referring particularly to intel-
lectual products). 
150. Publication without proper notice has been treated as an abandonment regardless 
of the copyright owner's subjective intent. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 405-406 (West 1977 & Supp. 
1989). With the adoption of the Berne Convention, lack of notice ceases to cause a loss of 
copyright. 
151. New creators can adapt existing public domain works-for example, a composer 
might newly arrange an old song-and have a copyright in the adaptations. The copyright 
extends, however, only to what has been added. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1982). Also note that 
if a second author, unacquainted with the public domain work, happens to duplicate it, that 
independently derived duplicate can be validly copyrighted. Id. § 102 (copyright given in 
"original" works; novelty not required). The public domain work will remain free for all to 
copy, but persons who copy its copyrighted twin will be infringers. Sheldon v. Metro Gold-
wyn Pictures, Inc., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) (classic state-
ment of the rule). 
152. This contrasts with the many limitations it imposes on authors' exclusive rights. See 
notes 134-140 supra and accompanying text. 
153. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra. 
154. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that the first 
amendment barred public figure's claim that magazine's caricature was tortious intentional 
infliction of emotional distress). 
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(perhaps an exhibitor in a more sexually tolerant jurisdiction). 155 
Not only are a creator's privileges of use fairly unconstrained in in-
tellectual property law, but a creator also has privileges of not using the 
creation. For example, a nondisclosure privilege is inherent in the 
"right of first publication" long guaranteed by state common law. 156 
Although the 1976 federal Copyright Act preempted most state com-
mon law of copyright, 157 the Supreme Court recently stressed that the 
judiciary would continue to protect the author's first publication rights 
strenuously. 158 In the patent area, the right not to use one's patent and 
even to suppress it deliberately is well established. 159 
Yet some negative consequences may attach to nonuse. For exam-
ple, in the right-of-publicity area, some controversy has attached to the 
question of whether a deceased celebrity's heirs should be able to as-
sert the celebrity's right of publicity only if the celebrity had exploited 
that right while alive. 160 In the copyright field, authors who do not al-
low access to their works after initial publication161 may find their ex-
clusion rights somewhat vulnerable to the fair use doctrine. 162 
155. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir. 
1979) (obscenity held not a defense to infringement action); see also Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 
F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973) (fraudulent content held not a defense to infringement 
action). 
156. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197-
202 (1890) (suggesting that the "right of first publication" expresses a right of privacy). 
157. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989); note 97 supra. 
158. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
159. See Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945) (patentee is free not to use, and 
to suppress, its patent). The courts have hinted, however, that this liberty may be limited 
where a refusal to license a life-saving invention, or even a health-promoting process, is at 
issue. See id. at 380-84 (Douglas,J., dissenting); see also Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wiscon-
sin Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 945-46 (9th Cir.) (patentee's refusal to license 
vitamin-enriching process for oleomargarine, 'the butter of the poor,' might justify denying 
injunction against patent infringement) (dicta), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945). 
160. The trend seems to be away from requiring such exploitation. See SHELDON W. 
HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND "MORAL RIGHTS" 537-85 (1988). 
161. Exercising the privilege of nonuse is very unlikely to prejudice an author's ability to 
assert her exclusion rights as long as no publication at all has occurred. See Harper & Row, 4 71 
U.S. at 551 (copying unpublished work is particularly unlikely to qualify as fair use). In such a 
context, privacy interests, and even a first amendment right not to speak, may be implicated. 
In a recent controversial opinion, the Second Circuit extended this respect for a copyright 
owner's interest in controlling initial publication to a case where the author of the unpub-
lished work is no longer alive and where, unlike in Harper & Row, the copyright owners would 
themselves be unwilling to publish the passages quoted or paraphrased by the defendant. See 
New Era Publications Int'I, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Nos. 88-7707, 88-7795 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 
1989). Although, as the court notes, the copyright owners would "make available" L. Ron 
Hubbard's unpublished writings to someone writing an "authorized biography," id., slip op. 
at 2881, the unflattering passages would be unlikely to appear in such a publication and might 
thus remain unpublished for the full duration of the copyright. 
162. See Gordon, Fair C:se, supra note 14, at 1632-35 (antidissemination motives). See also 
Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (I Ith Cir. 1984) ("The fact that [plaintiff television 
station] does not actively market copies of the news programs (copied and sold by defendant] 
does not matter, for Section 107 looks to the 'potential market' in analyzing the effects of an 
alleged infringement," id. at 1496, but the case might present different issues if the station 
"absolutely refused to allow the public to view recordings or scripts of its broadcasts," id. at 
1498.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985). 
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Similarly, the intellectual property rights that have emerged from the 
common law of unfair competition are often harder to assert if the 
plaintiff does not serve the particular market where the defendant is 
responding to public demand. Thus, some state courts have demanded 
as a prerequisite to a misappropriation action that the plaintiff show 
that the defendant competed with the plaintiff in the given market. 163 
In addition, the first amendment is more likely to defeat an intellec-
tual property claim if the plaintiff is enforcing the exclusion right to 
prevent utilization of the work. For example, the Supreme Court held 
that the Constitution did not prevent Ohio from giving a "human can-
nonball" a common law right against a television station that had 
broadcast the entirety of his unfixed performance without permis-
sion.164 But the Court suggested that the result might have been differ-
ent if, rather than using his rights to extract compensation, the plaintiff 
had sought to suppress dissemination: 
[I]t is important to note that neither the public nor [the television sta-
tion] will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's performance as long 
as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized. Peti-
tioner [Zacchini] does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his perform-
ance; he simply wants to be paid for it. 16 5 
Thus, at least after initial disclosure, an intellectual property owner's 
privileges not to use or license the work may be slightly limited as the 
courts seek to ensure that someone is serving the public interest by 
disseminating the work. 
Finally, the "real world" limits privileges even when the law does 
not. A privilege's value depends on the privilege holder's ability to ex-
ercise it. This point is important not only when assessing the impact of 
copyright (the author of an unpopular song or unpublishable story gets 
very little from her privileges of use), but also when considering recom-
mendations, like those of copyright critics, that privileges be substi-
tuted for rights. 166 Someone holding a privilege unaccompanied by 
rights is vulnerable to the interference of other persons utilizing their 
own privileges of action. 
163. See James Rahl, The Right to "'Appropriate" Trade l'alues, 23 OHIO ST. LJ. 56, 57 
(1962). Professor Rahl notes that "the court's protection will be reserved for situations in 
which defendant's conduct threatens to destroy the opportunity to market the trade value, the 
prospect of which has induced plaintiff to bring it forth." Id. at 63. While this indicates that 
an owner's refusal to use her property beneficially should trigger partial loss of her right to 
exclude, several misappropriation cases have declined to take that approach. See, e.g., Board 
of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 98 Ill. 2d 109, 456 N.E.2d 84 (1983) (holding competition 
between the parties not a prerequisite to misappropriation suit and permitting Dow Jones to 
enjoin use of the Dow Jones average in a market it did not wish to serve). 
164. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); see also text 
accompanying notes 457-458 infra. 
165. Id. at 578. Some authority would limit this concern for public access solely to 
"facts." See .\"ew Era Publications, Nos. 88-7707, 88-7795. 
166. See genera/(\' Breyer, The l'neasy Case, supra note 3, at 321-22; text accompanying 
notes 246-264, 393-40 l infra. 
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B. Assessing the Patterns 
This article has thus far demonstrated that the tangible and intangi-
ble property structures are quite .similar. Both have three key compo-
nents: rights of exclusion, powers of transfer, and privileges of use. 
Two important differences, however, must be assessed. The first con-
cerns boundaries: Since tangible property has physical edges while in-
tangible property does not, how can intangibles be property? The 
second pertains to how an owner's exclusion rights are defined, for 
where a realty owner has rights against physical intrusion, an intangi-
ble's owner has rights over use. What are the implications of this 
difference? 
In the following material, I suggest that intellectual property doc-
trine provides functional substitutes for the missing element of tangi-
bility and argue that this functional understanding explains intellectual 
property law's willingness to give rights over use. I also suggest that as 
a result, restraints on liberty need not be any more a part of intellectual 
property rights than they are of any property rights. Finally, I show the 
similarity in economic role played by the entitlement package in both 
forms of property. In sum, I suggest that copyright is functionally as 
well as structurally consistent with tangible property. 
1. "Thingness, " "use, " and the role of boundaries. 
How can intellectual property's grant of rights over use or enjoy-
ment be squared with the law of tangible property, where ordinarily 
someone else's extraction of benefits from the owner's resource is not 
per se actionable? For real property, a stranger's mere benefit from 
("use" of) the land does not ordinarily give the landowner a right of 
action. Someone who crawls under the fence to see the circus is tres-
passing; someone who looks through a hole in the fence is not. An 
owner must ordinarily plead and prove intrusion before he can be 
awarded a share in a user's profits. 167 On the other hand, a copyright 
owner is presumptively entitled "to demand compensation from (or to 
deny access to) any group who would othenvise be willing to pay to see 
or hear the copyrighted work." 168 The owner of the copyright in a 
painting of a beautifully landscaped garden can therefore demand com-
pensation from the publisher who prints a copy of the painting in a 
book. The owner of a magnificently landscaped garden, however, can-
167. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text. Although the courts sometimes 
speak of the "right to exclusive use" for tangible personalty, see Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 
26 Wash. 2d 282, 286, 173 P.2d 652, 654 (1946), they seem to mean by that a right to exclu-
sive physical use, equating "use" with a physical intermeddling that has benefited the defend-
ant. Language concerning the "right to exclusive use" in the tangible property context tends 
to appear where there has been some physical intermeddling with the object. See id. at 286-87, 
173 P.2d at 653-54. Such physical touchings invade the owner's interest in physical 
dominion. 
168. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 485 (Blackmun,J., dissenting), 
cited with approval in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985). 
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not demand compensation from those who benefit, even monetarily, 
from the sight or proximity of the landscaping. 
Why should harmless 169 eajoyment of another's resources be ac-
tionable in intellectual property, yet nonactionable in the tangible 
realm? The answer lies largely in the similar role played by different 
types of boundaries in the two areas of law. For realty, physical intru-
sion triggers restitution; 170 for copyright, violation of a specified exclu-
sive right does the same. 
In the law of real property, physical boundaries are essential to or-
ganizing transactions. To have a market, the objects to be bought, 
sold, and licensed must be clearly identified. Outside the market 
sphere, boundaries function to keep an owner's rights within socially 
tolerable limits. Because physical boundaries give notice as to what 
constitutes a trespass, they make planning for the future possible 
("What activities can I pursue without worrying that my neighbor's 
property interests give him grounds to sue me?") and make the tracing 
of consequences from past action practicable ("Now that someone has 
trespassed, what harms or profits have flowed from it?"). 
These functions are So important that where physical boundaries 
lack this capacity to limit liability, even common law liability for harm is 
much less likely to be imposed. 171 Limitless liability for benefits-a 
rule that we each be required to pay for any enjoyment or use we draw 
from another person's property-would be even more potentially ex-
plosive. Requiring that a landowner prove a boundary crossing helps 
contain this liability. 
169. "Harm" lo a plaintiff in lhe usual lOrl contexl is delermined by looking lo lhe plain-
liff's condilion "in lhe absence of any interaclion wilh lhe olher parly." Susan Rose-Acker-
man, I'd Rathei- Be Liable Tha11 l'Ou: A .\"ote 011 Property Rules and Liabilit)' Rules, 6 INT'L REV. L. & 
EcoN. 255, 258 (1986). The controversial bm slill dominant "bm for" lesl of causalion exem-
plifies lhis approach: "Blll for lhe defendant's imeraclion wilh lhe plaintiff, whal would lhe 
plaintiff's welfare have been?" Thus, in a standard lorl case, if lhe defendant has benefiled 
from his interaction wilh lhe plaintiff, bm wilhom making lhe plaimiff any worse off lhan lhe 
plaintiff would have been if lhe interaclion had nol occurred, lhe plaimiff will be lrealed as 
one who has suffered no harm. 
However, "harm" is a relalive concepl lhal depends for its content on specification of a 
baseline, and "absence of any interaclion," id., is only one possible baseline. See lexl accom-
panying noles 190-195, infra, for furlher discussion of lhis issue. 
170. George Palmer noles lhal while "(r]eslilulion is generally awarded only in order lo 
deprive lhe defendanl of an enrichment oblained al lhe plainliff's expense ... [l]here need 
[nol] be any loss lo lhe plainliff excepl in lhe sense thal a legally protected interest has been 
invaded." 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAw OF RESTITUTION§ 2.10, at 133 (1978). For some of 
lhe lechnical difficullies arising when unjust enrichmenl remedies are soughl for harmless 
trespasses, see D. DOBBS, supra note 56, al 372-75. 
171. Avoiding lhal 'nighlmare of the common law judges,' unlimiled liability, has Jong 
been a molivating force in the law. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 
195-98 (1927). Torl law exhibits this concern in proximate cause doclrine and in the courts' 
reluclance lo make emotional and economic losses as easily recoverable as physical losses. In 
partially explaining lhe lauer phenomenon, for example, Harvey Perlman has suggesled that 
while physical harms must come to resl somewhere, economic effecls have no natural stop-
ping poinl. Harvey S. Perlman, bzterf erence with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash 
of Tort a11d Co11tract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 72 (1982). 
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In short, an interdependent world requires demarcations to avoid 
paralysis and preserve valuable, mutually beneficial reciprocities. 172 As 
John Dawson has argued, 
Uncompensated gains are pervasive and universal; our well-being and 
survival depend on them .... Even with a bank of monster computers 
one could hardly estimate the consequences of discovering electric 
light. The radius of the fallout and the number of beneficiaries on 
whom it descends must be sharply reduced before one could even con-
sider tracing the fallout back to its source. l 73 
Physical boundaries provide one important limit. Copyright provides 
its own boundaries which, by and large, substitute well for physical 
boundaries, both in regard to promoting transactions 174 and to keep-
ing liability within tolerable limits. 
First among these substitute boundaries are copyright's fixation and 
demarcation requirements. Federal statutory copyright gives owner-
ship not in vague and hazy abstractions but in "works of authorship" 
which are "fixed" in a "tangible medium of expression." 175 The works 
so fixed-whether pencil-written melodies, tape-recorded symphonies, 
printed books, or computer programs embedded in plastic disks-have 
identifiable boundaries and stable identities much as physical things 
do. 176 Additionally, notices attached to these "fixed" copies when the 
172. In cultural life, the costs of tracing and administering payment might be high 
enough to bring intellectual life to a standstill if an unbridled restitutionary principle is al-
lowed full play. But in the end there may be little conflict between the need to limit the 
restitutionary principle to avoid paralysis and the desire to give a "fair return" to those whose 
labor generates benefits for others. In many situations, it will likely be ')ust" to pay no com-
pensation, because the donors will reap reciprocal benefits from leaving such benefits uncom-
pensated in the long run. For example, authors might prefer having no copyright in their own 
oral conversations, see notes 182-183 infra, or in their general ideas, if the alternative meant 
that they would have to secure others' permission every time they wanted to quote a speaker 
or convey to a third party another's idea. For further exploration of this theme, see W. 
Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55; see also notes 530-533 infra and accompanying 
text (Pareto-based privileges of use). 
This argument is obviously indebted to Frank Michelman's treatment of just compensa-
tion law. Frank I. Michelman, Property, ['tility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical FoundatiollS of 
.. just Compensation .. Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1222-24 (1967). In situations of reciprocity, 
where today's restrained landowner is likely to benefit tomorrow from like restraints on 
others, Michelman suggests that fairness does not require compensation to be paid. His anal-
ysis treats the possibility that restrained landowners may be better off in the long run without 
compensation, if having been compensated they would then (in their role as taxpayers) have 
to compensate all others similarly situated and bear the high administrative costs of doing so, 
or forgo (in their role as members of the public) the benefits of having a restraint like the one 
affecting their land applied to others' land as well. Id. at 1223-35, 1248-51. Similarly, there 
are some areas in which authors might benefit more from unencumbered reciprocity than 
from rights and duties over copying. 
173. Dawson, supra note 127, at 1412. On the virtues of preserving the unencumbered 
interdependence of modern life, see National Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 435 
F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977). 
174. See Gordon, Fair ['se, supra note 14, at 1612 (examining the economic role of de-
marcation in copyright). 
175. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). 
176. See Terrell & Smith, supra note 14, at 28-54 ("thingness as specificity"). However, 
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works are published mark them as owned. 177 Although the Berne Con-
vention Implementation Act of 1988 makes the use of notices voluntary 
rather than mandatory, 178 notices will probably continue to be widely 
used since, under the Act, the use of notices reduces defendants' ability 
to use the "innocent infringer" defense to mitigate damages. 179 Fixa-
tion and notice requirements warn potential infringers of the copyright 
holder's claims. 18° They also make it easier to avoid mistaken infringe-
ment and resulting unfair surprise. 18 1 
Even state common law copyright in unfixed works seems to require 
that the work of authorship be bounded in some way. 182 When Ernest 
Hemingway's widow claimed an ownership interest in the author's oral 
conversations, the New York court refused to honor the claim. Com-
paring oral with written communications, the court indicated that any-
one who wished to exclude others from using his oral communications 
must provide boundaries around his claim and warn others that he as-
serts ownership. 
Letters ... -like plays and public addresses, written or not-have dis-
tinct, identifiable boundaries and they are, in most cases, only occa-
sional products. Whatever difficulties attend the formulation of 
suitable rules for the enforcement of rights in such works ... they are 
relatively manageable. However, conversational speech, the distinctive 
behavior of man, is quite another matter, and subjecting any part of it 
to the restraints of common-law copyright presents unique problems. 
One such problem ... is that of avoiding undue restraints on the 
freedoms of speech and press and, in particular, on the writers of his-
tory and of biographical works .... 
the copyright owner's rights over adaptation and over non-verbatim copying can create some 
fuzziness at the edges. 
177. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-406 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). 
178. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 
2853, 2857 (1988). This Act modifies formalities in American copyright law to meet the inter-
national Berne Convention membership requirements. 
179. Id. § 7(a)(4); see also id. § 7(b)(4) (similar provision for notices on phonorecords). 
According to the Joint Explanatory Statement on Amendment to S. 1301 and H.R. 4262, 36 
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 901, at 648, 650-51 (Oct. 13, 1988), section 7 
"eliminates the mandatory notice requirement and replaces it with an incentive for voluntary 
notice." For other federal provisions regarding the use of notices, see 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1982) 
(patent notices); 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982) (trademark notices). 
180. As Justice O'Connor notes of the notice requirement in patent law, it "is designed 
'for the information of the public' ... and provides a ready means of discerning the status of 
the intellectual property embodied in an article of manufacture or design." Bonito Boats, Inc. 
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 983 (1989). Patent Jaw provides "clear federal 
demarcation between public and private property." Id. 
181. Copyright law, like the law of trespass, does not exempt good faith, innocent in-
fringement. A person who walks on a neighbor's land is trespassing even if she honestly 
believes the land is her own. A composer who has heard a rival's music is similarly liable ifhe 
unconsciously copies it. Both copyright law (via the notice requirement) and land use Jaw (via 
recordation requirements) try to minimize the occasions on which such mistakes will occur. 
Boundaries and demarcation also help keep property rights from imposing unanticipated ob-
ligations of payment on recipients of benefits. 
182. The 1976 Act did not preempt state protection for "unfixed" works. See 17 
U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989); note 97 supra. 
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Assuming, without deciding, that in a proper case a common-law 
copyright in certain limited kinds of spoken dialogue might be recog-
nized, it would, at the very least, be required that the speaker indicate 
that he intended to mark off the utterance in question from the ordi-
nary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a unique statement 
and that he wished to exercise control over its publication. In the con-
ventional common-law copyright situation, this indication is afforded 
by the creation of the manuscript itself. 183 
The second way in which copyright imposes boundaries is by declar-
ing only a limited set of intellectual products protectable.18 4 The copy-
right statute gives authors no rights at all in some aspects of creative 
works. Themes and general ideas may be copied without violating 
copyright law, 185 for copyright protects only the author's expression. 
Copyright similarly does not restrain the copying of systems, methods 
of operation, processes, or discoveries that a work of authorship may 
contain; 186 and the statute's protection does not extend to an article's 
utilitarian features, no matter how aesthetically pleasing they might 
be.187 
A third type of boundary is found in the statutory grant of only a 
183. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 347, 349, 244 N.E.2d 250, 
254-55, 256, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 777, 779 (1968). Regarding the court's reference to "conven-
tional common-law copyright," recall that at the time Hemingway was decided, states' "com-
mon-law copyright" covered unpublished documents such as letters. , 
184. 17 u.s.c. § 102 (1982). 
185. See id. § 102(b); note 127 and text accompanying notes 126-129 supra; see also Nich-
ols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (classic discussion by Judge 
Learned Hand of those elements in literary works that may be borrowed by others), cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). 
186. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). For example, assume someone invents and publishes a 
description of a solar-powered outboard motor. A copyright in the description will not im-
pose on persons who read the description any duty to refrain from using what they learn from 
it to build such a motor or from selling it in competition with its inventor. The author's rights 
cover only the expression in the description. Furthermore, if the only way to communicate a 
given idea or system is to use the original author's language, then even copying of the particu-
lar language is permitted. See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 
1967) (no copyright in short statement of contest rules where there is only limited number of 
ways to convey their substance); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.) 
(legal forms copyrightable but infringement finding necessitates higher-than-usual amount of 
copying), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958). 
187. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definitions of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" 
and "useful article"); id. § 113; HousE REPORT, supra note 143, at 54-55, 105 ("Unless the 
shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress ... or any other industrial product contains 
some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilita-
rian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill." Id. at 55.); see 
also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (statuette held entitled to copyright although sold as 
lamp base). 
The dividing line between utility and aesthetics is often hard to locate, even within a 
single circuit's opinions. Compare Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 
(2d Cir. 1985) (plaintiff's mannequins not copyrightable) with Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories 
by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's ornamental belt buckles copyrightable); 
see also Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (plaintiff's modernistic lighting 
fixtures not copyrightable), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Norris Indus. v. International Tel. 
& Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's automobile wheel covers not copy-
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limited set of rights. As previously outlined, copyright gives proprie-
tors defined rights over specific ways in which people can benefit from a 
work, rather than giving authors a generalized right to all the bene-
fits.188 For example, section 106 gives copyright owners no right to 
control the public's ability to learn from a work or to enjoy it, as long as 
the public does its learning or enjoying in ways that do not involve re-
producing the work or doing one of the other specified acts reserved to 
the copyright proprietor. Thus, as an owner of realty has a right to be 
paid for the use of his land if he can prove intrusion, to be paid for use 
the owner of copyright must prove the defendant violated boundaries: 
a specific section 106 right in regard to a protectable aspect of an origi-
nal and "fixed" work of authorship. Nor can the copyright holder ob-
tain relief simply because someone's activities are causing her economic 
harm. To be actionable, the harm must result from copying or some 
other prohibited act. Thus an author cannot successfully sue a compet-
itor whose more popular, but independently created, work is cutting 
into her market. As is often true with physical property, the copyright 
owner's rights to recompense for economic harm is parasitic on intru-
sion, the violation of boundaries. 
Although they are not physically "crossable," the fixation and mark-
ing requirements and the limits on protectable intellectual products 
and copyright owners' rights function as boundaries in the same way as 
the edges on personal property or physical boundaries around realty 
do. Inevitably, the boundaries of intangibles will be less precise than 
the metes and bounds of realty, and the courts must be vigilant in en-
forcing copyright's limits lest the public be "chilled" in its proper use 
of the unprotected aspects of a work. 189 If this vigilance is maintained, 
rightable). See generally Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach 
to Copyright ill l '.seful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983). 
188. See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.) (rebuffing plaintiff's 
claim that "the copyright laws restrict the economic benefits of copyrighted works to the copy-
right holders"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). Copyright thus tends to avoid the dangers of 
unlimited accountings that concerned john Dawson, supra note 127, at 1412. 
189. Although first amendment issues are outside the scope of this article, it may be 
worthwhile to discuss briefly the question of whether duties not to copy or adapt creative 
works create qualitatively different burdens on the public than do the duties not to harm and 
duties not to enter that characterize tangible property; in particular: Do copyright's duties 
inhibit liberty of thought and expression? 
The short answer has three parts. First, since intellectual property does not protect 
ideas, there is no explicit control on the expression of ideas one has learned from others. 
Second, intellectual property, like the rest of the law, only imposes duties regarding physical 
actions: replication, public performance, and public display. It does not purport to control 
thought. However, some of these physical actions do have a special and intimate relation to 
freedom of thought and expression of ideas. This leads to the third point: To the extent 
intellectual property does indirectly impose such restraints, its borders should be redrawn. 
Speaking one's mind in public is a form of public performance, for example, and responding 
to one's opponents effectively may demand some use of their expression. That use should be 
permitted. See New Era Publications Int'), ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Nos. 88-7707, 88-7795, 
slip op. 2863, 2884 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 1989) (Oakes, CJ., concurring). 
Connection between the physical and the intellectual also occurs, though with less fre-
quency, in the law of tangible property. Both tangible property law and intellectual property 
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copyright's boundaries can work simultaneously to identify the staked 
claim over which others must respect the owner's entitlements and to 
identify the intellectual material open to use by all. Because the na-
tures of the intellectual property and tangible property boundaries dif-
fer, the natures of "trespass" and "infringement" differ. Yet the 
boundaries function alike in identifying what constitutes "property." 
2. Harms and benefits. 
Copyright gives authors an ability to sue for a share in the profits 
others make from using their works. In doing so, does copyright really 
go further than giving rights against harm? In the text so far I have 
been willing to assume so, in order to highlight certain potential differ-
ences between copyright and tangible property, but in fact the answer 
is largely a matter of definition. The word "harm" is usually used to 
indicate the extent to which someone's welfare is below some specified 
baseline level of welfare. 190 Whether to call the author's failure to re-
ceive revenues from particular copiers a "harm" thus depends on how 
one characterizes the author's baseline. 
The clearest case of "harm" is where a copier sells to the author's 
own customers a product identical (except for its lower price) to what 
the author would have sold, so that the author's sales are diverted to 
the copier. Giving the copyright owner a right to share in the in-
fringer's profits where those profits simply represent revenues that the 
copyright proprietor would herself have earned in the infringer's ab-
sence would be uncontroversially described both as a right against 
"harm" and as a right to recapture benefits. (It is commonly recog-
nized that in the area of intangibles it can be difficult to measure the 
amount of injury, and that giving authors a share in the profits copiers 
make is in part a reaction to, and compensation for, that difficulty. 191) 
If the copying does not affect the copyright owner's expected markets, 
the case is harder to classify. Such a case might arise in several ways; 
perhaps the copier is a second creative artist with a valuable and novel 
law should and usually do give way when such conflicts occur. Thus, when the owner of a 
"company town" uses rights against trespass to inhibit first amendment rights, the federal 
Constitution requires those trespass rights to give way. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 
(1946). When the owner ofa shopping mall uses rights against trespass to keep out activists 
bearing petitions, certain state constitutions will require those rights, too, to give way and will 
privilege the strangers' entrance despite the landowner's protests. See Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Similarly, and more systematically, copyright's fair use 
doctrine, and its refusal to give creators rights over ideas, seek to ensure that rights over 
copying will not significantly inhibit liberties that are essential to human self-expressiveness 
or to political life. To the extent such inhibition is threatened, copyright need not be aban-
doned. It can be designed to give way when conflicts occur. One can criticize particular copy-
right decisions for being insufficiently sensitive to first amendment issues without 
condemning copyright as a whole. 
190. jOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 65 
(1984). 
191. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 431-34. 
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conception for adapting the copyrighted work, someone who transmits 
the work to a new audience using a communications technology in-
vented after the work was created, or perhaps an entrepreneur who 
knows of a market of which the author is ignorant. Assume that the 
revenues these copiers earn are not revenues the copyright owner 
could have earned on her own. If the author is entitled to control all 
copying of her work then a lack of compensation from these copiers will 
make her worse off than she was legally entitled to be. If "harm" is 
defined as the extent to which she is worse off in comparison with how 
she would have fared had the copier respected her copyright and paid the 
license fees the author would have demanded, then these copying activ-
ities done without her permission will be said to "harm" her. How-
ever, if she is entitled to control all copying of her work, but "harm" is 
instead defined as the extent to which she is worse off in comparison 
with how she would have fared in the defendant's absence, then it will not 
be said that she has been "harmed" in these cases. One would say in-
stead that when the copyright law allows a copyright proprietor to sue 
successfully in such circumstances, it is solely giving her an entitlement 
to share in the benefits her work generates. 
For the issues raised by copyright law, it is largely irrelevant 
whether the author's entitlement is viewed as an entitlement to be "free 
from harm" or "to share benefit." As I will explore shortly, it is appro-
priate that copyright should give rights beyond mere protection against 
harm (narrowly defined). Among other things, it is desirable for au-
thors to be responsive to the public demand in new areas as well as 
established ones, 192 and a rule of law that denied authors compensa-
tion except to their "expected" markets could cause line-drawing 
problems that would dampen the incentives that new markets should 
bring.193 
An additional point about the harm/benefit distinction should be 
mentioned. Although it is frequently argued that the law should only 
be employed to regulate behavior that causes "harm to others," that 
argument in its strongest form has no applicability to copyright. The 
"harm to others" argument is best used to argue that the law should 
not regulate the category of behaviors John Stuart Mill described as 
"self-regarding"-behavior that affects the actor much more than any-
192. See Gordon, Fair l'se, supra note 14, at 1621-22. It might be argued that potential 
revenues from unexpected uses are unlikely to play much ofa role in the author's pre-creation 
planning, and they are thus irrelevant to incentives. However, revenues from works at various 
stages of an author's or publisher's career commonly cross-subsidize each other. Thus, a 
frequent argument for copyright is that the occasional best seller and its mammoth revenues 
makes possible a publisher's willingness to give first time authors a tryout. For an individual 
author, too, whose books are well adapted to a new use (for example, particularly suited to 
cinematic presentation), obtaining large revenues the first time his work appears in the new 
medium may be important in providing him the wherewithal to make a second work. 
193. Further, it can be quite difficult to decide what is or is not an "expected" use. For 
example, there certainly had been some expectation that new broadcast media would evolve 
once radio was in existence and prior to the time television was announced as practical. 
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one else. 194 However, copying is not a "self-regarding" act; a legal de-
cision whether or not to allow unauthorized copying to proceed does 
not only or primarily affect the copier. It·also affects the author. For 
example, obtaining revenues from a new use could make the difference 
between a novelist staying a novelist or quitting to take a job in 
advertising. 
A different question is presented if enforcing the copyright entitle-
ment would not generate new revenues for the copyright owner; in 
such a case, the act of copying could conceivably be regarded as "self-
regarding." In such cases, however, it is far from clear that the copy-
right owner could bring a successful suit. 19 5 
3. Differences in liability criteria. 
Although formally the owners of both tangible and intangible prop-
erty have a similar right to recapture benefits196 achieved through in-
trusion, there may be some concern that the impact of this right will be 
greater in the intangible realm. Physical boundaries might allow a wide 
range of uses to occur without compensation. Intangible rights' 
boundaries, by contrast, have been artificially defined precisely to bring 
within their scope a wide range of the uses that can be made of the 
product. When copyright gives authors rights over specific forms of 
use, 197 the law arguably risks imposing a mor~ expansive liability than 
with rights against physical intrusion or harm. 
However, the differences are not as great as they may seem, and to 
the extent the design of intellectual property is broader, this breadth is 
tolerated because copyrights would provide little real protection with-
out it. For physical property, rights triggered by intrusion allow the 
owners of realty to control most of the uses made of their land. Since 
most economically significant uses ofland require physical entry (grow-
ing crops on arable land, building skyscrapers on a city plot) and most 
economically significant uses of tangible personalty require physical in-
termeddling (eating an apple, driving a car), rights against physical in-
trusion indirectly give tangible property owners a right to control most 
194. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 91-95 (C. Shields ed. 1956). The typical exam-
ple is freedom of thought or sexual behavior; since how X thinks or how X behaves in the 
bedroom affects X more than it does anyone else, and since controlling X's thoughts or sexual 
behavior would hurt X more than it could help anyone else, the law should not interfere in 
these aspects of X's life. Other interpretations of "self-regarding act" and of Mill's position 
can be made. For example, it might be argued that Mill was not merely making a utilitarian 
calculus, but also had in mind a particular substantive idea for human development or a par-
ticular preference for liberty. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Palemalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAw 
107, I 17-18 (R.A. Wasserstrom ed. 1971) (exploring non-utilitarian arguments in On Libert)'). 
Such a position might have different implications for intellectual property. 
195. I have suggested that such copiers have a good claim to the privilege of fair use. See 
generally Gordon, Fair ['se, supra note 14; text accompanying notes 434-435 infra. 
196. See text accompanying notes 190-195 supra. 
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). 
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economically significant uses of what they own. 198 On the other hand, 
a right against physical intrusion would not enable an intellectual prop-
erty owner to control most economically significant uses of the intellec-
tual product. For example, assume that someone visits a park and 
photographs a famous statue, intending to mass-produce a replica of 
the statue in plastic. Giving the sculptor a right only to control physical 
touching of the work would give her no effective remedy. Or assume 
that someone writes a symphony. Inexpensive portable taping tech-
niques may make it possible for someone who hears a broadcast of the 
work, or who is a member of the audience present at the work's per-
formance, to make recordings that will compete with the composer's 
own records. 
In these examples, a right against physical intrusion alone is unlikely 
to make the sculptor or composer fully responsive to the public de-
mand for what they can produce. More generally, resources tend to be 
utilized most efficiently when the decisionmakers must take the costs 
and benefits of potential decisions into account when deciding. In eco-
nomic language, they must "internalize" the costs and benefits. Dem-
setz and others have argued that "the main allocative function of 
property rights is the internalization of beneficial and harmful effects 
•••• "
199 In the law of tangible property, an owner is encouraged to 
keep his land from going to waste and to use it productively because he 
bears the loss or reaps the profit that results. The same logic applies to 
accident law. Forcing harm-causers to "internalize" the costs of their 
harm by imposing tort liability on them deters their careless behavior. 
Intellectual property performs the same internalization function; as 
accident law discourages careless behavior by internalizing costs, copy-
right encourages productive behavior by giving creators a share in the 
benefits they generate. For a nonaltruistic benefit-creator to alter her 
behavior to increase the benefits her work will give to others, economic 
theory suggests, she must be able to internalize at least part of those 
benefits. The more revenues the author can expect, the more she is 
likely to invest time, effort, or money in creating new works. As the 
statue and symphony examples suggest, achieving internalization of 
benefits for intangibles largely depends on rights not tied to physical 
touching. 
Doctrinally, the Supreme Court seems not unduly distressed by dif-
ferences between rights to exclude physically, on the one hand, and 
rights to control or profit from the benefits that ft.ow from use, on the 
other. In Ruckelshaus v . .Afonsanto Co. ,200 the Court held that intellectual 
property rights (there, trade secrets) could constitute "property" enti-
198. It might be suggested that control over the physical wqrk will in fact give the author 
or artist the same control as would copyright. See text accompanying notes 326-369 infra. 
199. Demsetz, supra note 21, at 450; see also Arrow, supra note 21. 
200. 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984). 
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tied to the protection of the fifth amendment's "takings" clause.201 
When the government, without prior notice that confidentiality would 
not be respected, obtained one company's trade secrets and then al-
lowed other companies to use them, the Court required the govern-
ment to pay compensation. 202 In treating an occasion in which the 
government had simply made it possible for one entity to take physi-
cally nonintrusive advantage of another as a taking of property, the 
Court demonstrated its comfort with the different liability criteria for 
tangible and intangible property. 
4. Economic functions of the entitlement package. 
We can easily see why each of us should have dominion over our 
bodies. Under all of the normative perspectives one coufd name-nat-
ural law,203 Hegelian philosophy,204 utilitarianism,205 economics,206 
common sense-it is easy to defend the notion that a soul should have 
dominion over the body it inhabits, in particular, a right to say "no" to 
intrusions. But it is not so clear why persons should be given the right 
to control things that lie outside their bodies, things as to which other 
persons might also have claims. Many theorists, including John 
Locke, 207 have attempted to justify dominion over property as an out-
201. See also Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (confidential information 
is "property" under the mail fraud statute). 
202 . .llonsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013-14. 
203. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§ 27, in Two TREATISES OF Gov-
ERNMENT 283 (P. Laslett ed. 1970) (arguing that persons have "natural" rights in self and 
products of the self). 
204. See Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971-78, 986-88 
(1982) (exploring Hegelian notions of property). 
205. A utilitarian argument might run as follows: Someone else's action that affects my 
body will probably affect me more than it does them, so giving me control over my body is 
likely to help me more than it frustrates that other person, thus leading to an increase in 
utility. Giving me a legal right to exclude will cause Jess social disruption than will leaving me 
to rely on my own efforts to effectuate this control. (This argument adapts and extends Mill's 
argument for liberty regarding self-regarding acts, which pertained to the privilege of being 
free from state control, see J.S. MILL, supra note 194, to include rights to call upon the legal 
system to prevent other private parties from interfering with the self.) In addition, loss of 
control over the self injures dignity, which causes disutility. 
Of course, this is simply an argument to show how a right over one's body might be de-
rived from considerations of utility. There may be circumstances where it is controversial 
whether such a right could be so derived. Supporters of the military draft, for example, might 
try to use utility arguments to justify giving the state certain rights over one's body, particu-
larly in wartime. 
206. Economists might adopt the utilitarian argument in part, although the relationship 
between "wealth maximization" and "utility" is always problematic. See genera/(\' JULES L. 
COLEMAN, Efficiency, Ctility and Jl'ealth .Uaximization, in MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 95-132 
(1988). Alternatively, their argument might stress information and other transaction costs: 
Decisions about interferences with a body are not easily monetized; the person with the best 
information about the applicable costs is likely to be the person whose body it is, and this 
person will probably be better able to act on any decision reached than a third-party deci-
sionmaker. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1096-97. 
207. Although Locke's view of property is often perceived as not based on "personality" 
interests, his basic argument was that a right of property in the things one labors to produce 
or appropriate grows out of one's right to control the labor of one's body. See J. LOCKE, supra 
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growth of rights over one's personal self;20s and an argument of that 
sort might also be used to justify intellectual property.209 In addition, 
many property rights clearly serve also to encourage desirable patterns 
of resource use. Since much of the criticism copyright faces is economi-
cally based, I shall explore the latter function and inquire into whether 
the institution's role in providing incentives differentiates it from tangi-
ble property. 
The market-promoting and internalizing character of the legal insti-
tution known as "property" has been noted frequently in regard to tan-
gible resources.210 As suggested above, the copyright statute similarly 
facilitates the use and development of copyrighted works through mar-
kets. 211 Putting the matter most simply: 'just as a farmer will not vol-
untarily cultivate land if any other person can come along and harvest 
the land, an author without copyright will not have sufficient pecuniary 
incentive to engage in the productive act of artistic creation."21 2 The 
following discussion will show how the various components of the intel-
lectual property package-the privileges, powers, and rights-all have 
distinct economic functions that allow authors to market their works 
and thus share in the benefits their works provide. 
Privileges. Privileges have at least three sorts of value for the creator, 
even when considered without reference to rights over copying. First, 
with the liberty to use213 a work, the creator can enjoy the work herself. 
note 203, § 27; see also Karl Olivecrona, Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of 
Property, 35]. HIST. IDEAS 211, 215 (1974) (examining how notions of property and personal-
ity were intermixed for several natural law theorists: "We have the feeling of our personality 
being in some inexplicable way extended to encompass the objects we own."); Karl 
Olivecrona, Locke's Theory of Appropriation, 24 PHIL. Q, 220, 225 (1974) (suggesting that for 
Locke, "[t]he spiritual personality is extended so as to encompass physical objects"). 
208. For an argument that the "personal" element should remain an active and explicit 
part of property law, see generally Radin, supra note 204. 
209. Immanuel Kant is often associated with the view that authors' personal interests 
can justify copyright, though the implications ofKant's'views are far from clear. See EMANUEL 
KANT, Of the byustice of Counterfeiting Books, in 1 ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL, 
AND VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 225 (W. Richardson trans. 1798), discussed in Breyer, 
supra note 3, at 288-89. 
210. See, e.g .. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Calabresi 
& Melamed, supra note 64, at 1099 (rights of exclusion and powers of transfer facilitate mar-
kets); Demsetz, supra note 21, at 347-48, 354-58. 
21 l. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1605-10 (general overview of the market 
model), 1610-14 (analysis of copyright markets). For recent analyses usefully discussing the 
parallel functions performed by legal and physical modes of exclusion in market formation, 
see Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 21; Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying and Price Discrimi-
nation, supra note 21; Palmer, supra note 6. 
212. Liebowitz, Copynght Law, Photocopying and Price Discrimination, supra note 21, at 184. 
Economic critics of copyright ask whether in the absence of property rights strangers would 
indeed be able to capture enough remuneration to undermine creators' incentives. A similar 
critique is often made of private property. Other entitlement packages might, in particular 
circumstances, facilitate desirable exchanges even better than the private property model. See, 
e.g .. Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 41, at 717-39. 
213. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (listing copyright holder's privileges, powers, and 
rights). 
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A creator wants to be able to sing her own song just as she wants to be 
able to eat her own apple. 
Second, value stems from the privilege not to use one's own work. 
Nondisclosure is perhaps the most economically significant privilege, 
for the threat of nonavailability gives the author leverage with which to 
exact payment from potential users for access to the work. That threat 
is credible as long as the author possesses the only copies, for she can 
use tangible property law to keep those copies secure from prying eyes 
and photocopy machines. Once copies of the work are in hands other 
than the author's own, however, the creator may lose control of it un-
less the law gives her more than a mere privilege of nondisclosure and 
tangible property rights. Depending on the nature of the work and the 
market, once a copy of a work is provided even to one customer, stran-
gers may obtain access to it through that customer. They then may 
either use it without paying or, even worse for the author, copy it and 
become competing sources of the work. The nondisclosure privilege 
thus gives the author some power to demand recompense, but the ex-
tent of the revenues that she can generate after the first customer has 
received a copy is uncertain. 
Finally, creators may be able to charge others a fee for sharing in 
their privileged use. For example, a composer can obtain significant 
fees from an audience if she can use physical strength to exclude 
nonpurchasers ("pay to hear me play my music or I'll have my bouncers 
throw you out") or if she can piggyback protection of the intellectual 
product on other legal rights like the right of exclusion from real prop-
erty ("this is my concert hall and I'll call the cops if you try to come in 
without paying"). 
Rights. The right to exclude-for intellectual property, the right to 
refuse others the privilege of using the work in specified ways-supple-
ments the privileges that an author has in crucial ways. An exclusion 
right against copying greatly increases the copyright owner's ability to 
prevent strangers from interfering with her ability to market the work. 
Since others are prohibited from copying the work, strangers cannot 
reproduce the copies to which they may have access and thus cannot 
directly compete with the author in selling the work. This right raises 
immensely the ability of the nondisclosure privilege to effectuate inter-
nalization, for the right counteracts the first-publication consequence 
of making the author vulnerable to pirates. 
The "trespass" character of infringement suits214 makes the exclu-
sive rights in copyright easier to use. As compared with trade secret or 
trademark plaintiffs, a proprietor can more easily prevail in a copyright 
infringement suit. She does not need to prove, in each individual case, 
that the defendant's copying leads to a socially undesirable result, un-
like the trademark plaintiff, who ordinarily must prove a likelihood of 
214. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra (nature of action of trespass to land). 
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confusion. She also need not show that the defendant committed any 
independent bad act, unlike the trade secret plaintiff, who usually must 
prove that defendants knew they were obtaining the contested informa-
tion through someone's breach of trust.215 This "formal" methodol-
ogy, in which violation of the exclusion right is per se actionable, is a 
typical example of the common law's ownership model. Rather than 
inquiring independently into whether plaintiff or defendant should 
control the contested use, as a prima facie matter the court defers to 
the owner as to a sovereign whose will is law over the owned terri-
tory. 216 The copyright plaintiff need not even prove that defendants 
knew they were copying; as in trespass to realty, where a good faith and 
reasonable belief that one is on one's own land will not protect a de-
fendant who ignorantly crosses a neighbor's boundary,217 even uncon-
scious copying gives rise to liability in copyright cases.21s 
Limits on exclusion rights also have an economic dimension, in both 
tangible property law and copyright. Just as a landowner's prima facie 
trespass claim can be defeated by a defendant who bears the burden of 
proving an applicable privilege, such as necessity, a copyright owner's 
infringement claim can be defeated by a defendant who bears the bur-
den of proving "fair use."219 Implicit in both sorts of privileges is the 
judicial decision that, when special circumstances are present, a court 
should inquire into the merits of what the intruder or user intends to 
do with the property, thus guarding society from potentially disastrous 
assertions of the exclusion right. The privileges act as a "safety valve" 
in the event the self-regulating character of property fails to keep it 
within tolerable bounds.220 
The privileges to trespass have evolved over the years into a discrete 
215. See text accompanying notes 117-119 supra (trademarks and trade secrets). 
216. Comparing trespass with negligence, for example, William Powers notes: 
Ownership embodies a formal methodology, since ... questions concerning appro-
priate use are answered wholly by asking whether a proposed use has been sanc-
tioned by the owner. A decision by the landowner ... concludes legal debate under 
the ownership model. On the other hand, a duty of reasonable use embodies a 
nonformal methodology because it makes direct, ad hoc reference to efficiency [or 
other measures of social desirability]. Under this model, a decision concerning the 
landowner ... would depend on a comparison of relative costs and benefits in the 
specific case. 
William C. Powers, Jr., A .\/ethodological Perspective on the Duty lo Act (Book Review), 57 TEX. L. 
REV. 523, 526-27 (1979). He notes that this formal and deferential approach "enhances pre-
dictability, is easier lO apply, and controls bias or other sources of error in the decisionmaking 
process," but that a formal approach also has costs, such as the "social cost of tolenting uses 
that do not maximize aggregate welfare in the short run." Id. at 527. 
217. PROSSER & KEETON, supm note 47, at 74-75. 
218. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) (George Harrison found liable for having "subconsciously" copied the song "He's So 
Fine" in composing "My Sweet Lord.") 
219. See notes 137-140 supra and accompanying text (fair use); see also Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (commercial copying is "presumptively" 
unfair; in cases of noncommercial copying, plaintiff has initial burden to show defendant's use 
has future to harm plaintiff's future market). 
220. See note 216 supra (costs of the "formal" approach); see also notes 62-64 supra and 
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set of defined privileges.221 But copyright law is newer, and "fair use" 
appears amorphous largely both because one doctrine is doing the 
work of many, and because the judicial understanding of appropriate 
grounds for privilege in copyright is still evolving. Eventually there are 
likely to be as many discrete privileges to use others' works as there are 
privileges to enter land. 222 
Powers. Because the exclusion right is coupled with powers to change 
the entitlements in the work, the copyright proprietor has an increased 
ability to demand significant payment from those who want to use the 
work. First, an exclusion right imposes on the public a duty not to 
copy; and if the proprietor is the only person empowered to void this 
duty, she can charge a fee for doing so. So, for example, persons who 
want permission to perform a musical composition publicly or to make 
numerous duplicates of it for use in their professional choirs will pay 
the copyright owner for her permission (a nonexclusive license). Simi-
larly, the proprietor's powers mean that the composer who wants to 
extract money for performances of her work would no longer have to 
rely on her ability to control physical access to the place where the mu-
sic is played. With a right to prohibit strangers from publicly perform-
ing the work and a power to change their duty not to perform into a 
privilege of performance, composers can exact payment from perform-
ers other than themselves who give concerts over the airwaves or in 
buildings the composers do not control. 
Second, in addition to enabling copyright owners to void othenvise 
applicable duties not to copy, powers also enable the copyright owner 
to transfer entitlements in full. Purchasers may pay significantly more 
for receiving the copyright owner's own exclusive rights than they 
would for mere permission to use. For example, if a novelist merely 
waives his objections to publication, without transferring to the pub-
lisher any of his exclusive rights, the publisher might be unwilling to 
pay a great deal for the license out of fear that the author might later 
privilege other persons to publish the same work. Giving authors the 
power to terminate their own privileges and powers, to assign com-
pletely their entitlements in their work, eliminates such problems.223 
accompanying text (privileges for socially desirable behavior); notes 523-526 i11fra and accom-
panying text (exigency-based exceptions to copyright). 
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 167-213 (1965) (privileged entries on 
land). 
222. Fair use has often been called the "most troublesome in the whole law of copy-
right." Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). I do 
not contend that fair use will ever be a matter of bright line categories. But much of the sense 
of mystery surrounding fair use might dissipate if one recognized that this single doctrine, 
though supplemented by a number of more specific statutory limits on copyright owners' 
rights, does the work that many separate privileges do in other areas of property law. 
223. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Haela11, a suit between two chewing gum companies over the 
use of a baseball player's picture on bubblegum cards, illustrates the importance of assignabil-
ity. The player had purported to sell the "exclusive" right to use his photograph to one gum 
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Third, authors can use their exclusion rights to demand a share in 
the new value created by the technology, talent, or entrepreneurial ac-
tivity of others, regardless of whether the authors personally could have 
implemented the new use. Since copyright proprietors have the power 
to transfer the rights and powers in their work to others, they can make 
transfers to persons who may be better situated than they to utilize the 
work to serve the demands of the paying public and who may earn 
more for the authors than they could earn for themselves. Thus, an 
author who knows nothing about movie making can still sell the motion 
picture rights for his novel to a film company. The right of exclusion 
allows the owner to act as a gatekeeper, demanding license fees from 
others who wish to apply their talents or resources to the works;224 eco-
nomic theory suggests that over time authors will probably respond to 
the new possibilities created by such developments, and the prospect of 
these new revenues will induce the creation of works adapted to filling 
the new needs. 
The entitlement package is more than just a way to give the author 
incentives to produce in the first instance. It also organizes the way 
already-produced works are rationed and coordinated. Owners "ra-
tion" the works by selling the privileges or rights to the highest bidder, 
thus allocating the entitlements to those economically best able to sat-
isfy public tastes.225 Also, by taking steps to maximize their own prof-
its, the owners through rationing and coordination control exploitation 
of the resource to encourage appropriate development. 226 
company, but then he also entered into a contract with the other. Resolution of the dispute 
depended in part on whether the athlete had the power to assign the right or whether he had 
simply waived a right that he lacked the power to sell. 
224. The owner has no economic power, however, to exact license fees for unprotected 
aspects or uses of the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). 
225. To illustrate, 
consider the example of movie producers who wish to purchase the motion picture 
rights to a best-selling novel. Smithian economists would posit that each producer's 
ability to raise funds from investors depends on the amount of revenue that his or 
her movie-making is expected to generate. Among producers of varying levels of 
skill, the producer best able to use the book to satisfy consumer tastes will be in a 
position to raise the most funds and thus to offer the highest bid. Similarly, the 
author or other owner of copyright in the novel will sell the rights only if the reve-
nues he could anticipate by exploiting the work himself would be less than the pur-
chaser's bid. Control over the resource will therefore gravitate through consensual 
transfers to the person in whose hands the resource can best be used to satisfy con-
sumer desires. 
Gordon, Fair l'se, supra note 14, at 1606 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1615 (users who 
plan economically valuable applications of the work are likely to be able to pay for their use). 
The Court seems to accept that, at least in some contexts, persons who can use a work to 
serve social needs (economically defined) will be the persons most able to pay license fees for 
its use. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985). 
226. The classic article on the employment of intellectual property rights to rationalize 
production and exploitation is Kitch, supra note 21; see also Denicola, supra note 21, at 640 
(arguing that coordination in trademark use may be necessary to preserve the value of the 
mark); Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Eco110111ic Surplus, 23 
J.L. & EcoN. 197 (1980) (commenting on Kitch's analysis); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Pros-
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This internalization, rationing, and coordination process does not 
necessarily lead to ideal allocations from a normative point of view, 
given, among other things, patterns of income distribution which may 
prevent certain groups from expressing their tastes.227 After all, "If 
wealth is very unequally distributed in a community, then the fact that a 
rich man buys caviar while a poor man goes without bread does not 
mean that the community as a whole values the caviar more than the 
bread."228 Nor does willingness to pay necessarily best indicate value. 
For example, trash novels regularly outsell classics, yet literature 
courses still spend more time on the latter. For another example, 
adopting strong trademark rights may make trademarks worth a great 
deal of money; but persons opposed to conspicuous consumption229-
like the beleaguered parents of teenagers demanding sneakers with 
"Reebok" and "Adidas" labels-might be delighted to see the drawing 
power of popular trademarks diminish. And, most generally, economic 
efficiency is not the only goal that law in general,230 or intellectual 
property in particular, should legitimately serve.231 Yet in promoting 
market formation, copyright serves the same function as the law of tan-
gible property. Copyright seems no "sport" but an ordinary example 
of a common pattern.232 
II. ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT 
This section will seek to illuminate the nature of the choices that 
must be made if copyright is to be eliminated, by briefly discussing 
some of the conceptually available alternatives to copyright. The dis-
cussion will first examine possible alternatives to copyright, focusing on 
three: (1) "copy-privilege"-eliminating copyright and all equivalent 
rights; (2) "no direct or indirect rights"-making unenforceable any 
peels, and Economic Smplus: A Rep(l', 23 J.L. & EcoN. 205 (1980) (responding to McFetridge and 
Smith's critique). 
227. The governing principle of markets might be described as "To each according to 
how much he benefits others who have the resources for benefiting those who benefit them." 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 158 (1974) (commenting on the views ofF.A. 
Hayek). 
228. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 222 (1985). 
229. Roughly speaking, "conspicuous consumption" is the process of making wasteful 
purchases in order to demonstrate wealth or status. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF 
THE LEISURE CLASS 68-101 (1934). 
230. For a discussion sensitive to many of the virtues and flaws in economic analysis, see 
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, E:.:cha11ge, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach lo 
Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980). 
231. See text accompanying notes 407-413, 444-445 & 516-533 infra; see also Fisher, supra 
note 5, at 1686-92 (discussing the underlying objectives of the fair use doctrine). 
232. That copyright takes the form of property and serves functions that property serves 
does not mean that it deserves unquestioning deference on that account. Property entitle-
ments vary with circumstance; courts and legislatures are continually faced with the question 
of what entitlements should attach to a given species of property in a particular context and 
are quite willing to vary entitlements as policies dictate. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 74, 77-
78 (warning against the reification of "copyright as property"). In this regard, too, copyright 
is no exception. 
July 1989] MERITS OF COPYRIGHT 1395 
right, even if not equivalent to copyright, whenever enforcing it would 
restrain or punish copying; and (3) "mandatory sharing"-imposing 
duties on authors to share their work. 233 I will then compare these 
three options to one another, showing where the alternative most often 
favored by the commentators, eliminating rights specifically directed 
against copying, fits among the available choices. This "copy-privi-
lege" option will provide the focus for the last half of the article, where 
I critically examine the major arguments advanced in favor of that op-
tion and against copyright. 
A. Generating Alternatives to Copyright 
Evaluating any legal institution requires identifying and understand-
ing the possible alternatives. Commentators on copyright usually focus 
on only two systemic choices: copyright as we know it, or an absence of 
copyright.234 Yet other potentially important options exist. 
Beginning with the most global set of alternatives, one might ques-
tion all private property, whether in land, tangible personalty, or intel-
lectual works, and examine a number of alternative property regimes. 
The law might be revised, for example, to substitute for private prop-
erty a regime in which all property was owned in common, with varying 
degrees of restrictions on resource use set by the community. Another 
alternative might substitute for private property a regime of no prop-
erty at all, i.e., a partial state of nature where self-help and voluntary 
assistance from others would replace police and courts as the primary 
means of protecting one's claim to resources.235 One might examine, 
as further examples, how property of various kinds would be handled in 
a regime governed by John Rawls's principles of justice,236 in Bruce 
233. Other options exist. For example, one might examine a regime of"copy payment." 
(I owe the term to Jane Ginsburg.) Currently, copyright grants exclusive rights that are 
backed by injunctive rights as well as rights to monetary relief. Eliminating the possibility of 
injunctive relief would leave creators with the right to remuneration but without a veto over 
how their works are used (a regime of "copy payment"). I explore that alternative here only 
insofar as it is a component of other regimes. Because the focus here is to show that some 
authors' rights, as opposed to an absence of rights, are normatively desirable, my analysis 
does not consider "copy payment" separately from copyright. 
234. See general{\' Breyer, The Cneasy Case, supra note 3 (advocating that copyright not be 
extended); Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 25, at 425-32 (exploring various alternatives but 
primarily questioning intellectual property's exclusive rights); Liebowitz, Copyright Laur, Photo-
copying, and Price Disn-imination, supra note 21 (suggesting that nonenforcement of copyright 
might be desirable where societal benefits of enforcement outweigh societal costs); Palmer, 
supra note 6 (arguing that copyright and patent are normatively inferior to legal schemes that 
would depend solely on creators' ingenuity in utilizing their common law entitlements in tan-
gible property and contract). 
235. I say a "partial" state of nature because an absence of property can coexist with 
state enforcement of contracts and other forms of government. For an interesting discussion 
comparing the efficiency of private propeny regimes with state-of-nature and things-owned-
in-common regimes and suggesting that each model's comparative efficiency depends on em-
pirical questions rather than on any inherent virtue or limitation of the models themselves, 
see Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 4 l. 
236. See general{rjoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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Ackerman's liberal state,237 or in Robert Nozick's minimal state.238 Fi-
nally, one might take any of these sets of global guidelines and apply 
them solely to intellectual property. 
Some rough observations can be made about the relation between 
certain of these global choices and copyright. Given a choice between a 
communitarian regime with extensive central control and a state-of-na-
ture regime, copyright critics would probably prefer that the latter gov-
ern intellectual property, since copyright's supposed evils stem from 
too much control over copying rather than too little.239 The critics 
might be attracted to much of Rawlsian theory, such as the priority 
given to liberty240 or the way Rawls's "difference principle" would fo-
cus on the welfare of the worst-off, who might need to use what others 
produce.241 Since "'[t]he difference principle represents, in effect, an 
agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common 
asset. .. ,' " 242 this could lead to a greater degree of sharing than in our 
237. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SoCIALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 69·80, 100 (1980) (role 
of dialogue). To the extent that the legitimacy that can sanction ownership arises out of dia-
logue, it seems highly arguable that the elements of dialogue should not themselves be 
owned. 
238. R. NozICK, supra note 227, at 109-10. 
239. This assumes that in a state-of-nature regime, some incentives for the production 
of new works would remain. Otherwise, those critics who take an economic stance might not 
favor abrogation of rights against copying. See, e.g., Breyer, The Cneasy Case, supra note 3, at 
283-306, 350-51. . 
240. See J. RAWLS, supra note 236, at 60-61, 541-48. His first principle of justice is that 
"each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a 
similar liberty for others." Id. at 60. His second principle, the "difference principle," is that 
"[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity." Id. at 83. Rawls gives liberty first priority, so that 
"a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be 
justified ... or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages." Id. at 61. 
The principle of liberty does not per se favor users of creative works over the authors of 
those works, for among "the basic liberties of citizens" appear not only "liberty of conscience 
and freedom of thought," the form of liberty with which persons seeking access to works of 
authorship might want to be aligned, but also "the right to hold (personal) property." Id. 
Nevertheless, particular such preferences could be constructed. Thus, Rawls argues that 
[a]ll citizens should have the means to be informed about political issues. They 
should be in a position to assess how proposals affect their well-being .... The liber-
ties protected by the principle of participation lose much of their value whenever 
those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantages to con-
trol the course of public debate. 
Id. at 225. Concerns such as this might give rise to rules limiting, for example, the copyright 
of materials useful in political debate. 
Rawls believes that in the Original Position (a hypothetical situation in which rational 
beings of equal liberty are to choose principles of justice to govern them), the participants 
would "set a particularly high value on the pursuit of their 'spiritual and cultural interest.' " 
T.M. Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of justice, in READING RAWLS: CRmCAL STUDIES OF A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 169, 186 (N. Daniels ed. 1985). Arguably, in order to relate to one's culture, one 
must use its cultural creations-whether such use takes the form of reading, quotation, re-
sponse, or adaption. The greater the importance to a society of cultural involvement, the 
greater its privilege to use intellectual products may be. 
241. J. RAWLS, supra note 236, at 83; note 240 supra. 
242. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 70 (1982) (quoting J. 
RAWLS, supra note 236, at 101). Of course, it might be argued that an intellect would not be 
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current legal system. 
But even if a wide range of alterations in the legal pattern could be 
implemented, most copyright critics tend to avoid fundamental rear-
rangements. 243 They concentrate on alterations in the law that are spe-
cifically designed to decrease creators' abilities to control the use that 
others make of their intellectual products and that operate within the 
framework of current legal institutions.244 But even if one refrains 
from essaying a wholesale redesign of the legal system, the choices are 
broader than copyright or no copyright. 
If there were no copyright, creators would have no exclusion rights, 
and users would have privileges to copy245 without fear of the restraint 
that creators could have exercised with exclusion rights. As already 
noted, that regime might be called one of "copy-privilege." As a sec-
ond alternative, the law might give users privileges to copy which were 
good against any right whatsoever. Finally, the law might give users 
rights to the legal system's assistance when they wish to copy. Restating 
these noncopyright alternatives from authors' point of view, they 
amount to: (1) eliminating copyright and all rights equivalent to copy-
right ("copy-privilege"); (2) rendering unenforceable any tort or con-
tract right, even if not equivalent to copyright, whenever its 
enforcement would restrain or punish copying ("no direct or indirect 
rights"); and (3) imposing duties to share on authors ("mandatory 
sharing"). The following material will describe these three options and 
then suggest why copy-privilege tends to be the commentators' favored 
choice. 
1. Entitlements revisited. 
As a preliminary matter, it will be useful to highlight certain aspects 
of the Hohf eldian entitlements out of which these alternatives to copy-
right are to be built. Hohfeldian rights and privileges are commonly dis-
tinguished by describing privilege-holders as entitled to liberty and 
right-holders as entitled to enlist the state's force. A privilege roughly 
lrealed lhe same for all purposes as olher "common assels" in a Rawlsian slate. ll is never-
lheless possible that a society lhat shares a sense that the creative person is "not really the 
owner but merely the guardian or repository of ... assorted assets and attributes," id. at 82, 
might impose significant limitations on such a person's intellectual property rights, if any were 
granted al all. The difference principle might not lead in this direction, however, since the 
principle is also consistent with granting significant legal righls over works if those rights 
create incentives benefiting the worst-off, provided that the liberty principle is respected. See 
J. RAWLS, supra note 236, at 100-08. Fisher briefly explores the applicability of the Rawlsian 
difference principle to copyright. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1756-62. 
243. One reason may be fear of hubris. For example, William Fisher has offered to recast 
copyrighl in light of his "utopian" vision of the role that intellectual products should play in 
modem life; but he admits the difficulties in trying to develop and implement a substantive 
vision of "the good life and the good society.'' See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1697. 
244. See sources cited in note 234 supra. 
245. For simplicity's sake, the discussion will employ "copying" as a proxy for the vari-
ous uses of the work over which the copyright statute now gives creators control. 
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parallels what Isaiah Berlin termed a "freedom from" (although recall 
it is only a "freedom from" the state); and, correspondingly, a right 
roughly parallels a state-guaranteed "freedom to."246 
One should not be distracted by the connotation of "undeserved 
advantage" that sometimes adheres to use of the word privilege in intel-
lectual property debate. For Hohfeld, a privilege is simply a liberty. 
Nor should one be confused by American constitutional law's occa-
sional identification of privilege with "favor" or "gratuity" and right with 
"entitlement."247 In the Hohfeldian lexicon, a privilege is also an enti-
tlement-an entitlement to be free from governmental interference. 
Neither rights nor privileges are matters of "mere benefit" that can be 
disregarded at whim. 
Every privilege is accompanied by a particular set of rights that op-
erate to protect that privilege from erosion by the state. Thus, behind 
every privilege is a right, of some degree of strength, that restricts how 
the government may impinge on the privilege. For example, most of 
the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights analytically are 
Hohfeldian privileges backed by rights against governmental interfer-
ence. 248 In property law, the most notable of these back-up rights is 
the fifth amendment's takings clause, which sometimes protects privi-
leges with a requirement that compensation be paid for their abroga-
tion. 249 Some privileges are less strongly protected but, even so, the 
entitlement holder will have some rights, such as a right that the entitle-
ment's abrogation comport with due process, a right to demand proof 
that the abrogation is authorized by the state's police power, and a right 
that the restraint's imposition comport with the substantive and proce-
246. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). 
247. In the constitutional law area, the terms "right" and "privilege" have been most 
closely identified with the debates over what kinds ofrestrictions the government can lawfully 
impose as conditions for receiving benefits, and over what kind of benefits it can withdraw 
without due process or cause. See McAulilfe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 
N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (Holmes,j.) (policeman fired because of his political activities held to 
have no valid suit, since "(he] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman"). The classic article on the topic is William W. Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinctio11 in Constitutio11al Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 
1439-42 (1968) (discussing the fate of the .\lcAulijfe-like distinction between constitutional 
right and "mere privilege"). 
248. For example, the first amendment creates a wide range of privileges to speak and 
publish. Other privileges are created by state law and protected by the Constitution's more 
general guarantees. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971), as inter-
preted by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976) (state action depriving person of privi-
lege to purchase liquor was an alteration of legal status that, when coupled with injury from 
state's defamatory statement, must meet due process clause requirements). 
249. For a familiar (because classic and controversial) example of the Court's willingness 
to hold that eliminating a privilege (called a "right" by the Court) constitutes a compensable 
"taking," see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state abrogation of a 
privilege to use certain land for subsurface mining held a taking requiring compensation). 
Although the Supreme Court has recently held that a law very similar to the one at issue in 
Pen11sylva11ia Coal did not constitute a compensable taking, the opinion there takes care to 
distinguish rather than overrule Pen11sylva11ia Coal. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484-97 (1987). 
July 1989] MERITS OF COPYRIGHT 1399 
dural constraints of local law. Thus, for example, federal intellectual 
property law currently contains both weakly and strongly protected 
privileges. The privilege to copy "unfixed" works is weakly protected. 
Although such copying is privileged by copyright, any state is free to 
replace that privilege with a duty not to copy within its borders, so long 
as the state does so by a proper legislative or judicial act.250 By con-
trast, patent law grants a privilege to copy nonsecret unpatented inven-
tions that states cannot abrogate.251 
Although privileges are accompanied by weak or strong rights 
against government, they might not be accompanied by any rights at all 
against private parties. As between private parties, one's ability to 
make fruitful use of a privilege unaccompanied by rights may indeed be 
a matter of "favor" or fortuity, for either party is free to restrict the 
other's use of her privileges. Thus, if person X has a privilege to eat a 
plate of shrimp salad, by definition no one has the right to call upon the 
state to stop X from doing so. However, other persons may lawfully eat 
the shrimp salad before X gets to it, unless X's privilege to pursue eat-
ing shrimp salad is accompanied by a right to that salad. 252 That is, 
where one private party has only a privilege, others have "no right" to 
interfere253 but they are privileged to interfere all they want. Privi-
leges, like liberties of all sorts, can thus be valueless if the privilege-
holder lacks the economic or physical strength to use them.254 
In any field of endeavor, some acts will be privileged, some forbid-
den, and some required. For example, one might be free to copy a 
work of art or prohibited from doing so; one might be free to restrict 
one's work to a particular favored market and mode of presentation, or 
required to license it to all comers. The alternatives to copyright that 
follow represent differing combinations of privileges, duties, and 
rights. 
250. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (b)(l) (state protection for unfixed works not preempted). 
251. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971 (1989). One way to 
analyze preemption controversies is to ask whether a gap in federal protection creates merely 
a weak privilege that states are free to alter, or a strongly protected privilege that binds the 
states. 
252. See W. HoHFELD, supra note 40, at 41 (the shrimp salad example); Some Fundamental 
Legal Co11ceptio11s, supra note 40, at 41-43; Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 41, at 752-53; see 
al(o Walter Wheeler Cook, Prfroileges of Labor Cnions in the Stmggle for Life, 27 YALE LJ. 779 
(1918). 
253. Hohfeld labels the correlative of a privilege a "no-right." If X has a privilege to 
act, }" has "no-right" to stop him; and the law will not intervene on l's behalf. Some Fundamen-
tal Legal Co11ceptio11s, supra note 40, at 32-37. 
Thus, someone who wishes to interfere with a privileged action cannot call upon the state 
to help him accomplish that interference. Hohfeld has been credited with helping the legal 
community realize more quickly that the law leaves much harm remediless-harms done by 
one person to another while pursuing their private mutual, antagonistic privileges. See Singer, 
supra note 41. 
254. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1095-96 (making a similar point). 
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2. Elimination of copyright: "Copy-privilege." 
The most modest course of the three options would be merely to 
eliminate copyright and equivalent laws which affirmatively grant cre-
ators rights to prohibit others' use of their works, and to leave intact 
the various doctrines in the standing law which might indirectly aug-
ment authors' abilities to control or profit from their work. In such a 
regime, copying per se would not violate a creator's rights. A state 
would be free to enforce confidentiality contracts, however, or to re-
strain the publication of materials obtained through unlawful trespass 
or invasion of privacy, even if such enforcement might restrict access to 
some creative works. In other words, such a regime would grant privi-
leges to copy that were strongly enough protected to void assertions of 
copyright, but not strongly enough protected to withstand rights 
grounded in policies unrelated to copying. 
As a result, authors in a realm of copy-privilege would have those 
rights in their creative works which could ride piggyback style on other 
legal doctrines. If copy-rights were simply transformed into no-rights, 
for example, the law of conversion could nevertheless prohibit burglars 
from profiting from their thefts, thus precluding thieves from selling 
multiple editions of purloined letters, or the law of contract could nev-
ertheless be employed to discourage persons who had signed confiden-
tiality agreements from breaching their contracts. A desire to 
discourage trespass, breach of confidence, fraud, and the like, might 
therefore yield piggyback prohibitions against copying, not out of con-
cern with copying itself, but because of a desire to avoid rewarding 
wrongful behavior. 
Under this option, all persons would be presumptively free to copy 
whatever works of art or expression they could lawfully obtain; and 
states would have to determine the lawfulness of actions by criteria other 
than mere copying. The only governmental restraint on copying would 
be enforcement of duties arising out of an individual's behavior that 
involved more than simple copying (e.g., behavior inducing and violat-
ing a fiduciary relationship) or the individual's agreement. When no 
contractual or similar duty bound a potential copier and he violated no 
independent state law, he would be privileged to copy. The simple 
duty. not to copy, now imposed by copyright law, would be imposed in a 
realm of "copy-privilege" only upon individuals who consented to ac-
cept it. 
Thus, a publisher who wanted an author to submit her manuscript 
for possible publication might well promise not to publish the piece 
unless the two of them reached a mutually acceptable agreement about 
royalties. This promise would bind the publisher not to copy, even in a 
realm of "copy-privilege." Once a book was publicly available, how-
ever, any person who obtained a copy without having promised not to 
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duplicate it would be free to make as many copies or adaptations as he 
wished. 
Just as users would be prima facie privileged to copy anything to 
which they had lawful access, in a realm of "copy-privilege" creators 
might be prima facie privileged to use any available mode of self-help 
to discourage copying. For example, publishers might try to come to 
informal or contractual agreements among themselves to respect each 
other's exclusive relationships with authors.255 They also might at-
tempt to structure the industry to maximize an authorized publisher's 
lead-time advantage, use advertising to persuade customers there is 
special merit in the "authorized" edition, link their intellectual product 
(e.g., software) with a product that copiers cannot easily duplicate (e.g., 
customer service and updates), or issue low-price "retributive strike" 
editions to try to drive copiers out of the marketplace.256 (Of course, 
continuous publication below cost would ruin any publisher; the hope 
is that the mere possibility of retributive strike editions may deter 
piracy before it begins.) Another alternative is the use of "technologi-
cal fences,"257 such as programming copy protection into computer 
software, or building copy protection into videotapes or audio material 
to make them difficult to replicate accurately. These and similar de-
vices might result in authors and publishers earning significant 
revenues. 
In the eyes of many commentators, resolving the question of 
whether particular uses of creative works should be subject to the rights 
of authors and their assigns, or subject to the privileges of all, depends 
on estimating the likely outcome of struggles between authors and 
users holding equivalent privileges. If the income from privileged pub-
lication would be high enough to provide an adequate return on invest-
ment, such critics argue, authors should have no rights to prevent 
piracy. An inquiry into the likelihood that authors could earn enough 
revenues to support continued creation and publication even in a world 
of copy-privilege is the foundation of the position of Professor, now 
Judge, Breyer, whose 1970 article is probably the most important of the 
modern criticisms of copyright. 
Judge Breyer expressed doubt about the desirability of copyright in 
particular areas and qualifiedly recommended that copyright not be ex-
panded. He argued that existing common-law and self-help devices 
would enable at least some significant segment of publishers to restrain 
copiers sufficiently for the publishers to obtain an adequate return on 
255. In a real world context, all such modes of self-help would be subject to the antitrust 
laws. 
256. When threatened by a "pirate" edition, an authorized publisher may respond with 
a "retributive strike" edition at below cost, in an effort to drive the copier out of the market. 
See Breyer, The l'neasy Case, supra note 3, at 300-01. 
257. See Palmer, supra note 6, at 288-89 (discussing a range of technological "fences"). 
Prior to the invention of printing, the necessity for laborious hand copying was itself a techno-
logical "fence" that rendered copyright largely unnecessary. 
1402 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1343 
their investments.258 Among those devices, Judge Breyer envisioned 
preserving contract rights that enable authors and publishers to be paid 
by persons wishing to obtain particular kinds of works, such as book 
clubs or subscription groups.259 His analysis also depended upon the 
continued availability of privileges of nondisclosure260 and reprisal,261 
and on informal arrangements of various kinds.262 He clearly recog-
nized that the extent of self-help's viability would depend on circum-
stance. For example, in some industries, there might be a lead-time 
advantage making the first publisher relatively free of the need for 
copyright. In other industries, where marketing arrangements and 
technologies for reproducing intellectual works were available to allow 
copiers to enter the market immediately, this advantage might be un-
available. As he therefore noted, recommendations for and against 
copyright in one kind of intellectual product (trade books, for example) 
might not follow for other kinds of products where factors such as lead-
time advantage, publisher customs, or alternative revenue sources are 
different. 
Judge Breyer's survey of noncopyright devices illustrates how the 
copy-privilege regime might look, 263 though his emphasis on empirical 
questions to which there are no clear answers kept him from going so 
far as to urge that copy-privilege govern all intellectual products. More 
recently, an attack on patent and copyright by Tom Palmer,264 pre-
mised primarily on grounds ofliberty but also making Breyer-like argu-
ments that intellectual property is unneccessary for incentives, takes 
258. Breyer, The l'neasy Case, supra note 3, at 300-06 (publishers' use of"strike editions," 
informal agreements and custom, and private subscription arrangements); see also id. at 309-29 
(applying the analysis to varying classes of books); Breyer, Copyight: A Rejoinder, supra note 3, 
at 76-82; Tyerman, supra note 21, at 103-07. Judge Breyer similarly argued that the creators 
of computer programs might not need copyright protection if, among other things, time shar-
ing and other industry developments made it easy for program suppliers to negotiate with 
potential users. Breyer, The l'neasy Case, supra note 3, at 346. 
259. See Breyer, The l'neasy Case, supra note 3, at 306 (discussing book clubs). Thus, a 
contract that said, "Our subscription group will pay you X number of dollars if you research 
and write a particular volume for us," would be enforceable. 
260. See id. at 300 ("lead time advantage"). 
261. See id. at 300-0 I. 
262. See id. at 302. 
263. Copy-privilege includes the possibility of contractual duties not to copy. Although 
Judge Breyer focused on contracts regarding payment rather than on contractual clauses that 
limit one's publication privileges, his general reliance on contract as an alternative to copy-
right clearly indicates that he would not question the enforceability of either type of agree-
ment. This is implicit in many of his arguments. For example, a credible scheme of privately 
commissioning works through book clubs or subscription groups might depend on authors 
having some assurance that if they send drafts to potential publishers, they would have some 
right to prevent the publishers from printing the material until they paid the agreed contract 
price. The same point applies to interpublisher modes of self-help. Reprisals against piratical 
competitors are oflittle assistance to a publisher unless the publisher can receive manuscripts 
and develop relationships with authors in the first instance. Without being able to enforce 
promises not to copy, publisher relations with potential manuscript sources will be difficult. It 
therefore seems clear that Judge Breyer imagined that in a world without copyright, the en-
forceability of contractual promises not to copy would be preserved. 
264. See Palmer, supra note 6. 
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this further step. In Palmer's view, intellectual creators should have no 
independent exclusion rights in their intangibles and should rely solely 
on common-law and self-help means of protecting their work. 
If Congress seriously desired to implement the copy-privilege op-
tion, it might be able to do so. The Constitution empowers Congress 
to enact copyright and patent legislation but does not require it.265 As 
mentioned earlier, legislation already contains provisions that affirma-
tively make some intellectual products unprotectable, granting privi-
leges to copy strong enough to override inconsistent state rights. 266 If 
conceptions of what was needed to "promote the progress of science" 
changed significantly enough, Congress conceivably could repeal the 
copyright statute and, under the copyright, commerce, and supremacy 
clauses, enact legislation preventing the states from reinventing copy-
right or giving other forms of rights over copying.267 (A drastic expan-
sion of the first amendment might even accomplish a similar result.268 
265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
266. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971 (1989) (state law 
prohibiting use of direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls held pre-
empted}, in which the Court stressed that "the federal patent laws do create a federal right to 
'copy and to use,' " id. at 985, and that this right privileges the public to duplicate any non-
secret invention not protected by a patent; see also 17 U.S.C. § 301 (preemption of state 
rights); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., l'nijication: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA 
L. REV. 1070, 1092-9 (1977) (arguing that the copyright and patent statutes affirmatively place 
certain matters outside the scope of federal or state protection); text accompaning note 251 
supra. 
267. It could well be argued that such federal legislation would have to be based on the 
Constitution's commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, rather than the copyright and 
patent clause, since the latter simply empowers Congress to grant monopolies "for limited 
times" to authors and inventors, rather than giving Congress plenary power to regulate intel-
lectual products as it sees fit, id. cl. 8. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) 
(copyright and patent clause did not give Congress power to create trademark law). In dicta, 
however, the Supreme Court has intimated that the copyright and patent clause could also 
provide adequate authority: "Where the need for free and unrestricted distribution of a writ-
ing is thought to be required by the national interest, the Copyright Clause and the Com-
merce Clause would allow Congress to eschew all protection." Goldstein v. California, 412 
U.S. 546, 559 (1973). Of course, these dicta, like the abrogation of state rights effected in 
Bonito Boats, see supra note 266 and accompanying text, must be viewed with caution since 
neither appeared in contexts where Congress was abandoning all of its own intellectual prop-
erty protections. 
Independent of whatever support might be lent by the copyright clause, the commerce 
clause power might be a sufficient basis for a congressional ban on rights equivalent to copy-
right. In some sense, rights against copying can be seen as inhibiting commerce, and the 
commerce clause power is quite broad. See S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 
(1984) (concluding that legislation protecting semiconductor chip design could be premised 
upon commerce clause powers); Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 
1943) (upholding the constitutionality of substantive federal trademark regulation under the 
commerce clause: "Many things not themselves goods moving in interstate commerce are 
held to exert such a substantial influence upon the flow of commerce that they are 'instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce,' and as such subject to regulation by Congress ... . ");see also 
Pamela Samuelson, Creating a Xew Kind of Intellectual Property: App(#ng the Lessons of the Chip Law 
to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473 n.6 (1985) (discussing use of the commerce 
clause as basis for sui generis legislation regarding semiconductors). 
If validly enacted, federal legislation granting privileges to copy could bind the states 
through the supremacy clause. 
268. The courts have so far held that there is no necessary conflict between the first 
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It is already clear that the amendment invalidates some state law rights 
that impede the distribution of creative works.269) The takings,270 due 
process,271 and contract272 clauses might restrict the elimination of ex-
isting rights; but making the changes prospective, applicable only to 
newly created intellectual products in which property rights had not yet 
vested, would minimize conflicts with these clauses.273 
As for already-created intellectual products to which the govern-
ment might wish to mandate free access, the government could subject 
them to eminent domain, 274 much as it now condemns privately owned 
real estate and then opens it to the public as parkland. Constitutional 
arguments that such an action is an impermissible exercise of govern-
mental power are likely to fail. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,275 
the Court concluded that "[r]edistribution of fees simple to correct de-
ficiencies in the market determined by the state legislature to be attrib-
amendment and copyright, primarily because copyright gives authors control only over ex-
pression and not over ideas and because the "fair use" doctrine integral to copyright is capa-
ble of incorporating first amendment policies. Seel M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 11, 
§ l.10 (suggesting that, in addition, there should be a first amendment privilege within copy-
right). Speaking literally, however, all copyright restrains free communication. 
Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to give copyrights to authors, the 
first amendment postdates the patent and copyright clause. If one were willing to ignore the 
historical context in which the first ten amendments were adopted, the first amendment could 
conceivably be interpreted to constitute an implicit repeal of the copyright power or a sharp 
limitation on it. To the extent that the first amendment applies to the states through the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the amendment could also have the effect of 
striking down state rights equivalent to copyright. 
269. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988) (public figure's emo-
tional distress claim directed at defendant who published an offensive caricature is subject to 
certain first amendment limitations). 
270. Restricting or eliminating rights in intangibles can constitute "takings" which trig-
ger the compensation requirement of the fifth amendment's takings clause. Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04 (1984) (trade secrets are "property" within the mean-
ing of the takings clause). 
271. Since rights in intangibles can be "property" under the takings clause, id. at 1000-
04 (trade secrets), there is every reason why they should also be so under the due process 
clause. 
272. Contracts purporting to transfer exclusive rights in intellectual products presup-
pose the existence of those rights. If copyright were eliminated in all currently existing works 
of authorship, many contracts would become valueless. 
273. The Supreme Court recently held that governmental disclosure of trade secrets 
submitted under assurances of confidentiality constituted a compensable taking but indicated 
that a prospective disclosure requirement constituted an exercise of the police power which 
would not require compensation . • ltonsanto, 467 U.S. at 1010-11. The Court took the posi-
tion that when a new statute warns of the possibility of disclosure, the warning prevents the 
formation of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" that would trigger the takings 
clause compensation requirement. Id. at 1005-07. How far the Court would be willing to take 
this approach is unclear. Its treatment of .'vlonsanto was undoubtedly influenced by the health 
and safety aspects of the issue presented. The contract clause issue is somewhat more 
straightforward. Since contract clause cases focus on the impairment of existing contracts, see 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), making any anticopyright law 
prospective should avoid most contract clause problems. 
274. See, e.g., .l1onsanto, 467 U.S. at 986. 
275. 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (statute redistributing land ownership from lessors to lessees 
in order to reduce concentration of land ownership held an appropriate exercise of eminent 
domain power so long as compensation is paid). 
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utable to land oligopoly is a rational exercise of the eminent domain 
power."276 Similarly, if Congress were to abolish copyrights in order 
to correct market distortions attributed to them,277 the Court would 
likely find this a valid public purpose achievable so long as compensa-
tion was paid. 
Furthermore, although quite credible arguments could be made 
that abolishing copyright would increase only the public's short-term 
wealth by making works cheaper and would disserve the public's long-
term material and cultural interest,278 such a challenge to Congress's 
wisdom in choosing this method of responding to the necessary imper-
fections in copyright markets would be unlikely to succeed. The Court, 
in a case analyzing a sort of eminent domain in trade secrets, stated that 
"The optimum amount of disclosure to the public is for Congress, not 
the courts, to decide."279 Though recent case law suggests a tightening 
of the public purpose requirement may be in the offing, 280 there is as 
yet no obvious constitutional bar to a massive legislative abrogation of 
intellectual property entitlements as long as compensation is paid. 
3. No direct or indirect rights. 
If freedom to use others' works is sufficiently important, why stop 
with copy-privilege? There is a host oflegal doctrines, from privacy law 
and trespass through fiduciary duty and contract law, whose enforce-
ment in particular contexts could lead to restraints on the use of intel-
lectual products. For example, Jerry Falwell recently sought to use the 
state tort doctrine of intentional infliction of emotional distress to ob-
tain damages when he was featured in and offended by a parodic car-
toon by Hustler magazine.281 Had Falwell been victorious, the state's 
concern with protecting emotional repose would have had the potential 
to chill the distribution of caricatures and other parodic material. Since 
276. Id. at 243. 
277. Of course, the issues presented by Midkiff and by copyright are far from identical, 
but both involve market distortions. As noted earlier, see note 23 supra, copyright provides 
incentives by making it possible for copyright owners to reduce the quantity of copies avail-
able and thus receive a higher per-copy price. This is a market distortion, in the sense that 
fewer copies are sold under copyright than would be sold in a hypothetical freely competitive 
market in the created work. 
278. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 143, at 10-12, 21-29 (arguing that ex post forms 
of analysis, which might favor sharing what has already been produced, are less desirable from 
an economic point of view than ex ante perspectives concerned with incentives); Roland N. 
McKean &Jara R. Minasian, On Achieving Pareto Optimalit)~Regardless of Cost!, 5 W. EcoN.J. 14, 
22-23 (1966) (although exclusion rights in public goods such as recordings and inventions 
give rise to imperfect markets, the costs of these imperfect markets can be less than the costs 
of permitting no exclusion). 
279. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015; see also id. at 1014 ("The role of 
the courts in second-guessing the legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use is 
extremely narrow." (citation omitted)); id. at 1015 n.18 ("The proper inquiry before this 
Court is not whether the provisions will in fact accomplish their stated objectives."). 
280. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148 (1987); see also John 
M. Payne, From the Courts, 16 REAL EST. LJ. 258, 263 (1988). 
281. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). 
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Falwell is a public figure, his state tort rights were "trumped" by the 
first amendment. Using an analogous approach, advocates of free ac-
cess to intellectual products might urge that free access policies should 
trump any rights that restrain copying, whether such rights are based in 
copyright itself or whether the restraint is direct or indirect. In other 
words, they might argue that the privilege of copying should be so 
strongly protected that all inconsistent entitlements should give way 
before it. 
Such a regime, which we might dub a regime of "no direct or indi-
rect rights," would not only affect copyright law itself (which it would 
eliminate) but would also prohibit the state and federal governments 
from enforcing other copy-restraining doctrines whenever such en-
forcement would assist someone who seeks to restrict, obtain damages 
for, or penalize the free circulation of works of authorship. For exam-
ple, if this option were implemented, suits like Falwell's would be dis-
missed whether or not the plaintiff was a public figure. As another 
example, a promise by a fiduciary or an employee not to copy or dis-
close material revealed in the course of a relationship with an author 
would be unenforceable. The possibility that the public might need the 
information would privilege an othenvise wrongful act. 282 In the re-
gime of "no direct or indirect rights," authors and others would have 
no rights to call upon the government to prevent copying, whatever the 
context. 
This is not an unthinkable possibility. The law already refuses to 
enforce at least one kind of confidentiality contract, the agreement be-
tween blackmailer and victim to exchange money for silence. Laws 
against blackmail have been justified on the ground that though con-
tracts of silence may satisfy the interest of the blackmailer and victim, 
such contracts sacrifice the interests of those third parties who could be 
affected by the concealed information.283 Analogously, it might bear-
gued that a promise not to copy a creative work impermissibly sacrifices 
the interests of those members of the public who might benefit if copies 
were made. Similarly, contracts embodying promises not to copy might 
be analogized to contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. Under the 
antitrust law, such contracts are unenforceable. 
Tort rights too are commonly sacrificed when the interests they rep-
resent conflict with the Constitution or with congressional goals. In 
Hustler itself, the Supreme Court held that Falwell's state tort claim had 
to give way because allowing public figures to succeed in such suits 
282. At most, an author might bring a "fair labeling" suit to obtain correct attribution of 
authorship, cf. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (states given 
little latitude in protecting unpatented light fixtures); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 
U.S. 225 (1964) (lamps), for more extensive remedies might inhibit the act of free publication 
itself. 
283. See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 670 
(1984) (exploring this and other explanations of blackmail Jaw). 
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would conflict with "the fundamental importance of the free flow of 
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."284 Fed-
eral intellectual property policy as well has frequently preempted state 
tort rights. In a pair of cases commonly known as Sears/Compco, the 
Court held that the federal policy of encouraging free competition in 
the manufacture of unpatented products is so important that states can-
not grant any rights that restrain the replication of innovative product 
designs, even if this means compromising state tort rights founded on 
legitimate state concerns, such as the desire to avoid consumer confu-
sion as to the source of distinctively shaped products. 285 The Court 
has not been so willing to sacrifice independent policies to intellectual 
property goals in recent years.286 Even its recent reaffirmance of Sears/ 
Compco was accompanied by the suggestion that states retain some lati-
tude in their efforts to prevent confusion as to source.287 Conceptually, 
however, the old approach suggests that if Congress made its inten-
tions sufficiently clear, the Court would be willing to implement a 
broad scheme ofpreemption.288 If free use of others' intellectual prod-
ucts were considered a sufficiently important goal, therefore, it is likely 
that federal law could require inconsistent tort and contract doctrines 
to give way. 
4. lvlandatory sharing. 
A third option, which one might call a "mandatory sharing" regime, 
284. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 879; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
(defamation claims). Note that adopting a regime of "no direct or indirect rights" would 
disable even nonpublic figures from bringing claims that interfered with the free dissemina-
tion of works of authorship. 
285. Compco, 376 U.S. at 234; Sears, 376 U.S. at 225 (cases together striking down use of 
state tort rights against confusing product imitation on the ground that when a state policy of 
preventing confusion interferes with a federal policy of allowing free copying of unpatented 
utilitarian objects, the federal policy is supreme). Note that the actual evidence of confusion 
in the two cases was quite thin and could be ameliorated in similar cases by labeling. At least 
on their face, therefore, these cases may have appeared not to pose a conflict with a state 
interest of major importance. 
Although in the years following Sears/Compco the Supreme Court withdrew from its ag-
gressively preemptive stance, the Court recently reaffirmed the holding in Bonito Boats, Inc. 
v. Thunder Craft, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971 (1989). Even prior to Bonito Boats, preemption retained 
some judicial "bite." Also, in the 1976 Act, Congress extended the preemptive reach of the 
copyright law in 17 U.S.C. § 301. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 676 {7th Cir. 1986) {state law right of publicity preempted by federal 
copyright law), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987). 
286. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265·66 (1979) (contract 
for royalties on keyholders held not preempted although no patent was granted on the 
keyholders); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (state trade secret 
law held not preempted); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (state prohibition 
of record piracy, at a time when sound recordings were not protectable by federal copyright, 
held not preempted). 
287. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 985. 
288. But see New Era Publications Int'!, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 
1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (suggesting that the Constitution might not give Congress the "power 
to override the state law function of determining privacy rights") (dicta), ajf'd on other grounds, 
Nos. 88-7707, 88·7795 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 1989). 
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would not only strike down any direct or indirect governmental protec-
tions for intellectual property but would also give new rights to persons 
who want access to works of authorship. This approach would substi-
tute for existing privileges of nondisclosure a set of duties to disclose. 
Such a regime might be employed in an effort to compensate for the 
loss of copyright's positive incentives by providing a set of negative in-
centives to force publishing to occur and to keep prices down. 289 
There might be laws, for example, to break up any informal agree-
ments that publishers might seek among themselves to respect each 
other's exclusive relationships with authors. Such laws would not only 
make that sort of agreement unenforceable, as in a regime of "no direct 
or indirect rights," but would also penalize participants for attempting 
to make one. Similarly, the law might penalize publishers who tried to 
use other self-help methods, like "retributive strike" editions.290 There 
might even be a governmental commission to require recalcitrant cre-
ators to make their drafts and sketches public, or to subsidize free dis-
tribution of literature to those who could not pay for it. 
In such a regime, authors would not only lack rights to prevent 
copying but would also be deprived of freedoms they would otherwise 
have. Instead of liberties to refrain from disclosure or to use self-help, 
for example, creators might have affirmative duties of disclosure and 
publication. 
In many ways the mandatory sharing option treats the author's work 
as common property, owned by both the creator and the public. For 
example, under the law of tenancies in common, consent of one's co-
owners is not a prerequisite to use;291 further, any co-owner can em-
ploy the courts to guarantee her access to the property.292 Members of 
the public, as hypothetical co-owners in such a tenancy, would have a 
privilege to use the resource, as well as a right to have access to the prop-
erty, good against any effort by the author or any other co-owner to 
prevent use of it. Thus, although the parallels are not complete,293 a 
289. For a discussion of how the different issues raised by positive and negative legal 
responses (such as rights to reward as compared with liability for damages) in restitution and 
torts affect intellectual property law, see W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55. 
On the differing roles of positive and negative legal responses in general, see generally Saul 
Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985); Donald Wittman, Should Compensation 
Be Based on Costs or Benefits?, 5 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 173 (1985). 
290. See note 256 supra. 
291. In the real property context, see 4A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 78, § 603(1); 
4 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY§ 1793 u. 
Grimes replacement ed. 1979). In the copyright context, see 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 
supra note 11, § 6.10. See also Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1984) ("A co-
owner of a copyright cannot be liable to another co-owner for infringement of the 
copyright."). 
292. In real property, a co-owner has a range of options available if a cotenant blocks 
her from the property. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 291, § 1809. 
293. For example, in a true tenancy in common, each co-owner owes some duties to the 
others, such as a duty to account for profits, that are not part of the mandatory sharing re-
gime. See Oddo, 743 F.2d at 633. 
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regime of mandatory sharing largely follows a common property 
model. 
The mandatory sharing approach is extreme but not without prece-
dent. Many current regulatory regimes have mandatory disclosure 
characteristics, particularly in the environmental area. Federal law re-
quires disclosure of pollution-related data, for example.294 If disclo-
sure of works of authorship were considered as important to the public 
weal as disclosure of pollution data, a regime of mandatory disclosure 
might be implemented. Note, however, that existing disclosure re-
quirements tend to be applied to industries that will have an incentive 
to manufacture or transport goods whether or not they are forced to 
disclose pollution or health data. Although the Supreme Court has up-
held disclosure requirements even when such data is valuable to the 
company concerned,295 that data was not itself the industry's primary 
stock in trade. Whether authors would have sufficient incentives to 
produce new works in a world mandating their uncompensated disclo-
sure raises quite different empirical questions. 
As for the elimination of self-help privileges, the common law itself 
provides some relevant precedent. Tort law penalizes landowners who 
use self-help to eject strangers during emergencies when the strangers' 
lives depend on staying on the land. 296 As for contracts, some forms of 
contract are unlawful as well as unenforceable. On the statutory level, 
the antitrust laws penalize both formal and informal agreements that 
interfere with designated social goals.297 If free copying and use of in-
tellectual products were considered an important enough goal, other-
wise legal acts that blocked public access to works might be outlawed, 
and duties of disclosure imposed, subject to constitutional protections 
for the author's privacy and right to be silent.298 
The "mandatory sharing" alternative would become more attrac-
tive, both in terms of incentives and fairness, if the government were to 
offer authors a payment along with imposing an obligation to publish. 
294. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a-l(c) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 132l(b)(5) (1982). 
295. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (government requirement that 
pesticide information be disclosed as a prerequisite to registration is not a taking for which 
compensation must be paid, despite the possibility that the mandated disclosure might de-
prive the company that generated the valuable data of a competitive advantage, as long as the 
company has no statutory basis for expecting the government to keep the submitted data 
confidential). 
296. See Ploofv. Putnam, 81Vt.471, 71A.188 (1906);seealw RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 197 comment k (1965) (possessor of land under a duty to let entrant privileged by 
necessity remain). 
297. In the antitrust area, "contracts in restraint of trade" (such as price-fixing agree-
ments) are not only unenforceable but also prohibited and subject to the imposition of civil 
and criminal penalties. Blackmail is also a criminal matter, though typically only one of the 
parties to a blackmail contract goes to jail. 
298. See L. TRIBE, supra note 127, § 12-14, at 889-90 (right of privacy with regard to 
personal information); see also Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 
(1985) ("the right to refrain from speaking"). 
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The payment could take the form of a governmental subsidy, fifth 
amendment "compensation," or compulsory license fees. 
Compulsory licenses in particular are familiar from current law. 
Under them, the government sets fees, and any eligible private party 
who pays the fee is entitled to copy regardless of the copyright owner's 
preferences. For example, the Clean Air Act provides that patentees 
may be compelled to offer licenses on those patents that would not 
otherwise be "reasonably available" and for which there are no "rea-
sonable alternative methods" where necessary for certain Clean Air Act 
compliance. 299 Current copyright law itself imposes compulsory 
licenses on some intellectual products. For example, certain copy-
righted television broadcasts are subject to compulsory licensing for 
cable rebroadcast.300 The copyright statute also gives compulsory li-
cense rights to any musician who wishes to record a song once it has 
been publicly distributed in phonorecords with the composer's authori-
zation,301 as long as the user pays the governmentally set license fees 
and complies with requisite procedures. The compulsory licenses im-
posed by copyright, however, are generally limited to works that are 
already distributed, or are in the process of being distributed, to the 
public. Furthermore, in contemporary times American law has usually 
adopted compulsory license schemes only in cases of special need (as in 
the pollution context) or as a compromise when creators ask Congress 
to extend existing rights to cover new technological methods of trans-
mitting or reproducing works (as with cable television).302 
At bottom, payment requirements are not a likely component of a 
"mandatory sharing" scheme. Opponents of copyright vehement 
enough to seek mandatory sharing would be unlikely to enact licensing 
payment rules, since, after all, any requirement of compensation would 
sharply inhibit the public's use of intellectual products. In a regime of 
noncompensated mandatory sharing, the career path of artist or author 
thus becomes somewhat uninviting. To provide the missing incentives, 
conceivably the mandatory sharing model itself might be taken a step 
further: Not only might our law be amended to treat works of author-
ship as common property, but it also might be amended to treat crea-
tive persons' talents as common property as well.303 As Vermont's good 
Samaritan law requires persons who are well situated for rescuing im-
299. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1982). Whether compulsory licenses will work to discourage the 
inventors of antipollution devices from using the patent system, or how they might affect the 
long-term prospect of antipollution research and development, are open questions. 
300. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see notes I35-I36supra and accompanying 
text (compulsory licenses). 
301. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); note 135 supra. On the "compromise" 
nature of compulsory licenses, see, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 143 at 88-89 (cable); Sec-
ond Supp. Report, supra note 135, ch. 9, at 3 (phonorecords); see also id. ch. 7, at 18-20 
(typefaces). 
302. See 17 U.S.C. §§Ill, 115 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
303. To view the genius of individuals as a sort of "common pool" in which we all have 
an interest is not unusual. See, e.g., note 242 supra and accompanying text (discussion of 
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periled victims to give those victims aid,304 statutes might require tal-
ented persons who are well equipped to produce art to do so. Of 
course, there are significant constitutional problems with such a step 
(the first and thirteenth amendments leap to mind), but conceptually 
this is a logical extension of the mandatory sharing model. 
B. Comparing the Noncopyright Options 
Copy-privilege has a number of advantages over the other two 
noncopyright options, particularly in regard to publishing practicalities. 
For example, in a regime with a rule against enforcing promises not to 
copy (the regime of "no direct or indirect rights"), post-publication 
piracy by strangers is not the only threat to incentives. Authors might 
be reluctant to submit their works for publication out of fear that the 
publishers or the publishers' employees will steal whatever they see. 
Not all publishers will find it in their long-term best interest to create a 
reputation for dealing with authors fairly. Similarly, some editorial and 
clerical employees might consider retention of their jobs less important 
than the chance of making a one-time killing by stealing a "hot" manu-
script, particularly if they interpret the lack of legal rights against such 
behavior to indicate that it is morally permissible. If such behavior be-
came the norm, initial agreements between potential buyers and sellers 
of intellectual products might not occur. Unless there is a custom of 
living up to agreements, or moral, community, or industry sanctions 
against those who break agreements, legally enforceable agreements of 
the "look but don't publish until you pay" variety will be a prerequisite 
for successful dealings between potential authors and buyers.305 
The "mandatory sharing" regime would outlaw voluntary intra-
industry sanctions, further decreasing the possibility that workable pub-
lishing arrangements would evolve. While private or governmental 
subsidy schemes or compulsory licensing might provide some compen-
sation under mandatory sharing, there are dangers both in patronage 
and in leaving it to government to choose works "worthy" of sponsor-
Rawls). To require a sort of slave labor from those with talent is, however, a far.from-inevita-
ble implication to draw from that premise. 
304. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 519 (Supp. 1971) (imposing a duty of easy rescue and 
imposing a fine of$100 for its violation); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 604.05 (West 1986 Supp.) 
(similar statute). Although the Vermont statute does far less than impose a general "duty to 
aid" on all persons with resources, the common law resistance to imposing duties to aid is 
increasingly subject to exceptions. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAw AND 
ALTERNATIVES 117-51 (4th ed. 1987). Any imposition of a duty to aid implicates questions of 
liberty similar to those raised by the extension of the "mandatory sharing" model I discuss in 
the text. See Epstein, supra note 82, at 197-201 (1973) (introducing a hypothetical "parade of 
horribles" to dramatize liberty issues that would be raised by imposing a duty to aid). 
305. Courts sometimes read implied understandings of this sort into the dealings be-
tween the parties, even regarding uncopyrightable subject matter such as ideas. Werlin v. 
Reader's Digest, 528 F. Supp. 451, 465-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (magazine required to pay author 
a finder's fee when, after rejecting her article for publication, it used the underlying idea). 
Where copyright applies, such contracts and obligations implied from a course of dealings are 
unnecessary; no one, including the potential publisher, can publish without permission. 
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ship or to set prices.306 As for the extension of the mandatory sharing 
model that would compel creative activity, practical problems (such as 
identifying who among the general populace should be forced to write 
what) and fundamental concerns with personal liberty (imagine a spe-
cies of debtors' prisons for those novelists afflicted with writer's block) 
probably place the mandatory sharing approach outside the pale.307 
The copy-privilege regime, in contrast, preserves the enforceability 
of no-copy agreements and allows self-help. That option further seems 
to avoid the additional practical difficulties and the new layer of coer-
cion that characterize the regime of mandatory sharing. As compared 
with copyright, copy-privilege may make it hard for a creator to de-
mand payment when strangers copy; nevertheless, copy-privilege at 
least preserves the possibility that creators might enter into decentral-
ized market bargains with publishers and users secure from piracy by 
the very people with whom they have dealt. 
There is an additional set of possible reasons for the commentators' 
reluctance to argue for regimes such as "no direct or indirect rights" 
and "mandatory disclosure." Privacy rights, laws against burglary, or 
laws against breach of confidence or contract are not directed against 
copying. They serve independent policies, and developing exceptions 
to these laws for the purpose of fostering access to creative works 
would be costly. It could play havoc with the policies favoring security 
of dwellings, for example, to allow a burglar to profit from her theft by 
publishing a manuscript stolen during the burglary (as would occur in 
the regime of no direct or indirect rights). Copy-privilege, in contrast 
to the other procopying options, preserves these independent interests. 
It avoids difficult policy balancings by consistently deferring to any pol-
icy unrelated to copying. 
* * * 
The examination and comparison of various copyright alternatives 
demonstrate that the copy-privilege option, which eliminates copyright, 
does not outlaw self-help, and preserves independent private law rules 
that might affect copying, is the most obvious candidate for replacing 
copyright. It also would require the least change to implement and 
consequently is the most politically credible of the three alternatives. 
This option preserves independent state law policies and is likely to 
have less negative impact on the production of books, music, art, and 
other works of authorship than the other two noncopyright options, yet 
it eliminates the do-not-copy restraint on liberty inherent in copyright. 
306. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1611-12 (dangers of governmental subsi-
dies); id. at 1622-24 Gudicial price-setting); T. MACAULAY, supra note l, at 198 (dangers of 
private subsidies (patronage)). 
307. See W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55 (exploring reasons why the 
law imposes no duties to create and discussing whether this is consistent with granting cre-
ators rights over their works); cf. Saul Levmore, Waiting/or Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and 
Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986) (exploring why 
the law generally imposes no duty to aid). 
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III. COMPARING COPYRIGHT WITH COPY-PRIVILEGE 
This section compares copyright with copy-privilege, the alternative 
most commentators seem to envision when opposing copyright or sug-
gesting that it be limited. The most powerful advocates of copy-privi-
lege come from the ranks of those who view copyright and patent law in 
economic terms30S_I call their particular use of economics "encour-
agement theory." Their position hinges on empirical judgments that, 
given current industry structures, a copy-privilege system would pro-
vide sufficient incentives to induce new creativity while allowing the 
public more access to what is already created than the copyright system 
now permits. 
Obtaining proof of such empirical contentions is difficult. Further, 
as an industry's technology or conditions change, a legal structure that 
once gave sufficient incentives without copyright might no longer do 
so. For example, advances in reprography might eliminate previous 
lead-time advantages, or someone might "invent around" previous 
technological fences and sell devices that enable consumers to over-
come copy-protect methods, descramble signals, or othenvise obtain 
easy access to what was previously physically unavailable. The compar-
ative merits of copyright and copy-privilege might therefore have to be 
reassessed frequently.309 Given the decades oflegislative struggle nec-
essary to produce the 1976 replacement for the 1909 Copyright Act, it 
would be unrealistic to expect Congress to meet such a continuously 
moving target. 
Of course, it might be argued that the lack of convincing empirical 
data makes copyright as uncertain a venture as copy-privilege, and that 
when such information is lacking, neither governmental position (copy-
right or copy-privilege) can be recommended over the other.310 Yet 
wealth-maximization defenses of copy-privilege all depend on findings 
that eliminating copyright will not trigger a large degree of free riding 
because alternative legal or practical restraints on copying exist. Once 
it is conceded that as an overall matter free copying is not desirable and 
that the relevant questions are instead how much free copying should be 
allowed and when copying should be permitted in which works, copyright 
seems to have the advantage, for the following reasons. 
First, at least some of these economic choices can be made prospec-
tively and with generality. To take an obvious example: Forbidding the 
308. See Breyer, The C:neasy Case, supra note 3; sources in note 25 supra. See also Fisher, 
supra note 5, and Palmer, supra note 6, who premise their recommendations on noneconomic 
as well as economic grounds. 
309. Thus, for example, Judge Breyer notes that the decision whether or not to extend 
copyright protection to computer programs should depend on projections about likely devel-
opments in the way computers are used and programs marketed; he uses the "next decade or 
two" as the relevant time frame. Breyer, The l:lzeasy Case, supra note 3, at 346-48. 
310. This is, roughly speaking, Judge Breyer's position, when he argues that, in the ab-
sence of more information, copyright should neither be extended nor abolished. Id. at 283-
84. 
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copying of general concepts would involve greater costs than forbid-
ding the copying of particular ways of expressing concepts. A prop-
erty-based system can be tailored to implement such choices, while a 
privilege-based system ordinarily cannot. As the prior discussion sug-
gested, the impact of copy-privilege will depend on factors outside the 
legal system's control; it would seem largely serendipitous if those fac-
tors were so configured as to conform private behavior with public 
need, even if that need is defined in economic terms.311 
Second, if any of the choices that an intellectual property system 
must make should be resolved by issues of noneconomic principle or 
right, other than a principle of liberty to use one's tangible property, 
then, too, copyright has an institutional advantage over copy-privilege. 
If the choices between copying and not copying are made simply as by-
products of ever-changing technologies and industry structures, a legis-
lature would have to review those results regularly to assure that the 
patterns of restraints on copying that emerged over time remained nor-
matively acceptable. A property system, by contrast, can be tailored to 
express principles in a systematic way.3 12 
These observations implicitly raise the several issues that will be dis-
cussed in the remainder of this article. First, is there a defense of copy-
privilege that is not dependent upon empirical outcomes? The most 
likely such defenses are arguments that focus on liberties to use one's 
tangible property and on consent. I examine these arguments and sug-
gest that neither suffices to indict copyright. In particular, I suggest 
that a focus on consent can no more justify copy-privilege than 
copyright. 
Next, to what extent does wealth-maximization provide an adequate 
normative guide to the allocation of intellectual property entitlements? 
In examining this issue, I conclude that economics is an inadequate ba-
sis for setting any initial scheme of entitlements, in part because of its 
insensitivity to distributional issues. I then go on to explore whether 
any distributional premise could be supplied to remedy this gap in a 
way that would lead to outcomes consistent with the encouragement 
theorists' method or results. I identify such a possible premise but con-
clude that it is normatively unacceptable. I further suggest some of the 
31 l. Although the decentralized market system has great flexibility, it responds only to 
costs and benefits that have an impact on decisionmakers. Thus, the notion that private be-
havior will serve public needs {the notion of the "Invisible Hand") depends, among other 
things, on the internalization of all relevant costs and benefits. See Demsetz, supra note 21. 
Where significant costs and benefits remain "extemal"-where, for example, producers of 
desirable things are not able to capture a significant share of the benefits generated-the 
"Invisible Hand" will not function. 
312. Recall that a property system can also grant privileges to copy that "trump" incon-
sistent rights. The Supreme Court sees such enforceable liberties as granted by the patent 
system. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 985 (1989); seealro 
note 266 supra. Thus a property system can protect both creators' entitlements and users' 
entitlements. 
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noneconomic values that should be taken into account but which "en-
couragement theory" defenses of copy-privilege ignore. 
Finally, I explore copyright's better ability to take noneconomic 
rights and principles into account as compared with copy-privilege and 
argue that only by utilizing a copyright system can legal decisionmakers 
pay due respect to authors and users in their capacities as authors and 
users. 
A. The Gap Between the Contract Nature of Copy-privilege and the Property 
Nature of Copyright: Whose Consent Matters? 
The common imagination places great stress on rights of tangible 
property and contract, and much of the hostility to copyright stems 
from the feeling that copyright inhibits one's liberty to use one's own 
tangibie possessions in ways to which one has not consented.313 This 
perception probably plays a background role in much intellectual prop-
erty criticism and it is most explicit in the works of Murray Rothbard3 14 
and Tom Palmer.315 Rothbard seemed to argue that intellectual prop-
erty is justified only when it replicates the results that would occur 
through the consensual agreements of creators and users. He thus ap-
proved of copyright (which he thought was contractual or mimicked 
contract-like results) and disapproved of patent (which he realized was 
inconsistent with a contractual approach).316 Palmer would go further. 
He suggests that any legal restraint on copying is impermissible except 
where it results from contract or from piggybacking onto rights in tan-
gible property.317 He opposes both copyright and patent as improper 
incursions into a voluntary regime.3 18 
To analyze such positions, it will be helpful to begin by exploring 
whether copyright will produce the same results as would contract in a 
world of copy-privilege. Showing why Rothbard is incorrect in assum-
ing an identity between copyright and contract will give us a new per-
313. See text accompanying notes 9-20 supra. 
314. See 2 M. ROTHBARD, supra note 17, al 650-60, 908-16, where Rothbard saw an iden-
tity between copyright and contract, id. al 653; that is my focus here. In later work, Rothbard 
look a somewhat different position on copyright. See M. RoTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 
123-24 (1982) (discussing what he referred lo as "common law" copyright). 
315. Palmer, supra note 6. 
316. 2 M. RoTHBARD, supra note 17, al 653-56. It is not entirely clear whether Rothbard 
would have accepted contract-like results, or whether he would have demanded actual contracts 
as a prerequisite for enforcing a duty nol to copy. I here assume the prior interpretation. 
Admilledly, Rothbard seemed lo think that copyright notices actually ensured that purchasers 
agreed not to copy. Id. al 654. However, seeing a copyright notice on an item before 
purchasing il is not identical to consenting lo all of copyright law's restrictions. 
317. These points run throughout Palmer's analysis. For his conceptual framework, see 
Palmer, supra note 6, al 262-63, 280-87, 303-04; for his survey of contractual and technologi-
cal means of restraining copying, see id. at 288-302. Palmer argues that "[!]aw in a liberal 
society ... emerges oul of contract and interaction among interested parties, and not as a 
result of slate edicts handed down from on high, as in the case of intellectual property rights." 
Id. al 280. 
318. See general(l' Palmer, supra note 6. 
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spective on the differences between a property-based system like 
copyright and a contract-based system. After concluding that copy-
privilege, with its focus on user consent, gives creators less protection 
than does copyright, I examine whether the importance of consent it-
self justifies this lesser degree of protection. 
1. Is copyright a form of contract? 
As I already made clear, the world of copy-privilege allows some 
legal rights against copying to exist, including rights arising out of con-
tract. 319 Since having a privilege means that one is free only of state 
interference, not the interferences of other people, in such a world 
there can be something worth contracting about. For example, individ-
ual users may be willing to pay a creator to waive her privilege of 
nondisclosure. 320 
Having transferable value does not necessarily make something 
"property," however,321 for contracts over privileges generally give the 
participants no right to employ affirmative state power against third 
parties.322 Only a contract signed by everyone could create rights good 
against the world. Using Hohfeld's terms, the rights and duties arising 
out of contract, like the rights and duties arising out of confidential 
relationships, tend to be "paucital" rather than "multital" entitle-
ments:323 They are entitlements created by particular circumstances, 
319. The world of copy-privilege is thus different from a complete state of nature, where 
there are no legally enforceable means of preventing copying. See, e.g., Kennedy & 
Michelman, supra note 41, at 715 (describing a state of nature regime in which even contract 
rights cannot be created). 
320. One can make contracts over both privileges and rights. Compare "If you pay me, 
I will not use my privilege to withhold this work from view" (leading to a contract over privi-
leges) with "I want to sell you my ability to call on the state to exclude others from this 
resource" (leading to a contract over rights). Even if only a privilege is transferred, the trans-
feror can bind herself to exercise it no longer, thus giving the transferee a legal right against 
her which did not before exist. 
321. "Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable-a 
matter of fact. Many exchangeable values may be destroyed intentionally without compensa-
tion." International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opposing a holding that in certain circumstances 
transferable but noncopyrightable "hot news" should be treated as property). 
322. Two persons can allocate an otherwise privileged activity between themselves and 
to that limited extent create a set of rights and duties between themselves that resemble the 
rights and duties between property owners and nonowners. Sometimes, albeit rarely, the 
positive law will treat aspects of the parties' dealings with regard to a resource as the basis for 
entitlements good against everyone. For example, depending on circumstance, the positive 
law sometimes imposes duties on third parties to respect others' contracts-the doctrine of 
tortious interference with contract. 
323. Hohfeld defines the terms as follows: 
A paucital right, or claim, (right in personam) is either a unique right residing in a 
person (or group of persons) and availing against a single person (or single group of 
persons); or else one of a few fundamentally similar, yet separate, rights availing re-
spectively against a few definite persons. A multital right, or claim, (right in rem) is 
always one of a large class ofjundamental(y similar yet separate rights, actual and poten-
tial, residing in a single person (or single group of persons) but availing respectively 
against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of people. 
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good against particular persons, rather than generally applicable enti-
tlements presumptively good against the world. Though there may be 
occasions when it suits the purposes of a statute324 or a constitutional 
guarantee325 to treat a paucital right as "property," rights premised on 
contracts or confidential relations between particular persons have ef-
fects potentially quite different from in rem rights good against the pub-
lic in general. Yet Roth bard thought he perceived in the copyright area 
an identity between the property and contract categories.326 
One can understand praise for American copyright law based on a 
belief that its prohibition against copying merely reflects the agreement 
the typical creator and user would voluntarily reach.327 Focusing on 
the way American copyright law restricts only the user's privileges to 
copy material to which he has had access, and gives no rights against 
independent recreation (unlike patent law), it is plausible to suggest 
that copyright does no more than provide a substitute for the contrac-
tual conditions that the author would normally impose, and that users 
would normally accept, as a condition of allowing access to the work. 
Thus, since the typical user wants to read a book, not republish it or 
make it into a movie, the standard contract for persons who want access 
to the intellectual product for their own immediate use would presuma-
bly contain a do-not-copy prohibition and a low price.328 Persons who 
want to copy would contract to do so, but at a higher price. Under this 
view, copyright law's prohibition against unauthorized copying merely 
provides "standard terms" for a convenient unwritten standard con-
tract and requires unusual users (those who want to copy) to bargain 
over their special needs.329 
Hohfeld, supra note 35, at 718 (footnotes omitted). Although I am obviously drawing on 
Hohfeld's treatment, my mode of employing his paucital/multital distinction is not identical 
to his. For example, he speaks of rights against a "very large and indefinite class" where I 
speak of rights good "against the world." 
324. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (confidential information treated 
as "property" under the mail and wire fraud statutes). This opinion exhibits an unfortunate 
willingness to label an overly large category of rights as "property"-whether those rights are 
paucital or multital and whether or not they embody the "formal" mode of control character-
istic of property law. See note 216 supra. 
325. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (confidential information 
treated as "property" under fifth amendment takings clause); cf. Martinez v. California, 444 
U.S. 277, 281 (1979) ("Arguably, the cause of action for wrongful death that the State has 
created is a species of 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause.") (dicta). 
326. He argued that in copyright a "plaintiff must prove that the defendant stole the 
former's creation by reproducing it ... in violation of his or someone else's contract with the 
original seller." 2 M. RoTHBARD, supra note 17, at 653. 
327. Id. at 652-60. Rothbard's treatment of the copyright issue is somewhat unclear, 
since his main interest seems to have been to argue against patent law that it did not follow a 
contractual model. My interest in his views centers on that contractual model. 
328. Whether the transaction is a purchase or something else matters little. Any re-
quirement of payment-whether a requirement that a ticket for viewing be purchased (e.g., for 
concerts and plays), that a copy be purchased (e.g., for books), or that a copy be rented (e.g., 
for movie videocassettes)-potentially gives the creator opportunities to extract agreements 
not to copy. 
329. Of course copyright law itself allows and encourages a "contracting out" altema-
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The implicit fulcrum of such a position is the author/owner's physi-
cal control over access, for it is this control that gives the author power 
to extract agreements not to copy. If one accepts Rothbard's apparent 
assumption that all persons who want access to a creative work can ob-
tain it only by bargaining with the author or those with whom she has a 
contractual relation,330 the results achievable by contract in a copy-
privilege regime would be essentially the same as those achievable 
under a copyright system.331 IfRothbard is correct, then copyright law 
merely codifies the legal relations that persons would create among 
themselves in a realm of copy-privilege. Dissolving copyright would 
then matter little, for equivalent private contracts would take its place. 
In addition, Rothbard's analysis temptingly seems to suggest that copy-
right law can be morally justified by the implied consent of all.parties. 
If copyright and contract would not come to the same results, however, 
then we need to analyze whether that divergence itself is a ground for 
condemning copyright.332 
In some circumstances contracts can substitute for copyright. For 
example, though the copyright statute allows libraries to do a great deal 
of photocopying for their patrons without copyright owners' con-
sent,333 Stanley Liebowitz suggests that libraries today may pay largely 
the same monies to those who own the copyrights in scholarly journals 
as they would have paid had copyright law not granted libraries a pho-
tocopy privilege. His research shows that scholarly journals charge in-
stitutional libraries a higher subscription rate than they charge 
individuals, apparently because of the amount of photocopying likely to 
be done by the libraries and their patrons.334 The high subscription 
rate amounts to an implicit license fee for photocopying.335 
tive: By giving the copyright proprietor an exclusive right to do or to authorize copying, 17 
U.S.C. § 106 (1982), the copyright law gives the proprietor the ability to prohibit or lo permit 
the copying that users might desire. See text following note 343 infra. 
330. Presumably the author could extract from the first purchaser an agreement that, 
upon reselling the resource, he would (1) similarly bind any later purchaser to the same no-
copy agreement and (2) similarly require the later purchaser to agree to extract similar agree-
ments from the next person in the chain of title. (Given the hypothetical nature of the in-
quiry, I shall not examine whether such clauses would be valid under current law.) · 
33 l. In later work Rothbard seems to argue that any initial contractual limitation on 
copying that is agreed to by someone who purchases a copy of the work should remain at-
tached to the copy and should restrain anyone who happens to be exposed to the copy. 
M. RoTHBARD, supra note 314, at 123-24. Such a position would come closer to yielding copy-
right-like results, but it has drifted fairly far from "consent." 
332. See text accompanying notes 357-388 iefra for this analysis. Even ifRothbard were 
correct that copyright and contract came to the same results, a person who placed great stress 
on autonomy might nevertheless object to copyright on the ground that only actual consent by 
users should suffice as a basis for imposing duties on them. It may be that Rothbard really 
believed that the use of a copyright notice assures that actual consent is present. Bui see note 
316 supra. 
333. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982) (certain photocopying by libraries permitted). 
334. See Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, supra note 21, at 
191-94; see also Liebowitz, Copyright and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of journals, supra 
note 21. 
335. Liebowitz, Copyright and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of journals, supra note 21. 
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In addition, the legal rules that govern at least one type of intellec-
tual product-trade secrets-follow the consent/ contract line rather 
closely. The originator of industrial secrets has little more than a non-
disclosure privilege as far as the general public is concerned. The trade 
secret originator's ability to redress unauthorized copying legally de-
pends on a showing that the defendant has violated rights other than a 
per se right against copying, such as a showing that the defendant is an 
employee who breached an agreement of confidentiality or an outsider 
who bribed employees who signed contracts not to disclose. Someone 
who learns the industrial knowledge of another by reverse engineering 
or by innocent observation is not liable.336 Thus, a safety pin discloses 
its "secrets" upon use, so it is not protectable under trade secret law. If 
a soft drink's taste, however, depends on a step in its manufacturing 
process that cannot be discovered by a chemical analysis of the end 
product, trade secret law can protect the secret formula. This results 
not because the formula is more valuable than other "advances in 
knowledge," but simply because using the drink does not give knowl-
edge of its contents; and those few who know the formula are bound by 
contractual duties not to disclose. 
Copyright, however, works differently. Contemporary copyright is 
valuable precisely because it extends beyond the place where the pro-
prietor and his contractual extensions can stand guard.337 When a 
copyrighted book falls into the hands of an innocent nonpurchaser, the 
property regime's prohibition against copying binds him just as closely 
as a person who has promised the author not to copy. 
This distinction would be unimportant if creators in a noncopyright 
world could rely on their initial customer being willing to offer such a 
high payment that fees from future copiers would be irrelevant. But 
such customers are rare. Liebowitz's research results do not indicate 
othenvise.338 Libraries can charge their patrons membership fees or, if 
affiliated with institutions such as universities, can obtain institutional 
budget funds to buy subscriptions to the journals that will be photo-
copied by the students and staff of the institutions. Libraries thus re-
ceive implicit payment from copiers in the same way as they pay implicit 
fees to copyright owners. But in a world without any copyright, pub-
lishers are the creator's most likely "big price" customers; and their 
336. See l R. MILGRIM, supra note 119, §§ 2.03-.06, 5.04. 
337. Copyright can be understood as a historical response to creators' decreasing abili-
ties to control personally their creations. Thus, Liebowitz suggests: 
The role of technology in disembodying the intellectual property from its creator 
must not be underestimated. The printing press is so familiar that it becomes diffi-
cult to imagine authors not being disembodied from their work. However, prior to 
the printing of words on paper, authors had to tell their tales in person. Only some-
one with an exceptional memory would have been able to reproduce a story in all its 
nuances. Copyright was probably unnecessary at the time .... 
Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, supra note 21, at 184. 
338. See note 334 supra and accompanying text. 
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situation is quite different. Unlike libraries, publishers have no institu-
tional ties to potential copiers that would allow them to pass on rele-
vant costs. Publishers could be vulnerable to free rider copiers eating 
into their profits-potentially as vulnerable as the creator himself 
would have been-and if so would be unlikely to offer the author signif-
icant remuneration. 339 
The distinction between having privileges of nondisclosure and hav-
ing rights over copying is also important because rights constitute a 
form of wealth. Authors with copyrights are able to make different bar-
gains than authors without.340 An impecunious artist might lack the 
bargaining power to extract a no-copy promise341 or a price high 
enough to cover copying from her customers. 
At bottom, copy-privilege and copyright lead to different results be-
cause of the many occasions on which persons have access to copy-
righted works without needing to purchase them and thus have the 
means to copy independent of a contractual nexus. Wherever one 
could have access to a copyrighted work without asking consent-
where one views statuary in a public square,342 receives a free broadcast 
of an advertiser-supported concert, 343 or picks up a book that someone 
else has dropped-ordinary contract rules would not support restrict-
ing what the person with access can do with what he receives. The per-
son has had access without needing to ask the creator's permission and 
thus has been free of the creator's leverage. Since this potential con-
sumer or copier has already received what he wants, the work's origina-
tor has nothing with which to bargain. 
The "consent nexus" so central to Rothbard's conceptual scheme 
thus fails at many points. In some cases, like the libraries studied by 
Liebowitz, a lack of direct control over copying will not reduce the crea-
tor's revenues from the copying that occurs. In other situations, such 
as those explored by Judge Breyer, a lack of legal control will not pre-
339. In fact, the Statute of Anne, from which Anglo-American copyright descends, ap-
pears to have been a response to publisher, not author, pressure. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 8, 
at 5-8. 
340. It is well recognized, the Coase Theorem notwithstanding, that income or wealth 
effects created by granting legal entitlements can change the allocational patterns resulting 
from bargaining. See, e.g., EJ. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities, 9 J. EcoN. LITERA-
TURE I, 18-21 (1971) (examining the allocative impact of"welfare effects"-more commonly 
known as "income effects"-flowing from alterations in legal entitlements). 
341. Copyright is open to the challenge that it offers no more protection than a 
noncopyright regime if the artist lacks bargaining power: She may well be forced to sell the 
copyright. A right good against third parties, however, is more valuable than a privilege of 
dominion (for reasons already suggested); therefore copyright gives the author something of 
value that should be worth more than a privilege in the marketplace. 
In addition, American copyright law has long contained paternalistic provisions to pro-
tect the legendary artist in the garret (who might be tempted to sell too cheaply) and to pro-
tect that artist's family. See notes 143-144 supra and accompanying text. 
342. See Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 1303 
(N.D. Ill. 1970) (declaratory judgment action to invalidate defendant's claim of copyright in 
monumental sculpture designed by Picasso for the Chicago City Center). 
343. See note 11 supra. 
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vent an author or publisher from inhibiting copying by other methods. 
Yet the lacunae which would result from a contract-only system may be 
significant. In a copy-privilege regime even one person free of a con-
tractual duty not to copy can make thousands of copies, and all who 
purchase their access from her would similarly be free of the author's 
restrictions. Is there some way to avoid this problem consistent with a 
focus on contractual rights? 
2. Changing the Jonn of noncontractual rights and duties to enlarge the 
domain of contract. 
One way to finesse the problem of contractual nexus might be to 
introduce contracts into most occasions on which persons have access to 
copyrighted works by imposing on users a duty to obtain the creator's 
permission before enjoying the work. But that is a far cry from a realm 
of privilege supplemented by a willingness to enforce contracts. It 
would be, in fact, a form of supercopyright. The fulcrum of the con-
tract system would simply have been shifted from physical control to 
control of the intangible. 
To see this, consider: If copyright were eliminated and replaced 
with privileges restrained by contracts, each person would have: (1) a 
privilege "to enjoy and copy whatever is open to my sight or senses 
without my breaking through physical barriers or otherwise breaking 
the law," (2) a privilege "to conceal what I can of my own creations 
from the access of others," and (3) a power to make state-enforceable 
contracts and a corresponding obligation to obey contracts made. 
Users would thus be privileged to copy whenever the creator lacked a 
bargaining lever with which to obtain a contract to refrain. 
If the law were to create a duty to obtain the creator's permission 
before enjoying and make that duty applicable regardless of what was 
physically accessible, then the user would no longer be entitled "to en-
joy whatever is open to my sight or senses without physical barriers." 
The user would now be entitled only to "enjoy what the artist gives me 
permission to enjoy." After such a change, the patron of sculptural arts 
would indeed probably contract for the privilege of enjoying the sculp-
ture in the plaza; as part of the payment, the sculptor may extract from 
the viewer a promise not to duplicate the piece of art. But to get to that 
point, the law will have had to replace the privilege of enjoyment with 
the duty to restrain oneself from enjoying until the owner's permission 
was secured. And that is largely what copyright itself does. In fact, 
imposing a duty to get a creator's permission before enjoying is an even 
greater incursion on users' liberty than is the copyright duty to get a 
creator's permission before copying. 
Neither copy-privilege nor copyright nor any other mode of allocat-
ing resources is "equivalent to" contract, for the content of contracts 
depends on the starting points from which the contracts are made. A 
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contract scheme in which the author's leverage depends on physical 
control will yield different results than a scheme in which a creator has 
independent rights over the intangible. Copy-privilege leaves creators 
vulnerable in a way that copyright would not, and it gives users liberties 
to copy that copyright would not. 
B. Compu/,sion and Consent 
As we have seen, without a set of state-imposed multital duties not 
to copy and a corresponding set of state-imposed multital rights against 
copying, gaps in contract protection could leave room for free riders to 
operate. Persons who favor copyright on economic grounds argue that 
under copy-privilege the presence of free riders would make the eco-
nomic return on intellectual products too low to support a desirable 
level of creative activity. Yet if copyright yields extra economic return, 
it does so because it empowers the author to restrain others from using 
the work in particular ways. Thus, the increase in incentive is 
purchased at the price of imposing this compulsion on potential users. 
The following discussion will examine the question of whether that 
incentive is purchased at the price of an impermissible sacrifice of lib-
erty. I first address the conflict that can occur between intangible rights 
and persons' privileges to use their tangible possessions. I argue that 
restraints on persons' liberties to use their tangible property are both 
common and inherent in a legal system that grants some people legal 
rights that operate against others. I then address the emphasis that is 
sometimes placed upon consent as a justifying criterion for treating 
creative works and conclude that it cannot adequately fulfill this role 
since copyright shows no less a respect for consent than does copy-
privilege. I conclude that copyright's restraints on liberty do not make 
that regime morally inferior to the regime of copy-privilege. 
1. Conflict between entitlements. 
Intellectual property rights often operate to restrain the owners of 
tangible things from their ordinarily privileged uses of those things. 
With copyright, the legitimate owners of paintings, floppy disks, 
records and papers, computers, tape recorders,344 and videocassette 
recorders345 cannot do with them as they wish. For example, A may 
purchase a word processing program embedded on a floppy disk. If A 
copies the program just purchased, using the computer A saved for 
months to buy, onto another floppy disk for which A has also paid good 
money, A will probably think that she was doing nothing wrong. "After 
344. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note l l, § l3.05(F)(b)(ii), at 13-124 to -129 
(home audio taping may not be fair use). 
345. Although the Supreme Court in Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417, held that certain home 
uses of videocassette recorders (VCRs) constituted "fair use," other VCR uses can constitute 
infringement. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156 
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) & 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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all," thinks A, "I have paid for all these things." Yet the author of the 
word processing program may have a copyright that makes A's act un-
lawful. Palmer argues: "[A]ny system of 'property rights' that requires 
the violation of other property rights, e.g., the right to determine the 
peaceful use in one's home of one's own videocassette recorder or to 
purchase blank tapes without paying a royalty to a third party, is no 
system of rights at all."346 Is this correct? Does the restraint that copy-
right imposes on the privileges of use which ordinarily accompany tan-
gible property make copyright illegitimate? 
Clearly not. All entitlements limit each other. Recall in this regard 
Justice Holmes's brief summary of a property owner's presumptive en-
titlements, quoted earlier.347 He suggested that property owners were 
completely "accountable to no one." If this were true without qualifi-
cation, an owner could use his property as he wished, even if the usage 
hurt another's property in the process. Yet Justice Holmes also sug-
gested that owners are "protected" by the legal system against other 
persons' "interference" and are "allowed to exclude all."348 Left un-
modified, the two statements are inconsistent, leading to two legal re-
sults-say, a reservoir owner being privileged to use his reservoir free 
from any liability and a neighboring mine owner having a right to keep 
the mine free from flooding349-that could not coexist between the 
same two parties as to the same physical event. When the reservoir 
overflows into the neighbor's mine shafts, each property owner would 
seem to have a claim inconsistent with the other's.350 
What saves this specification of entitlements from paradox or inde-
terminacy are the "limits prescribed by policy" that specify an ordering 
among entitlements.351 For example, in England, prior to Rylands v. 
346. Palmer, supra note 6, at 281. 
347. See 0.W. HOLMES, supra note 36, at 246; text accompanying note 36 supra. 
348. Id. 
349. Under the first statement, an owner "accountable to no one" could, for example, 
build a reservoir on his land which overflowed into a neighbor's mine shafts without being 
subject to liability. Under the second, the neighboring mine owner "protected against inter-
ference" and "entitled to exclude all" would possess a right to have agents of the law take 
action against the threatened flooding or a right to obtain relief in the courts when damage 
occurs. 
350. Hohfeld makes the logical impossibility clear. For X to have a right against Y 
means by definition that r has a duty, not a privilege. If l' instead has a privilege, X must, as a 
definitional matter, have a no-right. See note 253 supra. 
351. See text accompanying note 36 supra. Because Holmes admits that limits exist, he 
escapes the paradox. Since in the excerpt from The Common Law quoted above, see text accom-
panying note 36 supra, he leaves the nature of the limits unspecified, however, it yields an 
indeterminate result. When Justice Holmes turned his attention more specifically to tort law, 
he refined his description of property owners' entitlements in a way that eliminated the inde-
terminacy, at least at the prima fade level. In Privilege, Malice and Intent, Justice Holmes sug-
gested that everyone in society (including, presumably, property owners) had a duty to refrain 
from intentional infliction of harm and that the law gave privileges to do such harm only when 
justified by particular policies. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. 
REV. I (1894). Under this view, the example of the flooded mine shafts would no longer have 
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Fletcher,352 some of the mine owner's property entitlements would have 
been subordinate to the neighboring reservoir owner's privileges to use 
property nonnegligently. The mine owner could not legally redress the 
reservoir owner's nonnegligent and indirect flooding of the mine 
shafts.353 In Rylands itself, the reservoir owner's privileges were cur-
tailed and the mineowner's rights expanded. That case held the reser-
voir owner strictly liable for damage caused by the reservoir escaping 
into the neighbor's mine. Some ordering, some curtailment, is logically 
necessary. 354 
If property entitlements cannot be unlimited without potentially 
leading to paradox, one sort of entitlement can clearly restrain another. 
Since two pieces of adjoining land can be put to inconsistent uses, tort, 
nuisance, and environmental protection laws mediate among them, for-
bidding certain otherwise privileged uses of one piece of land in order 
to protect the other. Similarly, since cars can strike each other, the law 
of negligence says an automobile owner cannot drive as fast or as care-
lessly as he might like. Analogously, too, since copying can interfere 
with a copynght owner's interest, the law says that photocopy machine 
owners cannot make as many photocopies as they like and that com-
puter owners cannot make as many copies of programs written by 
others as they might like. And as zoning can restrict even nonharmful 
privileges to use one's property, and as the law of intentional trespass 
forbids even nonharmful intrusions onto land, copyright can restrain 
the violation of a proprietor's exclusion right even when the copying 
to yield an indeterminate result; if the release of the reservoir was intentional, then the owner 
of the reservoir would lose unless special circumstances or policies were present. 
Justice Holmes also clarified his position on unintentional harm, but in the opposite di-
rection. He seems to have envisioned a presumptive privilege to do unintentional harm that 
would be Jost by negligence. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 36, at 77-99. Under this view, if 
flooding the mine involved neither intentional acts nor the reservoir owner's negligence, then 
the mine owner would have no remedy unless special factors appeared. 
The indeterminacy was thus resolved for Holmes: The owner had a prima fade right 
against intentional and negligent harms but none against unintentional, nonnegligent harms. 
Similarly, the owner had a prima facie privilege to inflict unintentional nonnegligent harm but 
was not privileged to inflict intentional or negligent harm. These were some of the more 
prominent outlines of"the limits prescribed by policy." 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 36, at 246; 
see also Singer, supra note 41, at 1027-28, 1040-42 (discussion of Holmes). 
The current law is tending toward resolving the indeterminacy in a somewhat different 
fashion-namely, that in an increasing number of cases today, even unintentional and non-
neglig'ent harms are not privileged. See note 85 supra. More important for our purposes is the 
general point that no property entitlements can be unlimited and that one person's set of 
rights can limit another's privileges. 
352. Rylands v. Fletcher, 1. L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (H.L. 
1868). ' 
353. For a discussion of why other forms of action were unavailable to the plaintiff in 
Rylands, see M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 304, at 438. 
354. Even a court's refusal to judge a dispute between two inconsistent land uses implic-
itly specifies entitlements: The person who would have been the defendant prevails. See Cala-
bresi & Melamed, supra note 64; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 
CoLUM. L. REV. 603, 612 (1943) (discussing the inevitability of compulsion); Singer, supra 
note 41 (discussing dam11um absque injuria). 
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poses no threat to the proprietor's preexisting markets.355 That one 
person's intellectual property rights can limit another's privileges to 
use his things is no more remarkable than that tangible property rights 
can do the same. 
Nor does distance matter.356 One who copies another's work miles 
away from where the author resides may still be liable for copyright 
infringement, but there is nothing remarkable about that; liability has 
long stretched across the continent. If one who places a dangerous de-
fective product in the stream of commerce should be liable regardless 
of where the product causes iajury, then one who sends a work into 
commerce should be able to demand a fee for the benefits it brings, 
wherever the beneficial uses occur. 
2. Consent as a criterion for moral adequacy. 
Part of the popular resistance to copyright is a protest against being 
restricted in using one's tangible personalty. The last section discussed 
how such restraints are inherent in any system that gives some persons 
legal rights that operate against other persons. But even if copyright 
involves the same kinds of compulsions and restraints as do other kinds 
of property, are these compulsions nevertheless an evil to be avoided? 
Discussions of copyright and of other property rights systems are some-
times structured as if only the institution.of property, but not systems 
built on other legal foundations-consent, for example-requires spe-
cial justification. For example, Alan Ryan writes that "[a]nyone's prop-
erty limits the freedom of everyone else to acquire and use what he 
feels like acquiring and using. It is an institution which therefore re-
quires justification."357 Such statements are negatively pregnant with 
the implication that realms of liberty and consent (where one could use 
any resource desired as long as one had not bound oneself to refrain) 
are self justifying. 
Is this true? If the compulsions of copyright were eliminated so that 
the only restraints on intellectual property use would be those to which 
individual users had consented, would that give rise to a morally more 
desirable legal regime? 
It is tempting to think that it would. Consent sometimes appears to 
provide a sufficient ground for moral acceptability: "If you've agreed, 
how can you complain?" Some consent theories therefore attract ad-
herents because the theories offer an alluring illusion of providing legi-
355. It could be debated whether or not to characterize as a "harm" an act of copying 
that interferes with none of the copyright proprietor's preexisting expectations. See text ac-
companying notes 190-195 supra. My point in the text here is that, given the common law 
analogues, there is nothing illegitimate in using copyright law to require even such a copier to 
pay license fees, regardless of whether his act is viewed as "harmful." 
356. Justice Holmes's doubts about copyright had a spatial aspect. See text accompany-
ing note 15 supra. 
357. See A. RYAN, supra note 7, at 8. 
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timization without the need for determining independent criteria for 
legitimacy.358 But the lure is false. One needs to know and evaluate 
the background entitlements upon which choices and consents are 
based in order to know if such consents are worthy of serving as guides 
for the legal order.359 Without making an independent normative 
judgment about background conditions and starting points, one cannot 
be sure that consent is a necessary or sufficient basis for normative 
acceptability. 360 
For example, one might consent in a specific context to receive less 
than one is entitled on moral grounds to receive because one believes 
that, in that context, the moral entitlement will not be honored. The 
decision does not, however, erase the original entitlement. The classic 
example is the robbery victim who is given the choice, "Your money or 
your life." Few would suggest that the victim's assent to give the 
money should bind him later, however deeply the victim might have 
desired to make the trade. Because in our legal system all would agree 
that the victim is entitled to keep both money and life and that the rob-
ber is not entitled to use force, most people would not even view the 
victim's assent as "consent," regardless of\vhat may have been the vic-
tim's own subjective state of willingness. Conversely, lack of consent 
does not indicate lack of legitimacy. For example, the robber would 
not consent to give up his spoils, yet few would think that a thief's lack 
of consent morally taints retrieval of the goods. Similarly, a driver on 
358. The popularity of the law and economics view is at least partially attributable to the 
common but mistaken intuition that using a market model enshrines in the details of private 
law the noble models of consent on which many of our political orthodoxies are based. 
Among the several errors inherent in this intuition is its refusal to recognize that all contracts, 
even "social contracts," are not "immune from criticism in the light of pre-existing principles 
of justice." M. SANDEL, supra note 242, at 109. A second is to underestimate the differences 
between hypothetical and actual compensation. A third is to equate actual compensation with 
consent. On the latter two points, see generally J. COLEMAN, supra note 206, at 95-132;JEF-
FRIE MURPHY &JULES COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 255-72 (1984). 
Even those most adept at debunking these errors can fall prey to similar ones. As just 
suggested, not all of the people who use efficiency as a criterion do so solely because of a 
reasoned belief in its normative or descriptive powers. Some are influenced by the central 
image or "story" of law and economics: market deals which are consensual and not facially 
illegitimate leading to efficiency. Such market bargains are the discipline's constant reference 
point. From this attractive image emanates the illusion that in using criteria linked to effi-
ciency we will respect legitimate entitlements and individual choice. Coleman, supra note 230. 
359. M. SANDEL, supra note 242, at 104-13; see also Hale, supra note 354; cf. Anthony 
Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive justice, 89 YALE LJ. 471, 474 (1980) (distributive justice 
"must be taken into account if the law of contracts is to have even minimum moral acceptabil-
ity"). 
As John Raw.Is notes: 
Acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institutions does not give rise to 
obligations. It is generally agreed that extorted promises are void ab initio. But simi-
larly, unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind or extortion, even violence, 
and consent to them does not bind. 
J. RAWLS, supra note 236, at 343; see also id. at 14-22, 137-42 (original position and veil of 
ignorance). 
360. See M. SAI'!DEL, supra note 242, at 104-13. 
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the highway may not want to pay a toll; but her distaste does not by 
itself disentitle the highway fund of its mite. 
In these examples, using consent as a guide to moral adequacy is 
clearly unreliable, largely because there is consensus about who is enti-
tled to pose what choices. When questions of entitlement are not so 
clear, the temptation to use consent as an independent criterion can be 
strong. Yet "consent" does not become a more reliable criterionjust 
because other guideposts have lost their clarity. Consent simply cannot 
stand alone. 
Thus, when Palmer suggests that it is improper to impose an in-
dependent duty not to copy on a user who has not willingly acceded to 
such restraint,361 we must question: Should the user's consent matter? 
The answer is that it depends. Is the author who employs copyright to 
demand payment more like a highwayman, or more like a highway au-
thority toll collector? Or, to use a different analogy, is the person who 
wishes to use the intellectual product and who chafes at copyright's re-
straints more like a potential thief who resents that the law keeps her 
from raiding her neighbor's hencoop, or more like a homeowner who 
resents having to pay a local thug "protection" money to keep the 
house windows intact? Unless we know the relationship of persons to a 
resource, we do not know whose consent is required to stamp a given 
disposition of the resource "morally acceptable." 
Sometimes consent is inferred from a finding that to consent would 
result in an excess of benefits over costs.362 But that benefits outweigh 
costs is not a sufficient basis for moral ratification of a given condition. 
Allocation B may give more benefits than allocation A, but one may be 
entitled to something even better than B.363 And if harm is a relevant 
361. See Palmer, supra note 6, at 280-83, 303-04. Palmer would accept restraints arising 
out of tangible property entitlements, id. at 279-83, 287-89, though he would not accept re-
straints directed specifically against copying. The answers he gives to the questions I pose 
would therefore not be as indeterminate as the answers I believe would flow from a position 
accepting no restraints at all. 
362. Where for some reason it is impractical to obtain someone's actual consent, it is 
often nevertheless considered fair to impose a result on her as long as it appears to work to 
her long-term best interest. See Kronman, supra note 359, at 483-93 (Paretianism); 
Michelman, supra note 172, at 1176-81. For use of the implied consent m9de of analysis in a 
copyright context, see Gordon, Fair C:se, supra note 14, at 1615-18. 
A finding of"implied consent," so common in the law, shares the same potential flaws as 
any hypothetical consent analysis. Among other problems, people sometimes consent to 
things that are not in their self interest; and welfare-based arguments are substantively differ-
ent from arguments premised upon autonomy. See J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, 
at 200-01. Also, there are difficulties inherent in having a third-party factfinder try to gauge 
whether conditions exist (such as no harm done, or an excess of benefits over harms) upon 
which a reasonable person would have been expected to give consent. For discussion of the 
difficulties and possibilities inherent in any third-party estimation of what another person's 
harm or benefit might be, see, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64 (particularly the dis-
cussion of "liability rules"). But see BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 44-47 (1965) (sug-
gesting that interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible). 
363. To illustrate, in a regime of copy-privilege an author may be willing to sell her 
manuscript to a publisher for a low price because the author recognizes that the publisher 
may be subjected to the competition of pirated editions; this may be the best deal the author 
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question, lack of consent does not even prove that the unconsenting 
person is being harmed. Absence of consent may mean no more than 
that the person withholding consent is angling for strategic advan-
tage364 in order to maximize her benefits or that she is envious of an-
other person obtaining something that (aside from envy) would do the 
objecting party no harm.365 Also, "harm" is a relative notion that ob-
tains its content solely from comparison with a specified baseline, often 
the preexisting status quo.366 This is another reason why consent should 
be used as an ultimate criterion only by persons willing to accept the 
entitlement structure with which the parties began their negotiation. 
Admittedly, consent can help safeguard autonomy. Whenever 
someone withholds consent, no matter what the motivation, any over-
riding of that person's objections implies some lack of respect for his 
autonomy. Thus, philosophers who stress the independent value of 
consent may not care whether envy, strategy, or even perverseness 
motivates a refusal.367 But this focus on autonomy also fails to aid the 
copy-privilege proponent, because virtually all entitlements necessarily 
involve a lack of consent on the part of some persons affected. 368 The 
can make. The author's consent in that context would not mean that the author lacked any 
entitlement to a right against piracy or that the author would consent to the same terms if 
such an entitlement were secured. Like the victim in the robbery hypothetical, the author's 
consent is given only against a set of real-world constraints which may or may not be norma-
tively appropriate to impose on her. 
To illustrate again with the robbery example: Temporarily isolated from the legal sys-
tem, which enforces his entitlement to be free from intentional killing, the victim temporarily 
and accurately perceives that he cannot expect such an entitlement to be honored. Rather, his 
only options are to be killed (which we might call allocation A) or to trade his possessions for 
his life (which we might call allocation B). That he chooses allocation B does not erase his 
entitlement to something better. 
The question of who receives the benefits can also be important to the status of consen-
sual agreements. A contract of silence between a blackmailer and victim may make those two 
people better off but at the expense of those persons who would be interested in learning the 
concealed information. Thus, under the law of blackmail the person who learns an unsavory 
secret may be entitled to be silent about it-but he is prohibited from selling that silence. 
Here a consensual agreement between a willing seller and willing buyer is not only unenforce-
able but criminal. See generally note 283 supra and accompanying text. 
364. For example, the government's power to condemn land that it needs for public 
projects is frequently justified as a response to the danger of strategic behavior by the land's 
owners. Strategic threats can prevent parties from arriving at mutually beneficial outcomes. 
See Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 429 (1972). 
Similarly, the free rider problem that can exist under copy-privilege results from individuals 
seeking to take strategic advantage of someone else's willingness to purchase a first copy of 
the work. 
365. Those observers who are committed to the position that individuals are the only 
accurate judges of their own welfare may refuse to guess whether envy or strategy motivates a 
refusal. 
366. On the importance of a "baseline" and the related question of how to distinguish 
between being harmed and being prevented from obtaining a benefit, see J. FEINBERG, supra 
note 190, at 53, 135-43. 
367. See J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 204 (discussing the position that 
"[c]oercion fails to treat the person with proper respect, as a rational autonomous agent capa-
ble of promoting his own ends"); id. at 255-75 (different approaches to consent). 
368. See generally Hale, supra note 354; see also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly .\'on-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q 470, 470-74 (1923) ("[T]he conduct is motivated, 
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copier's autonomy may be overriden in the intellectual property sys-
tem, but the creator's autonomy receives insufficient respect under 
copy-privilege. Whether the entitlement is to keep or to share, right or 
privilege, someone will object. There is no way to avoid making entitle-
ment choices on some normative ground other than consent. 
That is why it is often so difficult to determine what should count as 
consent and what as compulsion. For example, an author might argue 
that there is no compulsion in property rights because a copyright 
owner gives potential copiers the freedom to choose whether or not to 
use a given work. When potential copiers encounter a work marked as 
owned, the argument would run, they can decline to reproduce it if 
they think the privilege not worth the price; the choice is theirs. The 
copiers might reply, in tum, that no one should force them to choose 
between paying for the work and doing without. But then the author 
might retort that she should not be forced to choose between keeping 
her work off the market and making it vulnerable to copying by free-
riders. Behind both parties' assertions are implicit claims about sub-
stantive entitlements. 
Unfortunately, the courts are not particularly helpful in illuminating 
the nature of what should count as a free choice. For example, the ar-
gument just mentioned raises issues similar to those that frequently 
arise under the "assumption of risk" doctrine when a plaintiff, who has 
engaged in a risky activity knowing of its dangers, argues that her 
knowledgeable choice should not bar her suit because the activity 
should have been available to her in a less risky form. 3 69 Rather than 
explicitly addressing the normative issues raised, however, the courts 
sometimes simply punt to the jury as a "question of fact" the question 
of whether the plaintiff "voluntarily" encountered the risk in suit. 370 
not by any desire to do the act in question, but by a desire to escape a more disagreeable 
alternative." Id. at 4 72.). 
369. The question also arises in regard to explicit agreements to waive rights. See Tunkl 
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (clause 
purporting to exculpate hospital from negligence held invalid). As an example of where the 
normative question is perhaps less obvious than in the hospital context but equally interest-
ing, consider a hypothetical loosely based on the facts in Verduce v. Board of Higher Educa-
tion, 9 A.D.2d 214, 192 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1959), rev"d, 8 N.Y.2d 928, 168 N.E.2d 838, 204 
N.Y.S.2d 168 (1960). In a college dramatics class conducted in a theater with extremely steep 
steps, assume that the drama coach has told a student she must "hold her head up" when 
stepping down from stage "or lose the part." The student knows she will not graduate if she 
loses her role in the play and also knows she might fall because of the extreme steepness of 
the steps. Continuing with head high might be considered a form of consent, or at least, a 
knowing encounter with the danger; she seems to have judged that the danger is less impor-
tant to her than keeping the role. If she indeed falls and sues the teacher, the court or jury 
will have to decide whether or not she had "assumed the risk" of falling. It will probably 
make this decision by inquiring (implicitly or explicitly) into whether students should be enti-
tled to safe places in which to complete their graduation requirements or, put another way, 
into whether teachers should be entitled to give their students a choice between physical dan-
ger and graduation. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 54-57 (1987). 
370. See l'erduce, 8 N.Y.2d 928 (1960), rev'gand implementing the dissenting opinion below, 
9 A.D.2d 214, 220, 192 N.Y.S.2d 913, 919 (ambiguously defined set of inquiries, apparently 
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But since the only "fact" involved is psychological willingness, and 
since even a psychologically willing consent can be found nonbind-
ing, 371 this judicial response only helps to conceal the true issue of 
whether the plaintiff was entitled to a less risky form of activity. 
An approach that says "favor liberty and avoid compulsion" without 
specifying the kinds of liberty and compulsion is thus radically indeter-
minate. "[A]ll money is paid, and all contracts are made, to avert some 
kinds of threats."372 Compulsion's unavoidability is implicit in the 
Hohfeldian categories: One person's privilege is another's vulnerabil-
ity, and one person's security is another's restraint.373 The question is 
therefore not whether compulsion is present, but whether the particu-
lar type of compulsion at issue in a given case is acceptable.374 
The weakness of the consent criterion is not always obvious because 
courts usually assume the justice of the background of liberties and 
compulsions against which consent is given or withheld.375 This ten-
dency is due more to judicial acceptance of those background patterns, 
set by legal traditions sanctioned by precedent and unlikely to be over-
turned, than it is due to any independent virtue in "consent" itself. For 
example, consider what would happen if a person P wished to challenge 
the frustration that a grocer imposes on P by keeping food locked up 
behind the counter until customers pay for it. Even if P has money with 
which to pay, Pis forced to choose between (a) having the food and 
including the question of whether the student was "free to act as she chose," to be left to lhe 
jury). 
On the general question of whether voluntariness or consent can ever be an objective 
concept free of normative presuppositions, see Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, 
.\Jethod, alld the State: Toward a Feministjurisprndence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983). 
371. See text following note 360 supra. 
372. Hale, supra note 354, at 612. Many commentators seek to distinguish between 
threats and offers. See, e.g., A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 369, at 204-21 (1987) (arguing for use 
of a moral baseline to "distinguish[] coercive and noncoercive proposals in cases which in-
volve the ascription of responsibility." Id. at 217.); Robert Nozick, Coerdon, in PHILOSOPHY, 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 101, 112-20 (P. Laslell, W.G. Runciman & Q, Skinner eds. 1972) (ex-
ploring various baselines to distinguish threats from offers). 
373. See Singer, supra note 41. 
374. See gellerally Hale, supra note 354. My conclusion here is linked to the sometimes 
controverted view that coercion is a "moralized" concept that should not be defined solely by 
reference to empirical criteria. See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 369, al 251-55 (suggesting that 
particular arrangements of property rights should nol be judged as coercive without making 
reference to an underlying moral theory); id. al 257-58. A "moralized" approach to coercion 
can be consistent with the position that threats and offers are distinguishable. See id. at 204-21 
(threats and offers); 305-06 (arguing that whether a proposal increases one's range of volun-
tary options, or decreases them, should be initially evaluated in terms of moral baselines). 
Even Robert Nozick, who has strongly taken issue with the notion that all constraints are 
threats, see Nozick, supra note 372, at 112, has recently argued that whether the constraints 
other people impose on an actor make the actor's conduct "non-voluntary depends on 
whether these others had the right to act as they did." R. NozicK, supra note 227, at 262. 
375. Similar assumptions play a role when courts uphold seemingly consensual agree-
ments against one party's later claim of invalidity on grounds of, for example, economic du-
ress. There are circumstances in which courts will invalidate terms of a bargain even where 
the bargain was entered into without threats of physical force. Cf U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) 
(unconscionability provision). , 
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paying money and (b) not having the food and keeping the money, 
when P would prefer (c) having the food for free. A "property privi-
lege" regime (analogous to copy-privilege) would allow persons to take 
the food without paying. Absent extremely unusual circumstances, P's 
challenge to the compulsion is unlikely to get very far, not because P 
has consented to the restrictions that make choice (c) unavailable, but 
because long precedent has determined that in the ordinary case it is 
the grocer's consent that matters. 
That compulsion is inescapable is as characteristic of the property 
area as it is elsewhere. If property rights were unenforceable, then 
armed and hungry strangers who wished to take a farmer's com would 
not be subject to property's compulsions-but the farmer would be 
subject to the strangers' compulsion. Eliminating property does not 
eliminate compulsion. The same is true of intellectual property. If 
compulsion were sufficient grounds for the copier to object to a legal 
regime of copyright, then compulsion would also be sufficient grounds 
for the work's creator to object to the regime of copy-privilege. After 
all, if the copier is not subject to the compulsion of the creator's copy-
right, the work's creator will be subject to the user's compulsion, be-
cause the user will employ his privilege to do things with the work 
which the creator would prefer he not do. In many ways, then, the 
users' and creators' interests in being free from compulsion appear 
symmetrical. 376 
Someone who wishes to copy others' created works might neverthe-
less strenuously deny that the important issues are symmetrical. For 
example, a copier's advocate might argue that there is a real difference 
between being stopped from doing something (which he might call a 
"true" compulsion) and being frustrated in one's ability to stop others 
from affecting one's interests. Persons who desire to copy will, under 
copyright, be stopped from physically doing something that they desire 
to do, while under copy-privilege, authors may merely find themselves 
unable to collect as much profit as they desire. The advocate thus 
might suggest that property rights are suspect because they impose 
"true" compulsion on copiers, while privileges merely impose on cre-
ators a less objectionable form of compulsion. 
Furthermore, the proprivilege commentator might point out that 
harm done by the state in enforcing rights is potentially much greater 
than the harm done by private persons pursuant to state-granted privi-
leges. For example, a person who wants to use a resource that is sub-
ject to another's property right can be sued or arrested if he takes the 
property without permission. This state-decreed harm is often ines-
capable and usually carries stigma. In contrast, the harm that private 
376. The person in the law and economics movement most closely associated with the 
position that the two sorts of costs are symmetrical is Ronald Coase. See R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. I (1960). 
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parties do can often be undone by self-help and is less likely than gov-
ernment-imposed harm to bring with it an aura of moral condemna-
tion. Thus, although a copier might decrease an author's revenues, 
that is nevertheless much less painful than being arrested. Further-
more, an author subject to piratical copying is not being injured by the 
state; and individuals in our culture by and large expect more fairness 
from the government than from individual strangers. Many of us may 
be willing to accept the old saw that "life isn't fair," but we believe that 
the law should be. In fact, law, like morality, has often been explained 
as an attempt to impose human notions of fairness on an arbitrary uni-
verse. Similarly, the Constitution imposes many fairness requirements 
on the government as agent of the law that are generally inapplicable to 
private entities.377 The copier's advocate thus might urge that state ac-
tion needs a justification that private actions do not and that state-
granted rights require a kind of justification that privileges do not.378 
An author's advocate might reply that it is not only the exercise of 
377. On the other hand, someone arguing that privileges require more justification than 
rights might claim that federal constitutional law provides no analogical support for copy-
privilege. The Constitution's tendency to require certain kinds of behavior more from gov-
ernment than from individuals may simply be a product of the document's nature and the 
institutions involved and may not embody a substantive decision by legal decisionmakers as a 
whole that individuals should be free to act badly. The federal scheme is not indifferent to 
individuals' behavior, it could well be argued; rather, sources of law other than the Constitu-
tion, such as federal and state statutes, control individual behavior. 
Thus, other aspects of American law may demonstrate more willingness to require fair-
ness from individuals. This can be true even at a state constitutional level. The California 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly constrains the actions of private 
parties more than does the first amendment to the federal Constitution, and the similar New 
Jersey provision appears to as well. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 2~ Cal.3d 899, 
592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Schmid, 84 NJ. 
535, 559, 423 A.2d 615, 628 (federal constitutional issue reviewed but decision based on state 
constitution), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1980). 
378. The advocate of copy-privilege might seem to be exaggerating in viewing private 
property "rights" as forms of state action. Such rights are in fact different from direct expres-
sions of governmental will, a point which a copyright advocate might advance in an effort to 
show that special burdens applying to governmental action should not be applied to her. Yet 
the differences between specifically directed governmental action and the government lend-
ing its force to assist a private plaintiff are not always determinative. The Supreme Court has 
held, at least in some circumstances, that when a private party asserts rights through the judi-
ciary, the judiciary's enforcement of those rights is an act of the state. See, e.g., New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (state libel law is subject to certain constitutional 
limits); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l (1948) (Constitution prohibits state enforcement of 
racially restrictive private covenant). Shelley makes particularly clear how the difference be-
tween privilege and right can be relevant to determining when constitutional guarantees of gov-
ernmental fairness should apply: 
We conclude ... that the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded 
as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence 
to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State .... 
But here there was more. These are cases in which the purposes of the agree-
ments were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of the restrictive 
terms of the agreements. 
Id. at 13-14. The Court has not gone so far as Shelley's dicta suggested. Not all assertions of 
private right will be treated as state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
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state power against defendants (which occurs in a rights regime) that 
might require justification. A refusal by the state to act (which occurs in 
a privilege regime) also implicates moral and economic issues.379 State 
inaction can have consequences as coercive (depending on one's defini-
tions) as state action. In the area of constitutional law, for example, as 
Seth Kreimer has observed, a "conception of negative rights as free-
dom from coercive violence has questionable value in shaping constitu-
tional restraints on a government that more often exerts its power by 
withholding benefits than by threatening bodily harm."380 Thus, the 
assumption of symmetry in rights and privileges might be attacked from 
the opposite direction, and a procopyright advocate might try to put 
the burden of persuasion on those who would give private persons lib-
erties to affect others' interests. 
For example, a creator arguing for copyright might draw on the 
common law's tendency to give rights against harm and contend that 
privileges that permit persons to do harm are wrongful unless justi-
fied. 381 Ironically, the private law theorist most often associated with 
the view that such issues are not symmetrical is Richard Epstein, who 
stresses the value of liberty yet makes precisely this opposite conten-
tion: He suggests that the state has an obligation to give tort rights to 
private persons who have been caused direct harm by the acts of 
others.382 A creator taking his cue from Epstein might argue that it is 
government passivity in the face of private parties causing injury that 
requires special justification383 and that, at a minimum, the creator 
should be protected from copiers' damage. Rights against injury would 
protect authors substantially, even if less so than the copyright stat-
ute.384 (Copiers can and do cause damage. For example, unauthorized 
379. A privilege arguably embodies the state's affirmative decision not to take action. 
See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 252, at 769-70 (the common law property and contract 
systems are modes of regulation). 
380. Seth F. Kreimer, A/locational Sanctions: The Problem of Xegative Rights in a Positive State, 
132 u. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1984). 
381. For common law dimensions of this question, see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 82; Ken-
nedy & Michelman, supra note 252; Singer, supra note 41. For constitutional aspects of this 
question, see, e.g., David P. Currie, Positive and .\'egative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 
864 (1986); Kreimer, supra note 380; see also note 378 supra. 
382. See Epstein, supra note 82, at 160-66 (arguing that causation should trigger liability 
where excuse and justification are absent); id. at 166-89 (analyzing force, fraud, compulsion, 
and dangerous conditions). In arguing that liability should be imposed when certain harms 
are directly caused, Epstein demonstrates the irony of a proliberty commentator taking a 
strong stance in favor of liberty-limiting rights to protect current possessions. 
Epstein's list of ways harm can be caused does not include harm done by copying. Adapt-
ing Epstein's argument to the intellectual property contei.:t thus extends his basic theory. 
Also, his argument is so oriented to physical events that he might reach quite different conclu-
sions about harm to intangibles. Nevertheless, his antisymmetry argument is applicable to the 
general points made here. 
383. This seems to be the core of Epstein's position regarding tort law. See id. (sug-
gesting strict liability for "direct" harm). 
384. In addition, copyright actually gives owners a share in the profits defendants draw 
from their work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)-(b) (1982). 
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persons who make copies can sell them at a price lower than that 
charged for the authorized edition since the pirate pays no royalties 
and need not cover the cost of generating the work in the first instance; 
the unauthorized edition will have a price advantage and could thereby 
drive the unauthorized but higher priced equivalent out of the market.) 
Alternatively, an authors' advocate might abandon the debate over 
whether rights or privileges need justification more. She might argue 
instead that "the law ought to do what is morally required"385 and con-
tend that it is morally wrong for users to take unconsented advantage of 
others' efforts. This argument also could support placing the burden 
of justification on copy-privilege proponents. 386 
But neither the copier seeking privileges nor the creator seeking 
rights could make more out of their respective arguments than a rebut-
table presumption of entitlement. Even the most ardent proponent of 
liberty seems obliged to concede that there are some occasions when 
liberty should be constrained. Even strong proponents of the view that 
the law should protect creators and all other persons from harm would 
probably shy away from enshrining the status quo in a presumptive en-
titlement unless there were some inquiry into how the status quo was 
reached387 or into the question of which status quo holdings are prima 
facie entitled to protection. Similarly, proponents of a "law as moral-
ity" view would have to explain what rights morality does and does not 
justify. As long as justification is possible, a need remains for a theory 
of entitlements to describe what kinds of justification are required or 
relevant. 
Thus, whatever the starting place, the presence or absence of con-
sent means little. Either consent by one party will be balanced by lack 
of consent by the other (the symmetry position), a presumptive privi-
lege will be subject to rebuttal by a showing of a justified right (the 
proprivilege position), or a presumptive right will be subject to rebuttal 
by a showing of justified privilege or excuse (the proright position). 
Perhaps no flat presumption can be laid down, and everything should 
·depend on the particular rights or privileges in question. In all these 
formulations, it is the underlying question of justification, the question 
of what entitlements rightfully attach to interests, that should deter-
mine an observer's normative recommendation of whether a right or a 
privilege should govern in that particular context. 388 
385. J. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 191. 
386. Philosophic arguments based on the laborer's claim to deserve a reward are ex-
plored at length in W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14, and W. Gordon, Restitutionary 
Impulse, supra note 55. 
387. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, supra note 227, at 149-52. 
388. Once a basic entitlement structure is determined legitimate, then consent can in-
deed be a quite useful building block in expanding it. For example, Congress has given the 
creator of a new work of art a prima facie right to control all copies made of that work. With 
acceptance of that entitlement, possible further doctrinal developments can be usefully ex-
plored by investigating the allocative patterns arising from the consensual relations between 
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In the end the choice for privilege is as freighted with moral charge 
as the choice for rights. Clearly, many have believed that private prop-
erty entitlements are justified.389 We must therefore move on to ex-
amine the normative appropriateness of the underlying entitlement 
structures on which proponents of copy-privilege base their arguments. 
C. Economics and Entitlements 
Most of the literature discussing the desirability of intellectual prop-
erty systems has focused on economics, and to some extent the analysis 
takes the same form as it does in regard to tangible property. Thus, 
supporters of private property often argue that, in a realm of pure priv-
ilege, exchange is unlikely to occur at an economically optimal level. 390 
In these arguments, a world without specified property rights391 is pic-
tured as potentially quite disruptive. Resources that could not be phys-
ically protected from marauders would not be produced, potential 
buyers who feared they might be too weak to protect their purchases 
from third parties would discount their willingness to pay by the likeli-
hood of loss, and so on. These problems would not vanish if buyers 
and sellers of resources had a state-enforceable contract between them, 
for even binding contracts are enforceable only against the people who 
sign them. 392 Merely privileged dominion is insecure, it is often ar-
gued, since it is open to the equally privileged depredations of other 
persons. People will probably not invest in production or enter into 
contracts if the anticipated benefits are likely to be leached away by 
third parties. 
As we have already seen, the economic arguments commonly made 
on behalf of intellectual property are essentially of the same sort. Free-
riding and other strategic behaviors may preclude effective coordina-
tion among potential purchasers.393 Even persons who might other-
creators (who hold the exclusive right to copy) and users (who have the corresponding duty 
not to copy). See Gordon, Fair L'se, supra note 14. 
389. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, supra note 203, at§§ 25-51. 
390. Compare R. POSNER, supra note 210, at 27-54 (2d ed. 1977), with Kennedy & 
Michelman, supra note 41. 
391. Property rights do not have to be privately owned in order to be specified and 
stable; as long as the state or other equivalent source of power guarantees a given allocation, 
the problems of a world with no rights will be avoided. Of course, varying sorts of problems 
are introduced with varying forms of ownership. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The L'se of Knowledge in 
Socrety, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524-25 (1945) (contending that without the pricing system 
that decentralized private ownership makes possible, needed information will not be trans-
ferred and the economic system will suffer from lack of flexibility and inability to respond to 
local conditions). 
392. One of the parties could, however, sell "protection." To the extent this protection 
was effective against other strong parties, such as competing protective associations, this pri-
vately provided protection would mimic property rights in impact. If the protection is a privi-
leged activity, the activity will also be free from interference by any state that exists. Cj R. 
NOZICK, supra note 227, at 10-25 ("protective associations" in the state of nature). 
393. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 763-64 (D. Del. 
1981) (discussing the free-rider problem), ajf'd mem., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982); sources 
cited in notes 21-23 supra; see also Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14J. 
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wise be willing to pay for access to a new intellectual product might be 
unwilling to do so if they expect to be able to duplicate their neighbor's 
copy.394 As a result, revenues may be low, the resulting incentives to 
produce intellectual products may be low, and fewer intellectual prod-
ucts may be produced than the public desires. 
If free-riding and other forms of depredation will not so easily oc-
cur, then property is less necessary to secure adequate incentives. In 
the realm of tangible property, a growing number of commentators are 
pointing out areas where a lack of private property need not be 
"tragic."395 In the realm of intangibles, commentators such as Judge 
Stephen Breyer,396 Tom Palmer,397 and Stanley Liebowitz398 take the 
position that, at least in some branches of the publishing industry, 
property in works of expression is unnecessary to deter depredation or 
to provide incentives for creators. In addition, since a market in copy-
LEGAL Sruo. 321 (1985) (suggesting that entitlements assigned to an "open class" of per-
sons-for example, a privilege assigned to the public to use creative works-are less likely to 
lead to effective markets than are entitlements assigned to a "closed" class-for example, 
exclusion rights assigned to individual creators). 
394. For tangible property, fences and physical force can enable owners to exclude 
others even absent state-enforced property rights, and exclusion in turn encourages market 
bargains. (Someone who wants an object locked in a warehouse will pay to obtain it, for 
example.) Inexpensive reproduction methods, however, make intangible property especially 
vulnerable to excludability problems. The more difficult it is to exclude nonpayors, the more 
tempting free-riding becomes. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1610-14 and the sources 
cited therein (the public goods problem). 
395. Garrett Hardin employed a "tragic common" abstract model to dramatize the diffi-
culty of using voluntary coordination to solve population problems, and property teachers are 
now accustomed to using the model to demonstrate why private property rights in land might 
be more desirable than treating land as a commons. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAw 2 (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); see also 
THOMAS c. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1975) (demonstrating that the 
self-interest of all individuals in a group can be frustrated by group coordination problems). 
It is simply a model, however, showing one of several possibilities. Commons may not be 
tragic. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 
53 U. Cm. L. REV. 711 (1986). See generally Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 41 (suggesting 
that a mixed regime can be more efficient than a "pure" property regime). Further, eliminat-
ing even inefficient commons can impose very real human costs. See BARRINGTON MooRE,jR., 
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 20-29 (1966) (historical account of the 
human costs imposed by the enclosure movement in England). 
396. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3. Judge Breyer examined several aspects of 
the book publishing industry and expressed doubt about the need for copyright in some of its 
segments. He did not go so far as to recommend that copyright be abandoned. Rather, he 
recommended, to no avail, that Congress not adopt the extensions of copyright it was then 
considering. 
397. See Palmer, supra note 6. Palmer argues that a range of devices exist to "internalize 
the externalities" of intellectual products without intellectual property rights, such as techno-
logical fences, tie-ins with noncollective goods, and contractual arrangements. Id. at 287-300. 
Though he believes copy-privilege is therefore more consistent with efficiency than is copy-
right, id. at 303, his preference for that regime is also grounded in his belief that intellectual 
property poses unacceptable conflicts with tangible property entitlements and the "voluntary 
regime" based upon them, id. at 303-04. 
398. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, supra note 21 (recom-
mending the "fair use" doctrine to implement an efficiency criterion). He suggests that price 
discrimination by journals may make copyright relief against photocopying by libraries unnec-
essary. Id. at 192-94. 
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righted works is likely to impose significant "deadweight losses"399 and 
transaction costs,400 these and like-minded commentators, such as Ar-
nold Plant, and Robert Hurt and Robert Schuchman, suggest aban-
doning copyright protection where these costs are not outweighed by 
positive incentive effects.401 
The economic focus of intellectual property criticism is not surpris-
ing. As the prior discussion has made clear, the entitlement structures 
of intellectual property, like the structures underlying all forms of pri-
vate property, enable economic markets to form.402 The relevant Con-
stitutional clause exhibits an instrumental approach to intellectual 
property, authorizing Congress "To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."403 In 
the copyright area, at least until very recently, the Supreme Court has 
consistently stressed copyright's economic role, stating that reward to 
the author is a "secondary consideration" in a system aimed primarily 
at increasing social welfare.404 
399. With tangible property, it is at least conceptually possible to have "perfect competi-
tion." For example, for tangible property, marginal cost, long run average cost, and price can 
(hypothetically) all be equal. When this occurs, anyone who is willing to pay a price above 
marginal cost can obtain the resource, and the producers' costs will be covered. With in-
tangibles, this alternative is unavailable. The choice is between allowing free-riders (which 
will raise the prospect of producers' costs not being covered and thus potentially result in 
undercreation of new works) or giving the creator a right to control copying and other partic-
ular forms of use (which, barring perfect price discrimination, can result in fewer copies or 
uses of those works that are made). "Deadweight loss" represents the economic costs of the 
second choice. To explain further: 
[C]onsumers who value the work at more than its marginal cost but less than its 
monopoly price will not buy it .... [This] results in a "deadweight loss," measured 
by the total of the consumer surplus that would have been reaped by the excluded 
consumers and the producer surplus that would have been reaped by the copyright 
owner had he sold the work to them. 
Fisher, supra note 5, at 1702 (footnotes omitted). 
As a result of intellectual property rights, the price charged can be greater than the mar-
ginal cost of copying. For example, when a competitor copies a computer program written by 
someone else, the marginal cost per copy will likely be low: the costs ofa new floppy disk and 
of using a computer or other copy device for a few minutes. Yet the person who invested a 
great deal in initially creating that intangible will need to charge more than the marginal cost 
of copying in order to recoup her investment. Copyright excludes the competitor from put-
ting identical floppies on the market, making it possible for the owner of the program's copy-
right to charge a price that more than covers marginal cost, but at the expense of the 
deadweight loss. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14; Liebowitz, Copyn'ght Law, Photocopying, 
and Pn'ce Discn'mination, supra note 21, at 183-88. 
400. See Breyer, The [.'neasy Case, supra note 3, at 316-18, 329-50; Hurt & Schuchman, 
supra note 25, at 430-32. 
401. Plant, supra note 25, and Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 25, set forth what has be-
come the basic form of the normative economic inquiry into the merits of copyright. 
Liebowitz shows how an inquiry balancing deadweight costs against incentive benefits might 
be conducted on a systemic level. See Liebowitz, Copyn'ght Law, Photocopying, and Pn'ce Discn'mi-
natwn, supra note 21, at 183-88. Fisher suggests how the inquiry might be conducted on a 
case-by-case basis. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1698-1744. 
402. See text accompanying notes 210-231 supra. 
403. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
404. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); see also Twentieth 
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But it is one thing to suggest that the system serves economic goals 
and employs markets to achieve a rough compromise between authors' 
claims to reward and the public's needs, and quite another to suggest 
that intellectual property rights for creators are only justifiable when the 
public gains something it would not otherwise have had. Yet most eco-
nomically oriented commentators ordinarily take the latter stance. 
Sometimes even the Supreme Court seems to take that position. For 
example, the Court wrote of patent rights: "The patent monopoly ... 
was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge .... The 
inherent problem was to develop some means of weeding out [and re-
warding with a patent] those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised 
but for the inducement of a patent. "4 05 
Under such a view, an inventor or author could not claim to deserve 
property rights as a reward for her effort or in recognition of her psy-
chological investment in the creation. Instead, a creative person could 
claim property rights only if those rights would help the public. One 
might call persons holding these views "encouragement" theorists, be-
cause they are united in believing that copyright is justified only to the 
extent that it encourages authors to generate new works. 
The extent to which intellectual property rights are in fact necessary 
to bring forth new works and the question of whether on the whole or 
in particular industries intellectual property rights do more harm than 
good are matters that raise complex empirical questions beyond our 
ability to resolve here.406 But we can make some important observa-
tions about the premises of such economic positions. To do so, the 
material in this section will first describe the underlying structure of the 
encouragement theorists' arguments and explore its potentialjustifica-
tions. I conclude that the most plausible defenses for the encourage-
ment theory are inadequate. I then go on to suggest that the most 
attractive feature of encouragement theory-its sensitivity to the pub-
lic's interests-can be better integrated into copyright law by other 
means. 
1. Structure of the encouragement theorists' argument. 
Essentially, the encouragement theorists adhere to the principle of 
wealth maximization, under which one asks "whether a policy seems 
likely to give its beneficiaries the equivalent of more dollars than it 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 
(1954). But cf. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (stating 
that copyright law is also designed to assure authors a "fair return for their labors"); see also 
notes 447-450 infra and accompanying text. 
405. Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1965) (emphasis added). 
406. There probably is no set of data available to answer the question on a general basis. 
See Priest, supra note 24, at 19-20. 
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seems likely to take away from its victims."407 William Fisher has re-
cently applied this economic criterion, suggesting that an economically 
oriented judge should aim to refuse copyright protection whenever 
such protection would not yield sufficient incentives to outweigh the 
deadweight losses408 that society would have to bear if the copyright 
owner's suit succeeded.409 Sole reliance on the wealth-maximizing cri-
terion to grant or deny copyright is highly questionable. 
The dominant purpose of American statutory copyright is to pro-
vide incentives, and copyright can properly be viewed as an economic 
doctrine. But developing a coherent economic theory does not require 
blind pursuit of untrammelled wealth maximization, even if that were 
possible. Rather, we may seek to maximize wealth, subject to some 
constraints. One such constraint may be some creators' claims to de-
serve a degree of control or payment; while desert may not be the only 
component of justice, it does have a weight that deserves respect. 
The normative ambiguities inherent in using the wealth maximiza-
tion criterion are well known. One is the difficulty of using the criterion 
to set initial entitlements. Wealth maximization depends on prices; and 
prices depend on, among other things, the distribution of resources. A 
search for "the" wealth-maximizing distribution is likely to fail because 
of its inherent circularity.410 Putting that foundational difficulty aside, 
another problem with wealth maximization is its apparent failure to 
take into account issues of distributional justice or noneconomic meas-
ures of desert. Some proponents of the wealth maximization approach 
seem to suggest that any action that leads to a larger gross total is desir-
407. Richard S. Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource .l!isallocation, 
28 STAN. L. REV. l, 2 (1975) (footnotes omitted); see also R. PosNER, supra note 210, at 10-12. 
For a critical review of this criterion of many names (it is variously called "wealth" or 
"value" maximization, "potential Pareto superiority," "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency," "efficiency," 
and even, most erroneously, "Pareto optimality"), see]. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 
358, at 262-72; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1093-94; Fisher, supra note 5, at 
1699 n.194. Under this criterion, one asks not if the affected parties consented, or even if 
they are unharmed; rather the inquiry is into whether the gainers could compensate the losers 
and still come out ahead, as a hypothetical matter. 
For the conceptual relationship between wealth maximization and Pareto superiority, see 
note 426 infra. 
408. See note 399 supra (explaining deadweight loss). 
409. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1698-1744; see also note 440 infra (discussing Fisher's 
analysis). Fisher suggests that his economic approach is only one possible ground for grant-
ing users of copyrighted works the privilege of fair use treatment. He also advances substan-
tive noneconomic conceptions of what might constitute the good life, and recommends that 
his pure economic approach be modified (but not abandoned) accordingly. Fisher, supra note 
5, at 1744-79. References to Fisher in the following discussion apply to him when he is wear-
ing his economist's hat. 
Fisher is well aware of the normative problems in using economics as he does, see id. at 
1695-97, 1698 n.190, which is in part why he presents a "utopian" analysis, id. at 1744. To 
the extent that Fisher stands by the antienforcement recommendations of his economic ap-
proach, see id. at 1766-83, 1794-95, 1795 n.586, he is fairly grouped among the encourage-
ment theorists for our purposes. To the extent that he does not, he is nevertheless an 
accurate expositor of the encouragement theorists' presuppositions. 
410. J. COLEMAN, supra note 206, at 108. 
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able, regardless of its impact on individuals.411 For example, if group A 
would bear the burdens of a change that benefits only group B, most 
observers would demand some showing that group B deserved to re-
ceive this boon and that there was some reason why members of group 
A were the appropriate persons to provide it. However, advocates of 
the wealth maximization criterion tend to argue that as long as group 
B's economic gain exceeds group A's economic loss, the change is de-
sirable. Such a focus on aggregate wealth unjustifiably412 ignores the 
moral claims that the members of group A have to be recognized as 
individuals.413 
Often "law and economics" advocates temper their approach by 
suggesting that persons disadvantaged by a wealth-maximizing move 
can be compensated after the fact.414 However, the encouragement 
theorists do not urge that creators be compensated for a lack of copy-
right protection. The absence of a principle to justify the distribution 
of gains and losses is therefore telling. 
But even if a wealth-maximizing economist possesses no explicit dis-
tributional preferences, distinct distributional patterns do result from 
any given programmatic recommendation. One can identify that pat-
tern and then use independent standards to judge whether the distribu-
tion is appropriate. The encouragement theorists' arguments appear 
consistent with this particular distributional principle: Consumers are 
entitled at a minimum to have whatever price and quantity of intellec-
tual products would be available to them in a world without intellectual 
property rights. 
This normative stance has long been apparent. For example, Hurt 
and Schuchman inquire whether the "copyright system induce[s] the 
creation of new goods which would not have been created in the ab-
sence of copyrights."415 Similarly, Stanley Liebowitz argues that 
"under a more 'optimal' copyright law," copyright protection would 
not be extended to creators who require no remuneration for their ef-
forts.416 As noted above, the Supreme Court took this position toward 
41 l. See, e.g., J. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 273. 
412. Various attempts have been made to supply an ethical basis for the criterion; none 
has thus far proved convincing. See, e.g., J. COLEMAN, supra note 206, at 111-22 (analyzing 
judge Posner's defenses of the criterion); see also Ronald Dworkin, IJ'h)· EfficienC)' ?, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 563, 573-84 (1980) (analyzingjudge Posner's defenses of wealth maximization); id. at 
584-90 (outlining further questions to be addressed if wealth maximization were to be justi-
fied by Kantian principles). 
413. See]. COLEMAN, supra note 206, at 105-22, 355-56 n.25; Dworkin, supra note 412, at 
583. 
414. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10, 
105-21 (1983) (discussing equity and efficiency). 
415. Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 25, at 425. 
416. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, supra note 21, at 188. 
Note that although Liebowitz uses solely economic criteria, he never says explicitly that he 
believes such economic analysis is all that should matter in the area. 
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patent law.417 
Copyright law, unlike patent, historically has not conditioned its 
grant oflegal protection on an inquiry into each work's novelty or other 
level of contribution to "science and the useful arts."418 Nor have 
judges considered it permissible to deny copyrightability when a de-
fendant proves that the plaintiff would have created the work without 
the incentive of copyright protection.419 Rather, fairly broad rules 
grant copyright to virtually all works within specified classes. Neverthe-
less, these broad rules have been subject to analysis by encouragement 
theorists, who have had to go beyond an inquiry into whether individ-
ual works need intellectual property incentives. 
An illustration of their approach may be helpful. Liebowitz suggests 
the following method of analyzing the economic effects of copyright 
rules. Some works come into existence only because copyright allows 
their creators to maximize their revenues by limiting the number of 
copies available to the public and thus receiving a higher price per 
copy.420 As to these works, Liebowitz implicitly argues, the concept of 
deadweight loss is irrelevant and should be disregarded. This is plausi-
ble; after all, society does not lose when copyright protection results in 
a low quantity of copies produced if the work would not have been in-
troduced at all but for the protection. Anything is better than zero. As 
to works that would have come onto the market even without copyright, 
however, deadweight losses do make society worse off than it would 
have been in a world without copyright. Liebowitz therefore recom-
mends weighing the costs of the "unnecessary" loss against the benefits 
bestowed upon the public by those works that exist only because of 
copyright incentives. 421 Where the positive economic value of a partic-
ular extension of copyright protection is less than the "unnecessary" 
deadweight loss it causes, he argues that an economic inquiry would 
417. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 973 (1989); note 405 supra and accompanying text. 
418. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 859-60 & 
n.20 (5th Cir. 1979) (copyright protection can be granted regardless of individual work's con-
tribution to science and useful arts; patent law distinguished), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). 
419. Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(holding telephone book that plaintiff was statutorily mandated to produce was copyrightable, 
reversing District Court denial of copyright on the ground that copyright protection was not 
necessary as an incentive to produce the work); see also Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 111-
12 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (governmentally commissioned work held copyrightable), cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 948 (1982). 
420. It is well known that a single producer, shielded from competition and able to 
charge only a single price, would produce [a quantity lower than the quantity that 
would be produced under conditions of pure competition where free entry were al-
lowed] and sell at [a price higher than the price that would be received under condi-
tions of pure competition]. 
Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, supra note 21, at 185. When 
copyright is introduced, therefore, and to the extent it provides some shield from competi-
tion, an "increase in the quantity of intellectual products is accompanied by a decrease in the 
quantity of physical embodiments produced of any particular intellectual product." Id. at 186. 
421. See id. at 186. 
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recommend abandoning the right.422 
Liebowitz's calculation is again built upon a distinct premise: Con-
sumers should not be made worse off by the adoption of intellectual 
property rights than they would be in a world of copy-privilege. The 
economic analysis may be appealing in its intricacy, but why should a 
world with copy-privilege provide the baseline for comparision? This 
distributional premise, the only one consistent with the encouragement 
theorists' work, is equivalent to asking whether the consuming public 
would consent to adopt an intellectual property system if it understood 
where its own best interest lay.423 Why should consumers be entitled 
to demand that copyright give them compensation (in the form of new 
works) for any diminution in the access the consumers would have had 
in a world without copyright? · 
2. Potential justifications for encouragement theory. 
Perhaps we should use a copy-privilege regime as the baseline be-
cause a safe, agnostic starting point for justifying an entitlement pattern 
(here, copyright) is to ask whether those who seem to be its immediate 
losers (here, potential copiers and other users) will in the end be better 
off than they otherwise would have been. Anthony Kronman names 
this general approach "Paretianism," after Vilfredo Pareto, the econo-
mist whose seminal work on the criteria of social welfare has been im-
portant to today's law and economics movement. Kronman defines 
Paretianism this way: "[Paretianism] states that a particular form of ad-
vantage-taking should be allowed if it works to the longrun benefit of 
those disadvantaged by it, but not othenvise. "424 Kronman adds, 
"[T]he baseline against which we are to measure changes in the welfare 
of the disadvantaged ... is represented by the situation in which the 
advantage-taking in question is legally forbidden."425 More familiarly, 
a move from allocation X to allocation Y is commonly said to be 
"Pareto superior" if no one would be harmed by the change and at 
least some would benefit.426 
422. Id. 
423. The encouragement theorists would probably disclaim the use of any distributional 
premise and instead claim to be applying only the wealth maximization criterion. See text 
accompanying note 411 supra. I am attributing to the encouragement theorists a distribu-
tional criterion which those theorists themselves have not explicitly adopted but which is most 
consistent with the structure of their arguments. 
424. Kronman, supra note 359, at 486. 
425. Id. at 491-92. 
426. If the change is Pareto superior in the sense that no one is made worse off by the 
change, then an economist following Pareto could recommend that the change be adopted. 
To illustrate how this and related criteria operate, assume that in allocation X, Lincoln has 
seven bushels of wheat, and Washington has four bushels. Assume further that under some 
proposed law regarding land usage their respective wealth will change. Call the output under 
the proposed legal allocation Y, and assume that the law might have either of two possible 
results, allocation Y-1 or allocation Y-2. Under allocation Y-1 both farmers will have seven 
bushels. Allocation Y-1 is Pareto superior to allocation X. Lincoln is not hurt, and Washing-
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Demanding that legal rules work to the long-term advantage of the 
have-nots,427 or at least leave them substantially unharmed, eliminates 
most grounds of complaint the have-nots might assert.4 28 When one 
has no way to distinguish between the haves and the have-nots, it there-
fore makes some sense to adopt Paretianism as a criterion for judging 
whether a specific change should be adopted. If one were to concede 
for argument's sake that there were no way to distinguish the claims of 
authors and users,429 then one might indeed be tempted to ask (as the 
encouragement theorists seem to do) whether adopting copyright ben-
efits users in the long run. 
Pareto, however, offered no guidance on the question of what an 
appropriate starting point might be from which to measure harm.430 
ton has gained. Pareto superiority would support adopting the new law if it were certain that 
allocation Y-1 would result from it. 
What if the result were different? Assume that in allocation Y-2 both farmers will have six 
bushels. Then the law will hurt Lincoln, who had seven bushels under allocation X. The total 
amount of wheat in allocation Y-2 (I2 bushels) is greater than the total in allocation X (I I 
bushels), and is thus wealth-maximizing. Nevertheless, a Paretian economist would not rec-
ommend adoption of the law. Allocation Y-2 is not Pareto superior to X because Lincoln 
would be hurt by the shift. 
If trades are possible, then any increase in the total amount of resources could be Pareto 
superior. To obtain allocation Y-2, for example, Washington might agree to trade some of his 
prospective wealth increase in exchange for Lincoln's consent. If Washington agrees to pay 
Lincoln 1.5 bushels if the new law is adopted, the "final" distribution in allocation Y-2 would 
be 7.5 and 4.5, which is Pareto superior to seven and four. Thus, when trades are possible, 
Pareto superiority and wealth maximization converge. When trades are not possible-as they 
often are not in the real world-applying the individualistic Paretian criteria does not always 
produce the same results as applying an aggregative efficiency criterion. 
If any alteration in an allocation X will harm someone, then that allocation X is "Pareto 
optimal." Pareto was quite aware that there would be "an infinite number of non-comparable 
optima[! points]." R. CIRILLO, THE ECONOMICS OF VILFREDO PARETO 43 (1979). An econo-
mist strictly following Pareto could make no recommendations about what might be prefera-
ble to a Pareto-optimal point. Id. at 43-44. On the other hand, an economist willing to "sum" 
the welfare of all affected persons and unconcerned with how that welfare was distributed 
would feel free to recommend the allocation that yields the highest gross total. This econo-
mist might recommend switching to allocation Y-2 because it increases the community's total 
food supply (from I I bushels to I2) even though in the process one farmer suffers depriva-
tion without compensation. If the resources in the allocations to be compared differ from 
each other (wheat and butter, for example), a wealth-maximizing economist following Judge 
Posner would use prices to measure their comparable value. 
427. Thus, a copy-privilege proponent might apply Paretianism to ask what legal rules 
would in the long term benefit the public who wants, but may not have, access to a work. 
428. Some complaints might remain-inequality, for example. The have-nots might ar-
gue that even if the change does not reduce their material well being, they would object to it if 
the increase in others' level of welfare is likely to sharpen already existing disparities. Also, a 
governmental decisionmaker'sjudgment about whether a change makes someone worse off is 
likely to be less reliable than that person's own judgment; further, the objection might be 
raised that whatever the welfare effects, the actual consent of the persons being affected 
should be sought. See J. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 193-205 (suggesting that 
Kronman's Paretian criterion overlooks the distinction between compensation and consent). 
429. See notes 444-445 & 516-533 infra and accompanying text (suggesting that authors' 
claims have a distinctly different basis than users' claims). 
430. See R. CIRILLO, supra note 426, at 42-44 ("Pareto dismissed the problem of an opti-
mum distribution of wealth as one of concern to social ethics rather than to economics .... 
The task of the economist, according to him, is to discover only the maxima of utility for a 
community rather than 'the maximum utility of the community.' "). On the importance of 
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One might equally well ask, therefore, whether adopting copy-privilege 
benefits authors in the long run. 
Without a specification of a normatively appropriate starting point, 
the Paretian approach offers as little assistance as did the consent crite-
rion, and for the same reasons.431 Essentially, criteria in both ap-
proaches are indeterminate unless joined to a specification of whose 
consent or welfare should be guaranteed and which state of affairs 
(copyright or copy-privilege) should bear the burden of proving itself 
Pareto superior to the other. As Bruce Ackerman has observed, 
[u]nless a legal rule is Pareto-superior to all other feasible rules [in the 
sense that no one would object to the adoption of that rule], there is a 
compelling need to advance one or another normative argument which 
seeks to explain why one group should be made better off at the ex-
pense of another.432 
The Paretian approach of asking whether a change is in the long-
term interest of those who seem to lose in the short run makes the most 
normative sense when there is some satisfactory basis for judging that 
the "losers" can appropriately claim to be entitled to what they cur-
rently have. It is in this fashion that legal commentators usually employ 
Paretian analysis. In the fifth amendment "takings" context, for exam-
ple, Frank Michelman suggests that property owners might be fairly re-
quired to bear without compensation certain losses if, in the long run, 
allowing such losses would be in the owners' interest due to benefits 
they would receive over time from leaving others' similar losses 
uncompensated. 433 
In the copyright area, I have employed an analogous approach to 
argue that uses of a copyrighted work should be treated as "fair" and 
thus noninfringing when such treatment would not make the copyright 
owner significantly worse off than she would be if the copyright were 
enforced.434 Most notably, when transactional barriers or other factors 
cause a market failure that prevents the owner from selling to potential 
buyers in that market, and compulsory licenses or other forms of mar-
ket "cure" are unavailable, the copyright owner loses no revenue that 
might otherwise have been available if consumers in that market are 
given free use of the copyrighted material. Granting fair use in that 
context largely yields a "Pareto superior" result: helping the public 
starting points in determining harm, discussed in a criminal law context, see J. FEINBERG, supra 
note 190, at 31-64, 127-86 (notions of "harm" are dependent on specification of baseline 
from which harm is to be measured). 
431. See text accompanying notes 357-376 supra. 
432. Bruce A. Ackerman, Introduction to ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAw, supra 
note 395, at xiii; see also id. at xi-xii (inconsistent states of the world can all be Pareto optimal); 
cf. J. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 265-66 (using the Scitovsky Paradox to show 
that even inquiries into "net" benefit can yield indeterminate results). 
433. See Michelman, supra note 172, at 1194-96, 1222-24; see also Kronman, supra note 
359, at 485 n.32. 
434. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14. 
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without doing substantial harm to the copyright proprietor.435 
But such analyses take as their starting point a specification, from 
the legal system or from independent normative criteria, that some 
possessions are legitimate. In the fifth amendment takings context, for 
example, the constitutional text itself designates some protection for 
existing property allocations.436 In the copyright context, the statutory 
framework within which fair use has evolved and the judicial origin and 
history of the doctrine both reflect a concern with protecting the copy-
right owner's interests.437 Thus, an economic view of fair use should 
"begin[] with the premise that a copyright owner is ordinarily entitled 
to revenue for all substantial uses of his work within the statutorily pro-
tected categories. "438 From that statutory baseline, a Paretian ap-
proach can be used to identify those occasions where granting 
defendants a privilege to copy will not result in long-term harm to 
copyright owners.439 
By contrast, even in the context of a statutory doctrine like "fair 
use," the encouragement theorists implicitly begin with the notion that 
the public is entitled to the most it can practicably receive. Both 
Liebowitz and Fisher suggest that courts concerned about economic 
impact should honor only those entitlements whose enforcement will 
help to induce the creation of new works and should use the fair use 
doctrine to deny relief when enforcing a copyright owner's rights would 
not economically benefit the public as a whole.440 
What is the basis for such a position? It will not suffice to answer 
that "the net total of social wealth will be greater if the law works to the 
benefit of consumers rather than authors," for this discussion began 
with the proposition that such arguments require distributional con-
435. Id. 
436. Michelman, supra note 172, at 1165. 
437. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
438. Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1651. 
439. See Gordon, Fair L'se, supra note 14, at 1606 n.38. The inquiry into fair use need not 
end with Paretian economics. See id. at 160 I. There may be grounds for honoring a public 
entitlement to free use even if the use causes harm to the copyright owner-for example, first 
amendment considerations or an analogue to the common-law "privilege for extreme need." 
See notes 457 & 518 infra and accompanying text (free speech interests); text accompanying 
note 75 supra (privilege of necessity); text accompanying notes 519 & 523-526 infra (analogic 
privilege to use copyrighted work in situations of exigency). 
440. See Liebowitz, supra note 21. Fisher builds on the Liebowitz approach, arguing: 
The task of a lawmaker who wishes to maximize efficiency, therefore, is to determine, 
with respect to each type of intellectual product, the combination of entitlements 
that would result in economic gains that exceed by the maximum amount the attend-
ant efficiency losses. Roughly speaking, the "gains" associated with a given combina-
tion of rights are the value to consumers of those intellectual products that would not 
have been generated were creators not accorded those rights. 
Fisher, supra note 5, at 1703 (footnote omitted, emphasis added); see also id. at 1705 n.218 
(quoting Gordon, Fair [.'se, supra note 14, at 1613 n.81), where he compares wealth-maximiza-
tion with my approach: "[Gordon argues] that courts interpreting the fair use doctrine should 
not strive to achieve 'optimal' levels of copyright protection, but rather should accept that 'the 
copyright law treats the outcome of the ordinary copyright transaction as normatively 
equivalent to an 'optimal' result.' " 
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straints-some guidelines about how the costs and benefits of the "net 
total" will be distributed-to be normatively acceptable.441 Is there 
some other ground for arguing, as the encouragement theorists and 
Fisher442 implicitly do, that consumers are entitled to be made no 
worse off by copyright than they would have been in a hypothetical 
world of copy-privilege where they would have been free to share in 
whatever works were created? In short, is there some ground for argu-
ing that the world of copy-privilege should provide the baseline? 
3. Baseline entitlements: In search of a distributional principle 
It is hard to see why the public should be entitled to share in a work 
merely because it would have come into existence without the incentive 
of property rights. True, the public may argue, as did Proudhon,443 
that persons who have labored at a task for their own reasons should 
have no right to claim payment from others for it. But authors may 
reply, quoting Mill, that "[i]t is no hardship to anyone, to be excluded 
from what [we] have produced: [We] were not bound to produce it for 
[a stranger's] use, and he loses nothing by not sharing in what other-
wise would not have existed at all."444 In my view, defensible and com-
mon sense notions of morality are in accord. Someone who works to 
produce something of value would seem to deserve a reward for her 
efforts from those who benefit.445 
Encouragement theorists have as yet offered no full-scale philo-
441. See text accompanying notes 411-415 supra. 
442. As indicated above, while Fisher is not convinced of the merits of "encourage-
ment" theory, he both asserts it as the correct interpretation of the economic stance and 
advances recommendations for nonenforcement of copyrights based upon it. See note 409 
supra. 
443. PJ. PROUDHON, WHAT Is PROPERTY? 61 (1966). 
444. See LAWRENCE c. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 41 (1977) (footnotes omitted). I have 
borrowed this hypothetical exchange between Proudhon and Mill from Becker, and the fol-
lowing discussion of Locke is also indebted to him. The quotation in text is from JOHN STU-
ART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk. II, ch. 2, § 6, at 142 (1872); for Locke's 
similar sentiments, see J. LOCKE, supra note 203, § § 25-51. 
445. John Locke is probably the best known advocate of the view that labor can, in ap-
propriate circumstances, give rise to property rights. His central position regarding property 
is as follows: "For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man 
but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as 
good left in common for others." J. LOCKE, supra note 203, § 27 (emphasis omitted). The 
intuitive appeal of Locke's position is well illustrated by Judith Jarvis Thomson's observation: 
If "enough and as good" is truly left after the laboring creator claims ownership in what he 
has made, then how could the Lockean argument fail to be "a sufficient condition for property 
acquisition"? Judith Jarvis Thomson, Property Acquisition, 73 J. PHIL. 664, 666 (1976) (sug-
gesting that satisfying Locke's proviso that "enough and as good" remain is a sufficient ba-
sis-though not the only possible basis-for morally satisfactory property acquisition). Of 
course, the intuition contains within it a series of analytic steps-concerning, among other 
things, the relationship between normative claims and legal claims-that need to be ad-
dressed. Full examination of the question of authors' desert is clearly beyond the scope of 
this article. For my current views of the philosophic issues, see W. Gordon, Restitutionary 
Impulse, supra note 55; W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14 (examining at some length 
the Lockean position, particularly the impact of Locke's proviso on intellectual property 
issues). 
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sophic defense for their position that individual desert should be irrele-
vant to the allocation of intellectual property rights.446 I shall therefore 
concentrate on analyzing the two defenses based in positive law that 
they off er to buttress their position that the public should not have to 
reward its creative benefactors any more than maximally serves the 
public's own self-interest. The first such defense is to argue that the 
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are solely concerned 
with providing economic incentives, not creators' just deserts. The sec-
ond is the notion that copyright is inconsistent with the common law, 
which itself is seen as setting a baseline of copy-privilege. 
As for the first issue, the Court has indeed often suggested that 
Congress has given a primarily economic interpretation to the Consti-
tution's patent and copyright clause.447 But economic concerns are not 
always viewed as the only goals of the statute. In its most recent deci-
sion construing the fair use doctrine, Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation 
Enterprises, the Supreme Court suggested that, although economic and 
other measures of social need remain important considerations, even 
under the statute an author deserves a reward for labor.448 
In Harper & Row, President Ford had sued The Nation magazine for 
having published a short article summarizing highlights of Ford's forth-
coming memoirs. As a result of this "scoop," Time magazine, which 
had contracted to publish an authorized excerpt, declined to do so, 
costing Ford at least $12,500 from Time plus book sales lost as a result 
of The Nation's story. The Court held that the Nation article, which in-
cluded some 300 to 400 words of verbatim quotation, was not a fair 
use, despite President Ford's public position. The Court wrote, "The 
rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the 
store of knowledge a fair return for their labors."449 Fisher has argued 
that the Court's fair return language stamps its "imprimatur" on the 
446. For brief but stimulating discussions of some of the philosophical issues raised by 
intellectual property, see, e.g., the very recent piece by Edwin C. Hettinger,justijjing Intellectual 
Propert)~ 18 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 31 (1989) (arguing there are "significant shortcomings in the 
justifications for intellectual property," id. at 51); Fisher, supra note 5, at 1744-66 (setting 
forth a utopian vision distinct from encouragement theory); Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 
3, at 284-91 (reviewing several potential "noneconomic goals served by copyright law" and 
concluding that none "seems an adequate justification for a copyright system," id. at 291); 
Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 25, at 421-25 (critically reviewing the extent to which Lockean, 
Kantian, and reward theories could provide justification for copyright). 
447. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1610 & nn.62-63. 
448. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). References to 
''.just deserts" have previously appeared in the cases, though ordinarily and ambiguously 
joined with economics. For example, in Mazer v. Stein, the Court stresses copyright's eco-
nomic purposes but then concludes its opinion with the declaration that "sacrificial days de-
voted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered," 
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953). See also Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 
1222, 1235 n.27 (3d Cir. 1986) (''.just merits" and public benefit both a concern). 
449. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546 (citing and giving a new twist to Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). Despite its solicitude for authors' ''.just 
deserts," Aikm, 422 U.S. at 156 n.6, the Court in Aikm emphasized economics primarily. Id. at 
156. In Harper & Row, the Court seems to have promoted fair return from being an "immedi-
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theory "that authors and inventors deserve a reward for their labor and 
should be given it regardless of whether they would continue their work 
in the absence of compensation. "450 
In its treatment of economics, too, the Court did not adopt the en-
couragement theorists' emphasis on seeking maximum totals of social 
wealth. Rather, the Court consistently pointed to authors' entitlements 
as the star~ing points from which markets evolve. Thus, the Court . 
noted that ordinarily copyright enforcement serves both the author and 
the public451 and stated that " 'the effect of the use upon the [author'.\"] 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work' ... is undoubt-
edly the single most important element of fair use."452 The Court went 
on to define the author's entitlement over potential markets quite 
broadly.453 Finally, the Court seemed to approve the view that for eco-
nomic analysis to justify nonenforcement of an author's exclusive rights 
under the fair use doctrine, a Paretian economic standard, using the 
author'.\" interest as the baseline for measuring harm, would have to be 
satisfied. It cited the view that fair use should be granted to a copier on 
economic grounds only if the copyright holder would lose no substan-
tial revenues as a result-only if "the market fails or the price the copy-
right owner would ask is near zero."454 
The Court's double-barreled concern with both public welfare and 
authors' claims to deserts, is not unprecedented.455 The most famous 
statement of this dual concern is probably James Madison's argument, 
in support of the proposed federal Constitution's patent and copyright 
clause, that "the public good fully coincides ... with the claims of indi-
viduals. "456 The Supreme Court's recent return to a notion of individ-
ate effect" of copyright, Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156, to being an independently important goal for 
which copyright was "designed," see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546. 
450. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1688·89. 
451. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559. 
452. Id. at 566. 
453. Id. at 568; see also Fisher, supra note 5, at 1670·71 & nn.53-54. 
454. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 n.9. This approach is proper when using Paretian 
economics itself as a basis for awarding fair use, though there can be other grounds for award-
ing fair use to a defendant, see note 439 supra, such as free speech interests. See note 457 infra 
and accompanying text (indicating that the Supreme Court would disregard both economics 
and authors' claims of personal desert in the pursuit of free speech interests). 
455. The precedent is not unambiguous, however. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 219 (1954) (not only affirming authors' desert claims, see note 448 supra, but also assert-
ing that "[t]he copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration") (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)); 
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT 
I.Aw 3-6 (1961) (suggesting that copyright has "an important secondary purpose: To give 
authors the reward due them for their contribution to society," id. at 5, but that "the ultimate 
purpose of copyright legislation is to foster the growth of learning and culture for the public 
welfare, and the grant of exclusive rights to authors for a limited time is a means to that end," 
id.). 
456. The full defense of the clause was as follows: 
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors 
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right 
to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public 
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ual claims makes the copyright statute a rather unsteady base for the 
solely aggregative approach of encouragement theory. 
Admittedly, the Harper & Row decision would have been far differ-
ent had President Ford been using his copyright to suppress facts. 
Then noneconomic arguments based on "First Amendment values" im-
plicated by writings on "matters of high public concern" probably 
would have been sufficient to trump the author's copyright claim.457 
But since Ford and his authorized publishers were "poised to release 
[the work] to the public," the Court viewed copyright as fulfilling its 
role as "the engine of free expression."458 In such a context, they did 
not inquire into whether enforcing or denying the copyright owner's 
claim would lead to "value maximization." Rather, given the function-
ing market and the lack of any noneconomic claim that could credibly 
be made on behalf of the public, the Court insisted on "deference to 
the scheme established by the Copyright Act"459 and indicated that the 
appropriate starting point was the Pareto-like inquiry: "[W]ould the 
reasonable copyright owner have consented to the use?"4 60 
When a noneconomic ground for fair use, such as free speech, is at 
issue, arguably neither the "encouragement theorists" nor the Pare-
tians have much to contribute. But when making an economic inquiry, at 
least in the absence of an extremely strong public need, Harper & Row 
suggests that the correct baseline is an author's entitlement. The ap-
parent public-benefit orientation of the constitutional clause did not 
bar consideration of authors' claims to fair return through copyright.461 
good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot 
separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have 
anticipated the decision of this point by Jaws passed at the instance of Congress. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Given the reference to 
English precedent, it might be argued that Madison's emphasis on individual claims rested on 
an (arguably inaccurate) view of the common Jaw. At least one historian suggests that 
Madison's view was independently based. See BRUCE w. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PAT-
ENT AND COPYRIGHT I.Aw 128-30 (1967) (arguing that the founding fathers saw intellectual 
property rights as "inherent"); id. at 130-31 (quoting Madison as suggesting that one reason 
for his support of the clause was the "dread[] that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to 
the many"). 
457. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555, 556, 559 (partially quoting Consumers Union of the 
United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
458. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557, 558. 
459. Id. at 545. 
460. Id. at 550 (quoting ALAN I.ATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958), re-
printed in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT I.Aw REVISION 
STUD. Nos. 14-16, at 15 (1960)). 
461. An element of uncertainty is introduced by the Court's very different approach 
when patent law, rather than copyright, is at issue. See note 417 supra and accompanying text. 
In the patent area, issues of inventors' fair return may receive quite limited solicitude, since in 
that area the Court has given significant force to the preamble to the Constitution's grant of 
power to Congress, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts." See Graham 
v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (the clause imposes limits on what patent standards 
Congress may use); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 
975-80 (1989) (giving a public benefit interpretation to the "Patent Clause" in the context of 
preempting state rights over the duplication of useful objects). The same constitutional 
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The second possible foundation for the encouragement theorists' 
opposition to rewarding creators is their perception that copyright is 
inconsistent with the common law pattern, though one can interpret 
claims based upon the common law in several ways. The encourage-
ment theorists might be using a specific historical referent-such as the 
period before adoption of the Statute of Anne, England's first copy-
right statute-to provide either a historical or normative baseline. 
Howard Abrams, for example, contends that if there was no common 
law copyright in the early period, then public access should be the start-
ing point.462 He scrutinizes two well known early cases that examined 
the question of common law copyright463 and concludes that both deci-
sions held that copyright did not exist in eighteenth century England or 
America.464 
Abrams has brought new light to the interpretation of these much-
debated cases.465 Even if his interpretation is correct, however, and 
clause provides Congress its copyright powers. So far, however, the preamble has played a 
much smaller role in copyright cases. 
One reason for the disjunctive treatment given to copyright and patent may be the belief 
that copyright is virtually unable to violate the clause. 
[U]nlike patents, the grant of a copyright to a nonuseful work impedes the progress 
of the sciences only very slightly, if at all, for the possessor of a copyright does not 
have any right to block further dissemination or use of the ideas contained in his 
works .... This is not true in the patent area, where an inventor has the right to 
prevent others from using his discovery. 
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 859-60 & n.20 (5th Cir. 
1979) (obscenity of plaintiff's motion picture held not a bar to copyrightability; constitutional 
clause viewed as applicable, but to be interpreted by "lenient standard"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
917 (1980). If granting copyright protection does not impede cultural or scientific growth, 
then the purposes mentioned in the clause would not be undermined if Congress chose to 
give authors more protection than a strict calculation of economic benefit would warrant. 
Copyright cases that treat the clause's purpose language as applicable tend to give it no 
clear effect. See, e.g., Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1498-99 (11th Cir. 1984) 
("We agree that the Constitution allows Congress to create copyright laws only if they benefit 
society as a whole rather than authors alone .... [But] a copyright holder need not provide the 
most complete public access possible."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985). Several cases go 
further, holding that the phrase "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts" does 
not articulate purposes that "limit Congress's power to legislate in the field of copyright." 
Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 1985); ac-
cord Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[W]e cannot accept appel-
lants' argument that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on 
congressional power." Id. at 112), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982). 
462. Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the 
.\1yth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1134 (1983) (arguing that if England 
and the American states gave no common law copyright in published works at the time the 
relevant statutes were adopted, "then the right of the public to easy access to copyrighted 
works is properly the dominant theme of our copyright jurisprudence"). 
463. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Donaldson v. Becket, l Eng. Rep. 
837, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774); see also 17 LUKE GRAVES HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF ENGLAND 953-1003 (1813). 
464. Abrams, supra note 462, at 1185-86. 
465. Donaldson and Wheaton are notoriously subject to varying interpretations. Donaldson 
has usually been taken to indicate merely that common law rights in published works had 
existed but had been preempted by the new statutory rights that substituted for them. 
Abrams, supra note 462, at 1156. This indeed appears to be the interpretation the United 
States Supreme Court gave to English law in one of its important early copyright decisions. 
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even if one grants the appropriateness of using common law as a stan-
dard by which to evaluate legislation, the puzzle remains why that par-
ticular era in judicial history should matter more than any other. In 
fact, that time period seems a particularly inapt choice for making a 
judgment about the tendencies of the common law, for an explicit pro-
copyright regime was unnecessary given prevailing institutional struc-
tures and the rudimentary publishing technology. English and Ameri-
can legislatures stepped in with statutory copyright as soon as 
institutional changes and advances in printing technology made it pos-
sible for someone other than an authorized publisher to reap significant 
revenues from the mass duplication of manuscripts.466 There was thus 
little opportunity for the gradual development of common law rights. 
Perhaps the encouragement theory advocates point to the failure of 
eighteenth century common law to provide postpublication rights 
against copying because they believe that any time a statute is passed, 
the legislature is prima facie obligated to guarantee all those affected an 
equivalent level of welfare to what they had before. This would be a 
novel theory oflegislation and one that would make it difficult for injus-
tices ever to be corrected.467 Even if it were valid, it would not explain 
the conclusion from the common law starting point that copying should 
be permitted, for it is hard to see that the public was able to do any 
substantial amount of copying in the prestatutory period. 
Common law intellectual property rights clearly have been consid-
ered legitimate in the twentieth century United States. In 1912 the 
Supreme Court held that common law copyright was a form of "prop-
erty" that could be used to restrain the public from making copies of 
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (referring to "the contest 
in the English courts, [which] finally decided ... whether the Statute of ... Anne, ... which 
authorized copyright for a limited time, was a restraint to that extent on the common law or 
not "). As for the Court's own decision in Wheaton, it can be interpreted simply as holding 
that Pennsylvania did not carry into its jurisprudence a postpublication common law copy-
right that existed in England, see Abrams, supra note 462, at 1183, and aspects of the Wheaton 
opinion "invite[] disbelief of its fundamental conclusion that there was no common law copy-
right," id. at 1183. 
Abrams suggests that the Supreme Court in Wheaton did not have access to the full opin-
ions of the House of Lords in Donaldson and that faulty historiography may have been the 
reason both for the commentators' assumption that common law copyright existed prior to 
the Statute of Anne and for the Wheaton opinion's "historically incorrect and unnecessary 
concession," id., concerning the existence of common law copyright under English law. Even 
if so, both the assumption and the concession have nevertheless had their effect on legal 
development; by the late twentieth century, at least, some forms of common law copyright in 
publicly disseminated works have become well established in the United States. See notes 468-
476 infra and accompanying text. 
466. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 1-37. Abrams seems to recognize this, noting: 
"(T]he common law never developed any law of copyright. This did not result from the com-
mon law either accepting or rejecting any particular idea or theory of copyright, but from the 
fact that other sources of governmental authority were already regulating the printing and 
distribution of books." Abrams, supra note 462, at 1134 (footnote omitted); see alw Landes & 
Posner, supra note 21', at 331 & n.11 (discussing institutional as well as physical methods of 
controlling copying in early England). 
467. Possession does not in itself guarantee legitimacy. See text accompanying note 387. 
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material that was not private in any meaningful sense, so long as the 
material was technically unpublished, such as musical compositions or 
plays that had been widely performed but never distributed in printed 
form.468 Though not extended to formally "published" works, this 
common law copyright cannot be explained away as a mere outgrowth 
of the laws of tangible property469 or of privacy. In 1918, applying a 
pre-Erie notion of federal common law, the Court held that one news 
service could be enjoined from commercially using the publicly posted 
and circulated news of its competitor.470 This decision, International 
News Service v. Associated Press (INS v. AP), spawned the "misappropria-
tion" doctrine that protects a protean form of intellectual property and 
which serves as one of the bases upon which a number of states have 
adopted and aggressively expanded state intellectual property rights in 
the past two decades.471 In 1977, the Supreme Court upheld a per-
former's state common law copyright in his "human cannonball" per-
formance against a constitutional challenge472 and indicated in dicta 
that one basis for the claimed right's legitimacy was its similarity to es-
tablished common law principles of unjust enrichment.473 Although 
copyright in published, written work remains an exclusively statutory 
preserve,474 the evolution of sister doctrines in areas not covered by 
statute suggests that had the legislature not acted, the courts could 
have and likely would have.475 
Whether such common law rights are necessary or wise is not at 
issue here. In fact, since state common law intellectual property rights 
468. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1912). No commentator questions that 
this common Jaw copyright in technically unpublished but nonprivate works both existed and 
survived the enactment of the early copyright statutes. State common law copyright in unpub-
lished and unfixed works still exists, though the Copyright Act of 1976 preempted state com-
mon law copyright in.fixed works. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). 
469. As the Court made clear in Ferris, 223 U.S. at 436, common law copyright could be 
asserted regardless of whether the infringer had somehow obtained a copy of the work or had 
simply memorized what she had heard during a performance. 
470. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918). 
471. See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy ef Intemational 
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 421-29 (1983); David Lange, Recog-
nizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 147, 151-54 (1981) ("(I]n 1972, the law 
seemed suddenly to metastasize." Id. at 153.). 
472. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (first amend-
ment does not bar a state from imposing common law liability on a television station that 
broadcast a "human cannonball" act in its entirety as part ofa news show). Although plaintiff 
Zacchini framed his cause of action as a "right of publicity," it was in fact a common law 
copyright in an unfixed performance. See Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players, 
805 F.2d 663, 674-79 (7th Cir. 1986) (state law "rights of publicity" in performance are 
equivalent to copyright). 
473. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. "The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is 
the straightfonvard one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will." Id. (citing 
Harry Kalven,Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)). 
474. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). 
475. However, Congress's decision to legislate rights for authors undoubtedly has 
helped state judges to feel that such grants are legitimate. Cause and effect in these matters 
can be hard to trace. 
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supplement a set of federal intellectual property statutes that already 
grant creative persons a wide range oflegal remedies, a strong case can 
be made that the promiscuous grant of state law rights over the last 
twenty years has gone well beyond justifiable prudential or even moral 
limits and that the courts have sometimes ignored the preemptive effect 
of relevant federal law.476 Wise or not, potentially preempted or not, 
twentieth century courts seem to consider the issue of common law in-
tellectual property as settled in a direction directly contrary to 
Abrams's understanding. 
Another strategy of the encouragement theorists might be to iden-
tify some more general pattern that has operated among various com-
mon law doctrines over time and argue that an authorial claim to 
deserve rewards is inconsistent with the basic distribution of entitle-
ments found in this larger scheme. Although such a methodology is 
controversial, it has sometimes yielded important insights and, if appli-
cable, might minimize the impact of the particular common law cases 
that explicitly grant rights over nonprivate works. For example, an en-
couragement theorist might argue that economic efficiency is the over-
all goal of all common law, and that courts which grant intellectual 
property rights have done so solely in an effort (however inept) to apply 
the efficiency criterion. An argument at such a level of generality is 
hard to evaluate. Here we can simply note that most of those who have 
examined the claim that the common law solely pursues efficiency have 
rejected it.477 
On a somewhat less abstract level, some encouragement theorists 
seem to prefer arguing that the protections copyright gives are struc-
turally or functionally different from other common law restraints. The 
notion may be that if copyright is an "exception[al]" and "queer branch 
of our jurisprudence," as some commentators have suggested,478 then 
we should view the institution with suspicion, tolerating it only when it 
makes the public better off than in a world without copyright. But, as I 
demonstrated earlier, such interpretations overlook the fact that copy-
right is structured in the same way as other forms of property and 
serves many of the same functions. It is worthwhile to expand on that 
discussion here. 
An example of the differences that encouragement theorists see be-
476. See W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14, pt. III, at 3-13, 26-31; Lange, supra 
note 471, at 147 (urging protection for the public domain); note 506 infra. 
477. Arthur Leff wrote classic pieces evaluating the then-new "law and economics" 
movement; among other things, he argued that economics is only one of several goals that the 
law does or should serve and that no culture has a unitary goal system. Arthur Leff, Law and, 
87 YALE LJ. 989 (1978); see also Arthur Leff, Economic Anal)'Sis of Law: Some Realism about .\'omi-
nalism, 60 VA. L. REV 451 (1974) (book review of Richard Posner's ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAw). For recent scholarship on the question of whether the common law is or should be 
primarily concerned with economics, see, e.g.,J. COLEMAN &J. MURPHY, supra note 358, at 273; 
Coleman, supra note 230; Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 41. 
478. The words in quotation marks are adapted from Umbreit, supra note 16, at 932. 
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tween intellectual property rights and common law rights in tangible 
property is Judge Breyer's argument that "[a]n intellectual creation dif-
fers radically from land and chattels. Since ideas are infinitely divisible, 
property rights are not needed to prevent congestion, interference, or 
strife."479 YetJudge Breyer's first two asserted distinctions are simply 
classic economic problems. As Kitch and Denicola suggest, intellectual 
property law, like tangible property law, prevents problems such as 
congestive overexposure and wasteful forms of exploitation.480 As for 
"strife," intellectual property law addresses battles to control intellec-
tual products that can be as strife-provoking as battles over any other 
source of power or money. 
A variety of common law case decisions also rejects the implication, 
sometimes found in encouragement arguments, that the common law 
gives the public a right to share in what others have made. Ordinary 
property and tort are fairly individualistic, and neither gives strangers 
claims to others' efforts or possessions without some kind of special 
justification.481 The most obvious illustration of this individualism is 
the tort rule that strangers have no "duty to aid" each other, even in 
extreme emergencies.482 If the common law gives people no prima fa-
cie claim to each other's efforts, then it would seem to give them no 
such claim to each other's work product.483 
But even if the common law gives no prima facie rights to share, does 
it give the public privileges to take advantage of others' effort? Judge 
Breyer argues that it does: "The fact that the book is the author's crea-
tion" does not "seem a sufficient reason for making it his property," 
479. Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 288-89. 
480. Denicola, supra note 187, at 637-41; Kitch, supra note 21. 
481. For example, necessity gives rise to a right and a privilege to enter others' property 
only to prevent "serious harm," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965); see also 
note 483 infra. 
482. See Epstein, supra note 82, at 197-201 (discussion of the "no duty to aid" rule). 
483. Various forms of public law, most notably taxation, do indirectly give persons 
claims on each other's work product, and the government uses tax funds for many purposes 
other than the relief of dire need. But public law does not need to be internally consistent. 
Legislatures can give, and legislatures can take away. At issue in the discussion here is 
whether any pattern in the common law can be utilized as a guide or reference point by 
lawmakers, whether legislative or judicial, who might be persuaded of the normative rele-
vance of such patterns. 
It might also be argued against the position in the text that the "no duty to aid" rule 
serves a limited set of purposes and that outside of the context of personal acts of rescue 
those policies are inapplicable. Most notably, it could be argued that the law refuses to im-
pose a general duty to aid because of the intrusiveness inherent in giving rights over others' 
efforts, but that no such incursion on liberty would be threatened by a duty to share, which 
gives rights over others' things. The law does indeed respond to this distinction, by giving 
rights of access to others' property (but not their efforts) in emergencies. But even that right 
does not extend to all cases in which invalidating the owner's exclusion rights would serve 
"efficiency" but is generally limited to cases of dire need. See Ploofv. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 
A. 188 (1908) (boating family had right to use dock on private island during hazardous 
storm). Furthermore, even in cases of dire need the common law requires persons who have 
availed themselves of others' property to pay for what they take. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. 
Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). 
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because "[w]e do not ordinarily create or modify property rights, nor 
even award compensation, solely on the basis of labor expended. "484 
But when labor creates something of value to others, the recipient is 
not always privileged to keep the benefit without giving recompense; 
the common law of restitution often does award compensation.485 It 
does not always do so, of course; there is "no single uniquely explana-
tory web"486 in the law, and the desire to reward deserving laborers is 
one goal among many. Yet were there no common law intellectual 
property, restitution law itself might provide the basis for an author to 
recapture the value of his effort487 from those who intentionally use his 
creative work.488 
The link between unjust enrichment and intellectual property has 
been made before. For example, the Supreme Court has accepted, as 
one argument in favor of common law intellectual property rights, the 
"straightfonvard" rationale of preventing unjust enrichment.489 And 
just as unjust enrichment can give rise to "quasi-contract," the 
Supreme Court has used similar principles to hold that an intangible 
intellectual product can be "quasi-property" as between someone who 
labors to produce it and a parasitic competitor.490 
A potential problem with my antiencouragement reading of unjust 
enrichment law is the denial of compensation under the common law of 
484. Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 289 (emphases & footnote omitted). 
485. Restitution law has two components: It provides remedies for other substantive 
areas oflaw, and it provides its own substantive base for recovery under the rubric of "unjust 
enrichment." See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 170, § 1.1, at 1-6. 
486. Leff, Law and, supra note 477, at 1009. 
487. There are two possible routes to this result. One is a right to monetary recovery, 
the other a right to enjoin use of the benefit and to require its return. Copyright Jaw gives 
rights to both monetary and injunctive remedy; what remedies might evolve from restitution-
ary principles is a complex question. Yet any sort ofremedy might induce potential users of a 
creative work to bargain with authors for permission before the fact, thus reducing the need to 
tackle difficult questions such as how much a use of a plaintiff's product was "worth" to the 
defendant, or whether it is appropriate to give a plaintiff a veto over a complex structure that 
a defendant has created in which plaintiff's work is one small but essential brick. 
488. See generally W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55. This is a controver-
sial claim, and I discuss it here only briefly. Among other difficulties is the question of how 
much generalization is appropriate. Thus, as Lord Goff and Gareth Jones noted of English 
law in 1966, "[T]hough all restitutionary claims are unified by principle, English law has not as 
yet recognised any generalised right to restitution in every case of unjust enrichment." 
R. GOFF & G.JONES, supra note 56, at 13 (1966). American law and commentary are more 
willing to generalize than the English on this point, and even England seems to be moving in 
that direction, see LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETHjONES, THE LAw OF RESTITUTION 15-16 
(3d ed. 1986) (omitting the prior edition's caveat), but particular precedents on particular 
fact patterns continue to be quite important. 
489. See note 473 supra. 
490. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918) (news is 
"quasi-property" as between the parties); id. at 239 ("defendant ... is endeavoring to reap 
where it has not sown"); see Dawson, supra note 127, at 1415-16 (interpreting /XS v. AP as a 
restitution case). The Court's use of the word "quasi" here may have been more than a hedg-
ing device. Quasi-contract represents a decision that it is fair to act as ifthere were a contract; 
the Court seemed to be making a similar decision in /.\'S: Under the circumstances, it was fair 
to act as if there were property. 
Note that economics also played a role in the decision. See I.\'S, 248 U.S. at 241. 
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restitution to anyone "who, incidentally to the performance of his own 
duty or to the protection or the improvement of his own things, has 
conferred a benefit upon another. "491 Under this rule, "volunteers" 
and "officious intermeddlers" are not ordinarily entitled to restitution 
and, conversely, persons who receive benefits from volunteers and in-
termeddlers are not ordinarily required to pay for what they have re-
ceived. By voluntarily writing and publishing a book, a person furthers 
his own interests and, except as to someone who has bargained with the 
author for production of the work (such as a patron, granting agency, 
employer, or contract-publisher), the author is a sort of volunteer. This 
might suggest that when members of the public copy an author's book, 
the "intermeddler" rule would give the public a privilege to do so with-
out paying. 
But there are many exceptions to the rule that volunteers are not 
entitled to payment, and copyright generally fits those exceptions. For 
example, after analyzing a host of cases in which volunteers were held 
entitled to recover, John Wade presented the following criteria as ac-
counting for the exceptions: no "intent to act gratuitously"; conferral 
of a measurable benefit; and offering the beneficiary an opportunity to 
decline (or a reasonable excuse for not doing so).492 If these criteria 
are present, Dean Wade wrote, the volunteer "is entitled to 
restitution. "493 
Each of these criteria is present in the typical copyright case. Most 
authors do not intend to act gratuitously. A copier's benefit is often 
measurable; at least commercial copiers will have account books show-
ing profit and loss figures, and the market may show the price that ordi-
narily would be paid for a license to copy.494 Persons who wish to copy 
the work ordinarily have a choice whether or not to do so,495 and the 
context in which a work is encountered or the presence of a copyright 
notice496 will inform users that if they do copy, someone may claim . 
491. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 106 (1937). 
492. John W. Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV. 
1183, 1212 (1965). Dean Wade conceded that his proposed rule went slightly beyond the 
available precedent in a subset of cases not relevant to our purposes. Also, additional restric-
tions apply if the beneficiary refuses the benefit. 
493. Id. 
494. Although there may be problems in apportioning the amount of profit attributable 
to use of the plaintiff's work and the amount attributable to other factors, the mere possibility 
of suit may encourage the parties to deal with each other before the fact and resolve this issue 
between themselves. 
495. When users do not have a choice, that may mean no protection should be given. 
Thus, for example, persons who want to describe the world have no choice but to use the facts 
others have discovered. This is arguably one reason why, generally speaking, copyright itself 
gives the discoverer of facts no copyright in them. See I 7 U.S.C. § l02(b) (1982). 
496. Legislation implementing the Berne Convention may reduce the use of notices. 
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §"§ 7(a)-(b), 102 Stat. 
2853, 2857-59 (notice requirement becomes a voluntary option, but applying notices will 
have certain advantages). 
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payment.497 Copiers can therefore decline the benefit if they think it 
not worth the cost. Thus, Dean Wade's set of general principles, sum-
marizing a myriad of restitution cases which did not themselves focus 
on intellectual property problems, predicts copyright results.498 Far 
from being coincidence, this parallel suggests that some forms of com-
mon law intellectual property are consistent with whatever larger pat-
terns exist in the law.499 
Other restitution scholars have indirectly suggested similar results. 
For example, when John Dawson investigated the issue of self-serving 
intermeddlers in restitution law, he suggested several sets of reasons 
behind the courts' tendency to rule that such volunteers are not enti-
tled to recover the value of their contribution.500 One set of reasons is 
social and instrumental: that a volunteer or intermeddler has her own 
sufficient incentives to do the good deed,50l rendering a reward unnec-
essary for creation of the benefit. Another set of reasons is individually 
oriented: that fairness to the unknowing recipient and concern with 
"individual freedom of choice" demand that the recipient not be placed 
under an unlooked-for burden.502 A third is a concern with limits: the 
possibility that requiring all "uncompensated gains" to be compen-
sated after all would be a dangerous and impractical rule, potentially 
causing societal paralysis.503 Where not all of these reasons apply, one 
might infer from Dawson's analysis that recovery is proper in order to 
honor the benefactor's claim to deserve payment; arguably, none of 
these reasons for denying payment applies to copyright. With intellec-
tual products the incentive issue is at worst a debatable question; the 
author may well have insufficient incentives to produce new works with-
out a right of recovery. As for fairness, the copier of a work of author-
497. Fixation may also help to communicate this information. Estate of Hemingway v. 
Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 349, 224 N.E.2d 250, 256, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 779 (1968), 
discussed at note 183 supra. 
One type of copyright case is not consistent with Dean Wade's approach. In copyright, 
even unintentional copying constitutes infringement. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Har-
risongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding ex-Beatie George Harrison's 
unconscious use ofa musical phrase from the Chiffons' song, "He's So Fine," in his own song, 
"My Sweet Lord," an infringement). Were copyright perfectly aligned with restitution, only a 
knowing act of copying would incur liability. Copyright law in fact follows the pattern of torts 
like trespass to land, under which even good faith does not protect an unknowing trespasser 
from liability. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 47, at 74-75. 
498. The area in which Dean Wade's principle fails to square with better intellectual 
property practice is its lack of limits. The boundary problems, such as administrability and 
explosive liability, are too great to be resolved only by insisting that the benefit be measura-
ble. This divergence means that Dean Wade's rule would predict more intellectual property 
recoveries, rather than fewer, than there really are or should be, so the divergence could not 
easily be used as evidence helpful to those who would prefer to eliminate copyright. 
499. See Levmore, supra note 289, at 113-17 (restitutionary relief for submission of 
ideas). 
500. See Dawson, supra note 127, at 1409-18. 
501. Id. at 1413-19. 
502. Id. at 1417. 
503. Id. at 1412; see also text accompanying notes 171-173 supra. 
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ship is ordinarily an intentional actor, rather than an unknowing 
recipient who would be taken by surprise if payment were de-
manded. 504 Regarding limits, the earlier discussion showed how copy-
right's demarcation and fixation requirements, combined with its 
limited definition of exclusive rights, can be employed to keep the 
boundaries of liability tolerably narrow.505 In the copyright context, 
then, all the reasons for denying someone a claim to their 'just 
deserts" are either of doubtful applicability or absent. Professor Daw-
son's analysis, too, therefore indirectly suggests that intellectual prop-
erty is consistent with the common law of restitution. 506 
Saul Levmore has suggested that many of the patterns in restitution 
law can be explained by the courts' desire not to allow judicially com-
pelled payments to undermine complex consensual markets.507 If vol-
unteers cannot expect to obtain restitution via the courts, Levmore 
suggests, they will be induced to enter into negotiations with persons 
whom they are in a position to benefit. Restitution for volunteers, 
therefore, is generally disfavored. But the same logic suggests that res-
titution should be favored for authors. Giving authors a right to pay-
ment will not discourage voluntary bargains. On the contrary, denying 
authors a right to payment causes free-rider problems that inhibit mar-
ket formation, while granting a right to payment encourages markets to 
form.508 Although economic concerns are relevant to both Levmore's 
and Dawson's analyses, neither commentator proves that the judges 
who have developed the law of restitution have erred in starting their 
504. Admittedly, some recipients know they are copying but think they are doing noth-
ing unlawful. The clearer the law were in identifying what copying constituted "unjust enrich-
ment," the less surprise a copier could claim. 
505. See text accompanying notes 168-189 supra. 
506. Professor Dawson, however, is properly wary of the unbridled application of the 
unjust enrichment principle. See Dawson, supra note 127. He was correctly disapproving of 
the insensitivity to the need for limits and boundaries shown by the majority opinion in Inter-
national News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (misappropriation of"hot news" 
enjoined). However, he was premature in suggesting that the Supreme Court had repudiated 
INS. See Dawson, supra note 127, at 1415-16. Professor Dawson's article was published in 
1974, when the Court was just beginning to reveal its tolerance for state intellectual property 
in preemption cases. See id. at 1416 n.15 (briefly referring to Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 
546 (1973) (state law prohibiting the piracy of musical recordings held not preempted)). 
More recently, the Court has cited INS with approval, see Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. 
Ct. 316, 321 ( 1987), and state courts have recently been quite willing to build new intellectual 
property rights. See generally Baird, supra note 4 71. The state courts may well be courting the 
very dangers of which Dawson warned, see Lange, supra note 4 71, and some federal courts are 
being less than wary in accepting state court rights. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 
460 (9th Cir. 1988) (singer's claim of a state right against imitation of her voice during per-
formance held valid and not preempted). 
507. See Levmore, supra note 289, at 79-81. 
508. The comparison between authors and other volunteers is explored in more depth 
in W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55, at 42-50; see also Gordon, Fair C.,'se, supra 
note 14, at 1610-14 (how copyright helps markets to form); cf. Levmore, supra note 289, at 
121-24 (suggesting that under some circumstances granting restitution to persons for their 
"profitable ideas"-a form of intellectual product-will be consistent with a desire to en-
courage "thick" and complex markets). 
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analysis at unjust enrichment rather than at value maximization.509 
To the extent there is a common law pattern, then, it militates 
against a starting point like the one the encouragement theorists use, 
which would give each of us, regardless of special need, a "right to ... 
the benefit of another's Pains."510 The common law does not stand for 
the proposition that the public has a prima facie entitlement to share in 
others' works, and the common law history does not cast any burden of 
justification upon copyright. To the contrary, basic common law pat-
terns in torts and restitution law and recent developments in the com-
mon law of intellectual property all suggest that the consuming public 
has no such entitlement. They even suggest that, all other things being 
equal, authors have a right to payment. 
One might investigate this analogic common law restitutionary right 
and seek to understand how the common law balances ')ust desert" 
against economic or other values when they conflict.511 One might fur-
ther seek to determine whether a claim to restitution could lead to a 
property right of full ownership. That would be a long journey, which I 
undertake elsewhere512 and which is not necessary here. One need not 
accept the notion that restitutionary claims can be an appropriate basis 
for some forms of property in order to accept that authors have a better 
prima facie claim to the benefits of their own creations than do users. 
The encouragement theorists' economic arguments in favor of copy-
privilege are therefore flawed, either because they lack a distributional 
principle, or because they use a distributional principle that is not itself 
easily defensible. 
Distributionally sensitive philosophic arguments do exist that might 
justify giving the public a baseline entitlement to whatever they could 
obtain in a world without intellectual property. For example, adoption 
of a "common pool" approach to human talents and energies might 
509. Adminedly, Levmore gives economics center stage, and he seems to doubt that 
"unjust enrichment" is a concept with much explanatory power. Nevertheless, he does not 
endeavor to prove that the impulse to reward productive persons is irrelevant to the cases. In 
fact, one might view his catalogue of economic reasons for not granting restitution simply as a 
set of countervailing considerations that can in some cases outweigh the goal of rewarding 
benefactors. 
510. Locke assumes that, absent extreme need or waste, each of us "ha[s] no right to ... 
the benefit of another's Pains." J. LOCKE, supra note 203, § 34 (emphasis added). 
511. For example, I use common law analogy to suggest that authors' claims should give 
way in the face of public exigency. See note 519 infra and accompanying text. Full specifica-
tion of the weights that should be given to desert claims and to competing considerations is of 
course outside the scope of this article. 
512. See W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55 (investigating the links be-
tween intellectual property and restitution); W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14 (ex-
ploring philosophic justifications for a legal claim to restitution, and examining the rights to 
which a restitution-based or Lockean labor theory could lead). In the laner piece I conclude 
that though a restitutionary or a Lockean starting point generates a much more limited range 
of intellectual property rights than is usually understood to flow from such principles, the 
resulting set of entitlements does contain some rights for authors that would be greater than 
those generated by the encouragement theorists' starting point. 
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justify giving the public something like this entitlement.513 But such 
arguments are hard to maintain on the merits.514 Even if copyright 
critics took such a stance, they would need to do so for all property 
rights, not just those that pertain to intangibles. And to take a leaf from 
the encouragement theorists' own book, we might demand that they 
defend their adoption of such a philosophic premise so at odds with the 
common law tradition.515 
4. Alternative notions of public entitlement. 
Although the encouragement theorists seem to be wrong in giving 
the public a baseline entitlement to share in what others have pro-
duced, any acceptable system of property rights must account for the 
interests of the nonpropertied for two reasons. First, it is likely that the 
public possesses justified noneconomic claims just as it is likely that au-
thors do. A second reason lies in society's material welfare. Though 
economics should not be the only relevant consideration, material well-
being has some importance. A strong public domain makes important 
contributions to a nation's cultural and scientific health. An intellectual 
property system must therefore be sensitive to the needs and claims of 
the nonowning public as well as those of authors.516 If the encourage-
ment theorists possessed a coherent statement of nonowners' interests, 
and no competing source of public entitlements were available, it might 
be necessary to defer to encouragement theory. For these reasons, and 
because many of the strongest doubts about common law intellectual 
property rights originated in doubts about judges' abilities to set and 
enforce limits,517 it is important to stress that rejecting the encourage-
ment theorists' point of view need not deprive the public of all entitle-
ments to copy nor send legislatures and judges into the morass with no 
guiding principles at all. While I cannot do more than briefly touch 
513. See note 242 supra and accompanying text ("common pool" interpretation of 
Rawls). In his "utopian" analysis, Fisher briefly explores the Rawlsian difference principle 
and notions of desert. He does not contend that his quasi-Rawlsian theory justifies the results 
of his economic theory. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1756-62 (distributive justice); id. at 1774-
79 (compensating creators). 
514. See generally George Sher, Effort, Abilit)~ and Personal Desert, 8 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 361 
(1979) (criticizing Rawls and arguing that personal desert can play a potentially significant 
role in deciding what distribution of goods is ''.just"). 
515. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 462, at 1126-27, 1186-87 (making reference to the com-
mon law). 
516. See Lange, supra note 471 (eloquently defending recognition of the public domain 
and its importance). 
517. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. l, 19 (1908) 
(Holmes,J., concurring) (suggesting that copyright must be limited in time to be tolerable but 
doubting that courts could develop and implement appropriate limits); Letter from Oliver 
Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (June 26, 1894), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETIERS 53 (M. 
Howe ed. 1941) (raising a similar point); see also International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 
248 U.S. 215 (1918) (Brandeis,]., dissenting) (suggesting that a right of misappropriation 
needs to be limited in ways that a legislature is best able to evaluate and implement). 
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upon some of these alternative sources of public entitlement in the 
space remaining, some particularly salient possibilities follow. 
The most obvious source for public entitlement is the first amend-
ment. So, for example, copyright should not be used to suppress facts 
or ideas,518 no matter how deserving the researcher or thinker whose 
efforts brought them forth. 
Another source is common law analogy. The common law grants 
certain privileges to nonowners against even the most traditional prop-
erty rights, and such privileges could apply to intellectual property as 
well. This article's prior discussion of tangible property and torts sug-
gests that the common law could easily support at least two kinds of 
entitlements for the public: a right or privilege of access in times of 
public emergency or great private need519 and a privilege against asser-
tions of intellectual property rights that would do harm.520 
The doctrine of Pareto superiority suggests yet another source of 
entitlements to copy: Some limitations on authors' rights may benefit 
the consuming public without harming authors.521 Since authors are 
part of the public-and in fact may constitute the part of the public 
most in need of using prior works as bricks when building new works-
it is likely that some privileges to copy will aid authors more than harm 
them.522 
518. See the discussion of Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, text accompany-
ing notes 457-461 supra (discussing the distinction between economic grounds for fair use and 
other grounds such as free speech). The "fair use" doctrine is often seen as incorporating 
first amendment policies, and some authors have suggested that in addition there should be a 
separate "first amendment" privilege. See l M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 11, § l.10. 
There are additional reasons why ideas and facts should not be subject to exclusion 
rights. This is a common phenomenon; many legal results are "over-determined" in the 
sense that many independent policies could justify them. 
519. See text accompanying note 75 supra (rights and privileges of entry, based on neces-
sity). Recall that a person who enters land pursuant to a privilege of private necessity must 
pay for any harm she does; a private need exception to intellectual property might be similarly 
incomplete. 
A "need" exception to property also appears in Locke, in the form of a "Right to the 
Surplusage" of another's goods to keep one "from extre[me] want." JoHN LOCKE, THE FIRST 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§ 42, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 159 (P. Laslett ed. 1970). 
520. A qualified do-no-harm principle not only underlies many tort rights, see text ac-
companying notes 79-85, but also plays a role in limiting those rights. For example, privileges 
of self-defense and defense of property limit some othenvise assertable rights against battery. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 63-68 (1965) (self-defense); id. § 77 (defense of posses-
sion). In addition, the pattern with which restitution cases award or deny recoveries to "vol-
unteers" can be in part explained as an attempt to avoid imposing a net harm on those who 
receive the benefits the volunteers confer. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 289, at l 00-08; see also 
Robert A. Long, Jr., A Theory of Hypothetical Contract, 94 YALE LJ. 415, 431 (1985) (student 
author) (''.Judges have limited recoveries for unsolicited benefits to the cost of the goods or 
services provided, or to the value of the benefit conferred whichever is less." (footnote omit-
ted)); see also id. at 429 (no recovery at all for benefits not measurable in dollars); W. Gordon, 
Creative Labor, supra note 14 (discussion of a do-no-harm interpretation of the Lockean 
proviso). 
521. See note 172 supra (reciprocity) and text accompanying notes 424-439 supra 
(Paretianism). 
522. This point is well made by Landes and Posner, supra note 21. Note, however, that 
such a position addresses the (objectively determined) welfare of classes of authors and, like all 
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Let us examine these last three entitlements (to ameliorate exi-
gency, to avoid harm, and to achieve a form of Pareto superiority) in a 
bit more detail. 
First, exigency: Though I contend that the law should take desert 
claims into account, even if that means attaining a less-than-ma.ximal 
amount of societal wealth, I do not contend that such claims should be 
"trumps." Some degrees of public need may be great enough (whether 
measured economically or otherwise) to warrant giving less than full 
deference to authors' claims. An exception to copyright premised on 
urgent public need might, for example, privilege the reproduction of 
unique copyrighted photographs that are the only evidence on an im-
portant and disputed issue of public importance.523 For another exam-
ple, deference to public exigency might give the public rights to employ 
eminent domain or other modes of mandatory sharing524 if a misan-
thropic inventor sought to withhold a cancer cure from public 
distribution. 525 
Such need-based entitlements can be distinguished from those that 
would arise from an encouragement theory calculus of economic value. 
The issue in the common law cases giving rise to the privilege of neces-
sity, for example, is not whether a stranger's use of the property is mar-
ginally more valuable to society than the owner's ability to exclude. 
Rather, the issue is whether such exclusion would threaten specific in-
terests (such as life) that have a special status or that have a grossly 
disproportionate value in comparison with what is sacrificed.526 
such approaches is vulnerable to the claim that, to be normatively acceptable, any limitation 
on rights should benefit every individual affected. Autonomy-oriented commentators might 
even demand that each affected person give actual consent. 
523. See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (scholar's 
duplication of unique copyrighted photographs of the Kennedy assassination held a nonin-
fringing fair use). In such a case, the issues of "need" and of free speech tend to coalesce. 
524. See text accompanying notes 289-304 supra (discussing a mandatory sharing model). 
525. In the ordinary case a patentee is free to suppress her invention. Special Equip. v. 
Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 377-80 (1945). Justice Douglas argued that this ordinary rule was incor-
rect because "there is no difference in principle" between usual cases of patent suppression 
and cases where the suppression put public health at risk. Id. at 383 (Douglas,J., dissenting). 
The Justice assumed (I think correctly) that in the latter class of cases, which falls into our 
"public need" category, no judge would be willing to enforce the patentee's exclusion right 
fully: 
Take the case of an invention or discovery which unlocks the doors of science and 
reveals the secrets of a dread disease. Is it possible that a patentee could be permit-
ted to suppress that invention for seventeen years (the term of the letters patent) and 
withhold from humanity the benefits of the cure? 
Id.; see also Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th 
Cir.) (suggesting that patentee's refusal to license vitamin-enriching process for oleomarga-
rine, "the butter of the poor," might justify denying injunction against patent infringement) 
(dicta), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945). 
526. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 196, 262 (1965) (privilege of public neces-
sity available to avert "imminent disaster"); id. §§ 197, 263 (privilege of private necessity 
available to assert "serious harm"); see also id. § 73 (no privilege to inflict substantial bodily 
harm on one person in order to avoid similar harm threatened by an independent source; 
caveat to this section intimates that such privilege might exist if the two banns are "dispropor-
tional" and the harm to be inflicted by the privileged actor is slight). 
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Turning to a public entitlement against being "harmed," such an 
entitlement appears to be consistent not only with the common law but 
also with the desert basis for intellectual property rights. (After all, if 
an author has a right against a copier arising in part out of claims to 
deserve a reward for the benefit the author has given that person, con-
sistency suggests that the "desert" justification of the right does not 
extend to occasions when its exercise would result in a net harm to the 
person against whom it is asserted.)527 Admittedly, a privilege against 
harm is fairly broad; but its principle can be seen already operating in 
several existing intellectual property doctrines. For example, under the 
doctrine of fair use, persons who have been maligned by a copyrighted 
work are privileged to replicate the work to the extent necessary to 
make an effective rebuttal and undo the harm done.5 28 
A public entitlement against being harmed by assertions of intellec-
tual property rights would not reenshrine the encouragement theorists' 
starting point. If individuals without a special showing of need have no 
prima facie entitlement to share in others' creative productions, then, 
as in ordinary tort law, 529 their harm should be measured against what 
their welfare level would have been had there been no interaction with 
the other party. We would therefore measure harm resulting from an 
assertion of intellectual property rights from this baseline entitlement: 
what the copier's welfare would have been in a world lacking the crea-
tive person and her efforts. 
Finally, the use of a Paretian criterion could give the public substan-
tial privileges to use works created by others because authors share in 
the benefits that many limitations to their rights bring. If benefits of a 
certain type are likely to be reciprocal over time, it can be argued that 
they need not be paid for because nonpayment does not make the im-
mediate donor, who will later be a beneficiary, worse off. Furthermore, 
if the costs of administering a tracing and payment system are high,530 
527. Locke's "proviso," which seems to condition a laborer's property claim on there 
being "enough, and as good left in common for others," has an analogous concern with 
avoiding harm. J. LocKE, supra note 203, § 27. This is discussed at length in W. Gordon, 
Creative Labor, supra note 14; see also L. BECKER, supra note 444, at 51-55 (effect on desert 
claims of effects that subtract value). 
528. Congress contemplated that the 1976 Copyright Act fair use provision would in-
clude such an entitlement: "When a copyrighted work contains unfair, inaccurate, or deroga-
tory information concerning an individual or institution, the individual or institution may 
copy and reproduce such parts of the work as are necessary to permit understandable com-
ment on the statements made in the work." HousE REPORT, supra note 143, at 73 (discussion 
of§ 107). Recent court decisions affirm this approach. E.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral 
Majority, Inc. 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986) (Falwell's reproduction and distribution to 
his followers of a copyrighted Hustler cartoon that ridiculed him for purposes of "stimulating 
moral indignation" and raising funds held a fair use: "an individual in rebutting a copy-
righted work containing derogatory information about himself may copy such parts of the 
work as are necessary to permit understandable comment," id. at 1153 (footnote omitted)). 
529. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 169. 
530. See text accompanying note 173 supra (discussing Dawson's suggestion that tracing 
the fallout of important intellectual advances would be nearly impossible). 
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then artists would actually be better off receiving no payment in recipro-
cal situations. As taxpayers they would have to help bear the systemic 
costs of requiring compensation, and as sometime recipients of benefits 
they would not want the flow of positive interactions inhibited by a re-
quirement for unnecessary payments. Speaking more generally, if art-
ists' claims to a ''just return for their labors" generate a requirement 
that authors be paid, the Paretian approach suggests that payment for 
benefits should not be required when the payment system would work 
to those very artists' long-term detriment.531 
In much of intellectual property law it is plausible to argue that reci-
procity determines the location of the crucial line between the benefits 
that one is legally obligated to pay for and the benefits that one can get 
for free. This notion can, for example, help to explain why general 
ideas (like the theory of relativity in physics or the use of perspective in 
art) are not ownable under any American version of intellectual prop-
erty law. Even if the generator of a new general concept may give a 
benefit to the world greater than he has derived from contemporary 
colle~gues, that creative individual has doubtless benefited from count-
less ideas originated by scientific or cultural predecessors. New idea 
generators will probably be far better off in a world where neither their 
ideas nor those of their predecessors are owned than they would be in a 
world that gave them ownership but also required them to refrain from 
using others' ideas without permission. Thus authors would likely gain 
from a provision in intellectual property law that made general ideas 
incapable of being owned. 
Similarly, much of the case law construing the fair use doctrine can 
be explained by authors' implied consent.532 Also, the notions of 
Pareto superiority and reciprocity might generate durational limitations 
like those in the current copyright and patent statutes. Most authors 
and inventors would probably prefer having their copyrights and pat-
ents expire, rather than face perpetual restrictions on all their prede-
cessors' works.533 
Let me reiterate that I mean this discussion of alternative sources of 
public entitlement to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. I have not 
indicated beyond the barest sketch, for example, what principles should 
govern priority among entitlements when they conflict. The discussion 
531. Thus, the inquiry could take the following form: whether a group of persons (e.g., 
authors) who are to be negatively affected by a governmental act (e.g., limitations on intellec-
tual property rights) would be better off with these limitations, and thus likely to consent to 
them, than they would be if the limitations were not imposed. The inquiry has obvious links 
not only to Kronman's applications of Paretianism, but also to Michelman's applications ofa 
fairness criterion, see Michelman, supra note 172, Fletcher's version of reciprocity, see Fletcher, 
supra note 82, Landes and Posner's analysis of authors' ex ante economicinterest, see Landes & 
Posner, supra note 21, at 332-33 & n.13, and the legal construct of "implied consent," see 
Gordon, Fair C,'se, supra note 14, at 1616-18. For the summary and suggestive purposes here, 
it is unnecessary to analyze the distinctions among these notions. 
532. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1641-45. 
533. For a related discussion, see Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 362. 
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nevertheless should suffice to demonstrate that intellectual property 
law is quite capable of embracing a concern with the public's welfare 
without having to accept the premises of encouragement theory. 
D. Autonomy of the Intangi,ble Realm 
The preceding section suggested that copyright law is appropriately 
concerned with issues of fair return and that the public has no auto-
matic entitlement to whatever they could receive in a world without in-
tellectual property rights. It also argued that the public should have 
alternative sources for entitlements. Throughout I have argued that 
creators and copiers should have fine-tuned entitlements appropriate 
to their particular roles in particular contexts. This section will show 
that copy-privilege is further flawed in treating authors' and users' par-
ticular relationships to the intellectual creation as irrelevant. 534 
Copyright has one strong advantage over copy-privilege: It takes 
the claims of authors and users seriously in their capacities as authors 
and users. In a copy-privilege regime, an author's ability to control the 
use made of the work and to profit from it, and the ability of someone 
other than the author to copy or otherwise use the work, depend on a 
host of considerations that are largely independent of the existence of 
the work and the author's and user) relationship to it. 
Under copy-privilege, the law takes no active position regarding 
copying in and of itself; copying may or may not take place, with or 
without a state impediment, depending on the interrelationship of in-
dependent state policies with serendipitous physical circumstance.535 
In such a system, a creator's ability to obtain protection against copying 
would not be responsive to any quality inherent in the person seeking 
the reward, any quality of the work itself, or any characteristic of the 
audience. Mere happenstance would matter536 more than the amount 
of labor invested, the quality of a given work, the moral desert of a 
creator, the dependence on incentives of a particular industry, a crea-
tor's emotional stake in what she has made,537 or the urgency of public 
need for access to a particular creative endeavor. 
The discussion above is replete with examples of how copy-privilege 
takes its shape from background circumstance. For instance, in the dis-
cussion of the economic functions served by the entitlement package, I 
534. I am particularly indebted to Bruce Ackerman here. 
535. See text accompanying notes 305-307 supra (alternatives to copyright). 
536. For example, under a copy-privilege regime, third parties would have privileges to 
copy, but the law might forbid them from impairing other of the creator's interests, such as 
the creator's interest in physical security. To the extent that protection of these other inter-
ests happened to provide some shelter for the creator's copying interests, this shelter would 
be permitted. See text accompanying notes 255-264 supra (copy-privilege); text accompanying 
notes 319-343 supra (exploring Rothbard's notion of copyright as contract). 
537. Although this issue is given little attention here, an alternative defense of intellec-
tual property might be erected on the ground of creators' psychological cathexis to what they 
make. See text accompanying notes 208-209 supra. 
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suggested that some composers might earn significant revenues simply 
by using their legal rights in realty to exclude nonpayors from concert 
halls. 538 That is, a composer could piggyback protection for her intel-
lectual product on the legal system's protection of physical security if 
the composer happened to have some way of linking performance of 
the work to a physical location. But what of record broadcasts? Piggy-
back approaches like using a right of physical exclusion to extract no-
copy promises are not very effective in limiting illict copies made from 
public radio broadcasts. Listeners can easily make and sell excellent 
copies of what their radios receive. Reproductive technology and its 
relationship to marketing patterns, not the composer's energy or talent 
level or contribution to public benefit, determine what the composer 
receives. 
For physical exclusion to work as a mode of generating revenues, a 
creator's work must be of a type that can be eajoyed by some but be 
physically hidden from nonpurchasers. Contract might fairly easily 
protect such works from being copied in a world of copy-privilege. If 
the information necessary to copy the intellectual product can be hid-
den even from purchasers, so much the better for the originator. No 
ornate confidentiality contracts are needed to protect a trade secret if 
the device in which it is imbedded cannot be reverse engineered. But 
while a manufacturer might be able to profit from an innovative process 
without revealing it, authors cannot sell their books without exposing 
their creations to purchasers' eyes. If concealment is impossible, and if 
initial sales make the intellectual product known both to purchasers and 
to third parties, creators may be unable to use their privileges of non-
disclosure or their rights of contract and security of realty to obtain 
revenues. 539 
Let me repeat an example I used in another context: A soft drink's 
secret recipe might be more easily hidden than the "secret" of the 
safety pin and if so could be more easily protected under copy-privi-
lege. 540 The soft drink inventor can extract confidentiality contracts 
from those involved in the manufacturing process, while the safety pin 
inventor cannot prevent anyone who sees his invention from knowing 
how it is made. Though for all one knows fastener inventors may de-
serve more rewards (or need more incentives) than soft drink inven-
tors, potential for concealment is determinative. 
The same "luck of the draw" also operates on an industry-wide 
scale. In any given communications or publishing industry, the existing 
state of technology or complex distributional networks might allow an 
authorized disseminator such an extensive lead-time advantage that a 
de facto monopoly would result regardless of whether copyright were 
538. See text following note 213 supra. 
539. See text accompanying notes 342-343 supra. 
540. See text following note 336 supra. 
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available. In such a case, a copy-privilege regime would be as profitable 
to authors as copyright. In an industry where reproductive technolo-
gies were more advanced, however, or where independent copiers 
could easily make their wares available to customers, copy-privilege 
might be fatal to authors' revenues. Yet the authors in both industries 
may have produced work that is equally valuable, and the authors them-
selves may be equally deserving and equally attached in an emotional 
sense to their work. Their future productivity might even be equally 
dependent on economic incentives. The impact of copy-privilege is no 
more sensitive to where economic need is greatest than it is to most 
other potentially relevant concerns. 
To the extent that nonproperty solutions mimic property-like re-
sults, they impose similar costs. Thus, for example, lead-time advan-
tage, marketing devices, and various institutional or technological 
arrangements can inhibit copying. Even if deadweight loss would be 
less in a copy-privilege regime than with copyright, there is no guaran-
tee that the loss that remained would be distributed in normatively ap-
propriate ways. And where nonproperty solutions did not avail 
authors, resulting in some inexpensive access to creative works, the de-
crease in cost would also be distributed in a largely arbitrary fashion 
among consumers.541 Except if administered on an individualized ba-
sis, which would likely be impractical,542 copy-privilege would not dis-
tribute the economic costs and benefits according to any systemic 
principle at all. 
By contrast, copyright and other forms of property fill in the gaps 
left by physical control and can be fine-tuned to match a particular view 
of desert or other normative strictures. A pure contract mode of alloca-
tion, unaccompanied by property rights, cannot easily reward behavior 
considered desirable by the polity or make secure those interests the 
polity judges worthy of protection. It can only award what the parties 
have power to extract from each other-power derived largely from 
tangible property rights-and then cannot protect this allocation from 
potentially significant third-party interference. Only a mixed regime543 
that incorporates the possibility of property rights can be molded to 
reflect appropriate notions of justice and be sensitive to the peculiar 
characteristics of intellectual works and the relationships surrounding 
them. 
Copy-privilege simply makes the contours of the physical world too 
541. Judge Breyer does, however, suggest that at least some of the impact of restraining 
copyright would be distributed in socially valuable ways. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra 
note 3, at, e.g., 315-16 (lower textbook prices). 
542. See text accompanying note 309 supra (low probability that Congress could fine-tune 
intellectual property entitlements on an ongoing basis). Fisher has conceded and shown by 
the complexity of the economic inquiry he outlines that the encouragement theorists' version 
of copy-privilege is highly unlikely to be a practical method for judges to use in solving individ-
ual controversies. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1739. 
543. Current copyright law is such a regime. 
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important. It accepts the patterns of compulsion and freedom gov-
erning that world as determinative and treats the interests of authors 
and users in the work as essentially irrelevant. The characteristics that 
determine the fate of creators and users in a world of copy-privilege 
have only an arbitrary relationship to either users' or creators' 
characteristics. 
Creativity is too important to human life, economically, psychologi-
cally, and culturally, to have its legal treatment subordinated to the 
legal policies regulating the tangible domain. Both creators and the 
persons who wish to use their works should have a right to demand that 
their entitlements be defined by societal notions of the proper interests 
of authors, artists, inventors, adapters, copiers, and audience, rather 
than being defined as accidental byproducts of laws created with other 
interests in mind. Some claims may merit granting a liberty to copy, 
such as claims based on free expression interests. Some claims of use 
may even merit intrusive pro-access measures, such as imposing emi-
nent domain or mandatory disclosure if lifesaving medical secrets are 
being hidden. Discrete policies should be set to accommodate the rele-
vant interests, but in copy-privilege the law treats most of the relevant 
interests as nonexistent. Copyright defenders thus can make one claim 
not open to the supporters of copy-privilege: It respects the autonomy 
of the intangible realm. 
* * * 
The initial sections of the article analyzed the components of copy-
right as a species of intangible property and showed the common struc-
ture underlying both intellectual and tangible property. Among other 
things, that discussion revealed that all property involves compulsion. 
Yet some observers, both lay and scholarly, perceive the compulsions 
that emanate from intellectual property law to be more unfair than the 
more familiar and thus less striking species of coercion that regulates 
the tangible realm.544 The article has shown, however, that copyright's 
compulsion is simply the same stuff of which all property is constituted. 
The two most likely regimes for regulating intangible works of au-
thorship are copyright and copy-privilege. In a world with copyright, 
persons who have not consented to restraints on their activities may 
find their liberty restrained, as they may be prohibited from copying 
physical things to which they have legitimate access. In a world of 
copy-privilege, users have greater liberty, but then creators would be 
subjected to a fate to which they have not consented. Although the 
544. For example, Palmer is willing to accept compulsions that stem from power over 
tangible property, such as the contractual promises not to copy that an author might be able 
to extract by virtue of his power over the physical embodiments of the work of authorship. See 
Palmer, supra note 6, at 291-95. He does not, however, appear willing to accept compulsions 
that have independent bases arising out of policies relating to intellectual products. See id. at 
263, 303·04. 
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sources of compulsion may be different under copyright and under 
copy-privilege, the problems are similar: One party wishes to do some-
thing to which the other party objects, and the law must choose be-
tween them. 
One could use many possible normative criteria to parse authors' 
and users' claims. In addition to examining claims based on "consent," 
I have examined the normative premises of most economically oriented 
copyright criticism and shown its weaknesses, particularly in regard to 
the use of an economic methodology blind to distributional considera-
tions and the dependence upon a belief that copyright is suspect be-
cause of its supposed inconsistency with the common law. I then 
suggested that the common law supports giving author- right to be 
rewarded for their efforts. I also argued that the first amendment and 
the common law provide, directly or analogically, independent sources 
upon which safeguards to protect nonowners' interests could be 
erected that are more finely tuned to the relevant issues than the safe-
guards the economic theorists could provide. In addition, a Paretian 
approach to economics, emphasizing reciprocity, is available to supple-
ment the public's privileges of use in ways that both respect authors' 
claims to deserve reward and promote the mutually beneficial in-
terchanges upon which cultural life depends. 
The Supreme Court has indicated an openness to arguments based 
on the notion that creative persons deserve a fair return for their labor. 
In forthcoming articles I explore the nature of such desert claims and 
the extent to which they might justify particular forms of legal entitle-
ment. 545 As I suggested briefly earlier in this article, I do believe both 
that authors deserve some reward for their labor and that their desert 
claims have a weight that the law should take into account. But adop-
tion of such desert-based arguments is not essential. What is essential 
is that the choice between author and user should be made on some 
considered judgment of the merits, not on the basis of happenstance 
and serendipity as would occur in a realm of copy-privilege. The realm 
of copy-privilege has an arbitrariness that renders it an unacceptable 
method for governing creative works. 
545. See generally W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14; W. Gordon, Restitutionary 
Impulse, supra note 55. 

